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Abstract 
 
The diffusion of the neoliberal Silicon Valley venture capital (“VC”) model seems to be another 
case of convergence on neoliberal orthodoxy as the spread of Silicon Valley replication ambitions is 
ubiquitous. But, when looking under the veneer of the Silicon Valley VC policy diffusion trend, I 
find that VC policy diffusion is not a story of “universal convergence.” Though more than 40 states 
deployed VC policies in an attempt to create local Silicon Valleys, the policies they implemented 
took different, and interventionist, forms. This thesis seeks explain why variance, rather than 
convergence, characterizes the diffusion of this clear, successful model. 
 
Diffusion scholarship has made initial attempts at theorizing why and how diffusion does not lead 
to complete convergence. This thesis contributes to this growing body of work by conceptualizing 
and investigating how bounded rationality drives incomplete convergence. To do this, the thesis 
extends Kurt Weyland’s work on cognitive biases to by testing how five economic management 
norms shape the Silicon Valley VC policy diffusion: (1) pre-existing norms guiding state 
intervention, (2) private sector financing norms, (3) preferences for supporting large or small 
companies, (4) international versus local company support preferences and (5) bank or capital 
market preferences. The five economic management norms are drawn on to develop East Asian 
comparative typologies (Nightwatch-man State, Private Sector Promoter, Financier and Director 
and Command Economy) to test the impact of the norms in specific cases. This thesis also tests 
state-of-the-art diffusion literature’s hypotheses about the sources of variance in the diffusion 
process, namely: the impact of multiple diffusion items, diffusion items’ levels of specificity and 
diffusion mechanisms. 
 
Empirically, this thesis provides a large-N dataset of forty-six countries' VC policies and four East 
Asian case study analyses (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam). The case studies reveal 
how, in the face of competitive pressures, three of the five economic management norms propelled 
policymakers to choose unique policy formula. As a result, this thesis concludes that Tip O’Neill’s 
presumption that “all politics is local” rings true in policy diffusion. 
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
 This is a story of policy diffusion
1
 in which a clear, successful policy model was transmitted 
via learning and competition mechanisms. The ending of this diffusion story, according to 
mainstream diffusion research, should be the spread of policies similar to the source model. Yet, 
this diffusion story has an unexpected ending as universal convergence has not occurred. 
Transformation and variance, rather than complete convergence, characterizes the way in which 
adopting states design local versions of the policy model. The objective of this thesis is to uncover 
why variety, rather than universal convergence, has resulted from what should be a textbook case of 
diffusion driving policy convergence. 
  
 This puzzling case of diffusion emanates from the Silicon Valley
2
 venture capital (“VC”) 
ecosystem.
3
 The Silicon Valley model has attracted international policymakers’ interest in 
“developing their own venture capital industries” as a means to support local innovation, 
competitiveness and high-technology entrepreneurial activity since the early 1980s (Gulinello, 
2005: 846). Internationally adopted “Silicon” monikers demonstrate the global diffusion of the 
                     
1
 As will be further defined in Chapter 2, diffusion is defined as “as any process in which the prior adoption of a trait or 
practice alters the probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters” (Strang, 1991: 335). 
 
2
 Silicon Valley is an area south of San Francisco, CA, specifically Santa Clara County, which is centered around 
Stanford University. The term “silicon” is used to describe the region because of the original density of silicon chip (a 
personal computer component) manufacturers in the area. Silicon Valley gained in notoriety by the early 1980s given 
the successful technology firms, start-ups and investors based there. 
 
3 
Though VC investment activity started to take place on both sides of the Atlantic around the time of World War II, it 
was the VC market centered in the US Silicon Valley that achieved world-renown “exceedingly attractive” returns by 
the 1970s (Lerner, 2009: 29). The success achieved by VC managers in the US came in tandem with the global high-
technology industry’s growth and high-technology companies’ unprecedented initial public offering (“IPO”) valuations. 
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Silicon Valley model. A few examples include the “Silicon Roundabout” in London, Taiwan’s4 
“Silicon Island,” Australia’s “Silicon Beach,” Israel’s “Silicon Wadi,” Chile’s “Chilecon Valley,” 
Hong Kong’s “Silicon Harbor” and the “Silicon Alley” in New York City.  
 
 More than just a catch phrase, policymakers’ desire to develop their local “Silicon Valley” 
translated into an estimated USD 3 billion spent annually by Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) governments by the mid-1990s (OECD, 1997). 
Singaporean policymakers, for example, recognized “the importance of venture capital financing in 
the success of countries such as the US,” so the Singaporean government “placed particular 
emphasis on the development of a venture capital industry in Singapore to boost the development of 
high technology start-ups and entrepreneurship” (Bruton et al., 2002: 199). Another (perhaps 
unlikely) adopter is Russia; in 2006 Russian policymakers launched a USD 1 billion fund of VC 
fund (“FoVCF”) and in 2010 Russian President Dimitry Medvedev launched an initiative to turn 
Skolkovo, a suburb of Moscow, into the “Russian Silicon Valley” (Basich, 2010: 1).  
 
In Russia, as in elsewhere, building a local VC industry is a central tenant of the Silicon 
Valley replication efforts. To this end, the Silicon Valley duplication formula has been said to 
consist of the following: 
 
select a hot industry, build a science park next to a research university, provide 
subsidies and incentives for chosen industries to locate there, and create a pool of 
venture capital (Wadhwa, 2013; Italics added for emphasis). 
 
This thesis focuses on the international diffusion of policies aimed at the last element in this Silicon 
Valley formula: policies deployed to create a local VC industry.
5
 My thesis research finds that more 
than 41 countries (out of a 46 country sample) have studied and deployed VC policies, across a 
                     
4
 The Republic of China (“ROC”), also known as Chinese Taipei, is referred to as Taiwan throughout this thesis.  
 
5
 Hereafter, policies aimed at the local VC industry, as detailed in Chapter 2, are referred to as “VC policies.” 
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range of neoliberal and socialist states across the globe, including Russia and Canada, France and 
the UK, China, and Chile.
6
 Figure 1.1 illustrates the output of my research, which is a trend of 41 
states launching VC policies.  
 
Figure 1.1: State Launches of VC policy Efforts (Cumulative Number 1979 – 2012) 
 
Sources: European Venture Capital Association (“EVCA”), Latin American Venture Capital Association (“LAVCA”), 
European Union, OECD, World Bank and individual country sources. Methodology: Chart indicates initial VC policy 
launch date and represents the cumulative number of VC policy launches. Sample is all OECD, G-20, BRICs and Asian 
Tiger countries (46 states
7
). 41 states (nearly 90%) had launched some form of VC policy by 2012.  
 
The pace of VC policy diffusion, as illustrated in Figure 1.1, increased in the 1990s and has been 
global as VC policies have been adopted by European, Middle Eastern, North and South American 
                     
6
 See Section 1.3, Research Methodology, for further explanation of what is included in the large-N dataset. 
 
7
 The 46 states included in the large-N sample are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan (Chinese Taipei), Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and Vietnam. 
   
United States Taiwan France, 
Indonesia 
Denmark 
Australia, Hong Kong, Korea 
Canada, 
European Union 
Finland Sweden 
Austria, India, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom 
Hungary, Norway, 
New Zealand 
Russia 
Brazil, Portugal, Turkey, 
China 
Slovenia 
 
Year in which VC policy launched 
Laggards Majority Early-adopters 
Israel, Ireland, 
IADB Funds 
(Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico) 
Spain, Japan, 
Singapore 
Belgium, 
Greece 
Netherlands, Poland, Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg, Czech Republic 
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and Asian states. In recent years, the late developers of the BRICs
8
 and Eastern European countries 
launched VC policies. The VC policy adoption pattern evidenced in Figure 1.1 is expected to result 
in an S-shaped curve over time as the universe of potential adopters diminishes (Rogers, 1995).  
 
VC policy diffusion may seem to be another story of “universal convergence” (Kuczynski 
and Williamson, 2003: 325). As illustrated in Figure 1.1, at least 41 states – across geographical, 
regime type and economic structure divisions – adopted some form of VC policy. But, when I 
looked beneath the veneer of the general VC policy diffusion trend, I found that VC policy choices 
have not converged on replicating the neoliberal policy environment that fostered the Silicon Valley 
VC industry’s growth.9 Rather, the Silicon Valley-inspired VC policies deployed outside of the US 
have been markedly more interventionist than Silicon Valley’s hands-off environment. The 
internationally adopted VC policy choices consist of overt, and differing, means to attract private 
capital, including VC industry-specific tax credits, regulatory incentives and FoVCFs.  
 
What’s more, even states of similar population and economic sizes, which are 
geographically proximate and at comparable levels of industrialization, have not made similar VC 
policy choices. Instead, even amongst proximate cultural and regional peers there have been 
significant variations in their interventionist VC policy choices. As a testament to the diversity that 
characterizes this diffusion pattern, in my assessment of the large data set represented in Figure 1.1, 
no countries were found to have identical VC policy forms. To be sure, although Silicon Valley VC 
policy diffusion resulted in 41 states deploying VC policies, the adopting states have deployed 
unique, interventionist tools rather than replicas of Silicon Valley’s neoliberal environment. 
                     
8
 BRICs is the term coined by Goldman Sachs chief economist Jim O’Neill in his 2001 paper entitled “The World 
Needs Better Economic BRICs” to refer to the high-growth economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China. He argues 
that these four developing economies will be four of the world’s top economies by 2050.  
 
9 The Silicon Valley VC policies will be further discussed in Chapter 2. As a brief introduction, the Silicon Valley 
policy environment for its VC cluster has included American regulations, particularly the limited partnership structure 
and the 1979 regulatory reinterpretation that allowed pension funds to invest in the asset class. It has not consisted of 
more region-specific incentives or regulations. See Avnimelech and Teubal (2004) for further discussion of the Silicon 
Valley VC policy, beyond the discussion in the following section and in Chapter 2. 
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 The cross-national variance in VC policy choices is puzzling because in international 
political economy (“IPE”) diffusion research, competitive pressures should propel the adoption of 
similar policies amongst geographic clusters (e.g. Elkins and Simmons, 2005). Scholarship on 
diffusion’s learning mechanism hypothesizes that if rational policymakers obtain information about 
a highly successful model from outside their region, they will converge in their beliefs and then 
“they will make the same policy choices” (Meseguer, 2009: 216). Applying this logic, the diffusion 
of Silicon Valley policy information should result in policymakers replicating the neoliberal Silicon 
Valley regulatory environment. Shared competitive pressures and a similar desire to replicate a 
clear model, together, are expected to lead to convergence on Silicon Valley’s central policy 
components (ERISA-like regulations and use of the LP structure). But, similar, neoliberal Silicon 
Valley-like VC policy choices have not occurred across the large-N dataset, or within regions.  
 
 This brings me to this thesis’ central puzzle: why has the diffusion of Silicon Valley VC 
policy information resulted in varied, and interventionist, VC policy choices rather than 
convergence on neoliberal regulatory environments? To answer this question I investigate the 
sources of transformation and variation in the diffusion of Silicon Valley VC policy information. 
Using an East Asian cluster of states as a lens to examine the impact of local contexts on diffusion 
outcomes, I aim to explain why, even though there is a clear model spread primarily via competitive 
pressures and policy learning, there has not been “universal convergence” on Silicon Valley’s 
hands-off VC policy environment. In so doing, my thesis contributes to IPE’s understanding of the 
sources of diversity amidst convergence. 
 
This chapter proceeds by introducing the thesis’ analytical framework, research 
methodology and case selection. Section 1.2 introduces the thesis’ analytical framework for 
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investigating the sources of variance in the VC policy diffusion process.
10
 It introduces my 
extension of bounded learning tools to investigate the role of domestic norms in shaping policy 
diffusion and identifies diffusion scholarship’s state-of-the-art tools for examining diversity 
amongst convergence. Section 1.3 then outlines the research methodology, which is qualitative, 
including the compilation of the large-N VC policy choice dataset and four case study analyses. 
Section 1.4 explains the rationale behind the selection of the East Asian cluster, and the specific 
cases of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam. Finally, Section 1.5 concludes the chapter 
and outlines the structure of the thesis, including the sequence and aims of the VC policy, literature 
review, analytical framework, case study, analysis and conclusion chapters. 
 
1.2. Analytical Framework 
 
 As previously mentioned, diffusion scholarship has focused on how diffusion processes 
drive broad convergence trends. To this end, diffusion scholars argue that the spatial and temporal 
clustering of policies, government regime types, etc. shows that there is increasingly less scope for 
unique policy choices (Simmons et al, 2008; Busch and Jörgens, 2005; Holzinger and Knill, 2005). 
In this way, policy diffusion research contributes to IPE scholarship through its identification of 
mechanisms behind policy interdependence. However, diffusion scholarship has paid insufficient 
attention to important components of the diffusion process, particularly domestic contexts 
(Lenschow, et al 2005; Painter and Yeo, 2011: 378). As a result, diffusion frameworks help to 
explain only a part of an interesting phenomenon: interdependent, but diverse, policy choices. 
                     
10 Prior to the empirical investigation of VC policy conducted within this thesis, there had not yet been an investigation 
into the drivers behind the spread of VC policies. Existing academic research on VC policy primarily comes from 
business schools and IOs, and focuses on describing the laws, tax incentives or outputs of policies in certain regions 
(see Da Rin, et al, 2013 for a recent VC literature review). Harvard Business School professor Josh Lerner is 
particularly well published on the topic of VC policy. Notably, his analysis of public efforts to drive entrepreneurship, 
Boulevard of Broken Dreams (2009), examines the policy components that have aided and undermined VC market 
building attempts across a number of countries and American states. Recent studies from public policy and economics 
departments have applied “institutional frameworks” to explain differences in VC firms’ operations or differences in 
VC activity levels across countries (see Bruton et al 2002; Li and Zahra, 2010). IOs and regional organizations have 
conducted numerous studies on the role of VC in the economy and have published research on how states can support 
VC markets (see European Commission, 1995; OECD, 1996; UNCTAD, 1997; OECD, 2003). 
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Diffusion research’s quantitative bias has led to its inability to articulate how the diffusion 
process leads to limited degrees of convergence (Dobbin et al, 2007: 463). Diffusion scholarship 
has largely focused on explaining broad patterns of convergence (Levi-Faur et al, 2011: 1345), 
rather than employing qualitative case study examinations (Poulsen, 2011). For example, in her 
research on the diffusion of liberal market reforms, Meseguer (2009: 1) acknowledges that there 
had been “differences in the timing of reforms, in their speed and intensity, and in their results,” but 
the aim of her study was “not to explain those differences.” As a result of diffusion scholars’ focus 
on large-N trends, quantitative studies have not identified specific choices.
11
 This has also resulted 
in diffusion scholarship not delving into the causal chain by which elements of the diffusion process 
contribute to varying policy choices (Weyland, 2006: 14).  
 
 On the other hand, comparative capitalist
12
 frameworks, such as Varieties of Capitalism 
(“VoC”) (Hall and Soskice, 2001), identify how different institutional complementarities propel the 
persistence of various forms of capitalist systems despite global competitive pressures. In this way, 
VoC scholars argue that global economic forces are “crucially intermediated by social and political 
institutions and by policy discourses” (Walter and Zhang, 2012: 60). However, while institutional 
research programs explore the role of domestic institutions and path dependency (Skocpol and 
Weir, 1985), these models fail to account for the role of international factors in policy choices and 
changes (Knill, 2005).
13
 Comparative capitalism frameworks therefore struggle to explain the 
                     
11
 With that said, there are a number of important diffusion research projects that have either pursued relatively small-N 
investigations (e.g. Weyland, 2006) or have paired large-N examinations with case study research (e.g. Meseguer, 
2009’s use of Costa Rica as an illustrative case study). 
 
12
 The term “Comparative Capitalism” includes the VoC, comparative institutional, NSI and comparative business 
systems research programs (this umbrella term includes the works of  Whitley, 1992; Walter and Zhang, 2012: Witt and 
Redding, 2013 and others). These comparative programs together offer hypotheses as to the roles of institutional 
settings as drivers of market structures and performance. Comparative capitalism tools are typically deployed to explain 
tripartite institutional complementaries’ impact on market activity and performance, not policymakers’ policy choices 
(Crouch, 2009; Walter and Zhang, 2012). 
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occurrence of interdependent policy change that diffusion scholarship accounts for. 
 
In light of the complementary strengths and weaknesses of the diffusion and comparative 
capitalism programs, this thesis fuses comparative capitalist tools into a diffusion framework. In 
doing so, this thesis’ framework identifies and differentiates the impact of local contexts on the 
diffusion process. As employed here, comparative capitalism tools offer typologies that guide an 
investigation of how, even in the face of external pressures and exposure to the same policy models, 
policymakers adapt policy items to fit their local context. In this way, my domestic norm-focused 
diffusion framework pays “attention to diffusion itself” (Solingen, 2012: 631). 
 
My analytical framework’s central hypothesis is that bounded learning drives adaptation in 
line with policymakers’ economic management norms. In doing so, my framework builds upon the 
work of Kurt Weyland (2006) regarding the way cognitive biases explain why and how different 
policy choices result from diffusion processes. Cognitive heuristics (anchoring, availability and 
representativeness) help “account for the spread of similarity and diversity,” which Weyland posits 
to be a “defining characteristic of policy diffusion” (Weyland, 2006: 8).14 In a critique of bounded 
learning, Meseguer supports my use of Weyland’s framework to explain variety. She argues that 
although the bounded learning framework: 
 
has been used to explain policy convergence, what one would actually expect is the 
opposite – that is, policymakers arriving at very different conclusions about the 
consequences of policies, and hence choosing divergent policies (Meseguer, 2009: 
19; Italics added for emphasis).  
 
Following from this logic, bounded rationality is employed here to explain the occurrence of 
                                                                    
13
 Crouch (2009: 85) discusses the debate about whether VoC has, and can, account for economic policy choices. He, 
importantly, notes that Iverson and Soskice (2006) did respond to this critique that VoC does not sufficiently account 
for policy choices by exploring how economic arrangements affect policy choices.  
14
 Please see Chapter 3 for the full discussion of the three cognitive heuristics. 
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different policy choices resulting from the diffusion process. My thesis’ framework extends the 
bounded learning theory by investigating how policymakers’ policy area-specific economic 
management norms drive each state to pursue unique policies, leading to limited, rather than full, 
convergence across adopters. The five economic management norms delineated and investigated in 
this thesis are: (1) pre-existing interventionist orientation, (2) private sector financing norms, (3) 
international or local firm preferences, (4) large or small firm preferences and (5) bank or capital 
market preferences. In developing these context specific norms, my thesis employs Weyland’s 
cognitive biases in a more domestically-rooted direction.  
 
To endow greater analytical power on the five economic management norms, I employ them 
to formulate comparative typologies for East Asia. I delineate my own typologies because 
comparative capitalism literature does not sufficiently delineate national institutional arrangements 
within East Asia (Storz and Schafer, 2011). Much of existing comparative capitalism’s coverage of 
East Asia has thus far focused on a singular type, based upon analyses of Japan, Korea or China 
(see Amable, 2003; Aoki, Jackson and Miyajima, 2007; Levechevalier, 2011, Storz and Schafer, 
2011).
15
 As evidence of comparative capitalism’s myopia, Amable (2003) developed the 
comparative capitalism’s singular “Asian model,” that effectively only describes the Korean and 
Japanese models and Soskice only offered a similar “group-coordinated East Asian economies” 
type (Crouch, 2009: 85).  
 
In this way, the comparative capitalisms literature assumes that strongly interventionist 
Asian states promote national champions (keiretsu or chaebols). Therefore, they overlook the 
diversity of systems and focus on state relations with large firms rather than state relations with 
SMEs. These oversights impair the comparative capitalism theory’s ability to guide investigations 
in East Asia for two reasons. First, East Asian policymakers’ norms have not all been MNC or 
                     
15
 Recently there have been attempts to rectify this deficiency. For example, Witt and Redding (2013) provides an 
account of numerous different types of business systems, using the VoC lens, across Asia. 
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national champion focused. There are East Asian systems centered on start-ups (e.g. Taiwan
16
) as 
well as states that prefer neoliberal approaches (e.g. Hong Kong). Second, and importantly to the 
VC policy area, these existing typologies do not delineate policymaker preferences for small or 
large firms. Since VC policy is closely related to local SME support, existing comparative 
capitalism typologies do not account for policymakers’ SME-focused norms. 
 
At the other extreme, some comparative capitalisms research delineating differences in East 
Asian systems are criticized for being too specific.
17
 These carefully delineated, and perhaps overly 
descriptive, types come from the East Asian business systems and national innovation systems 
(“NIS”) research (Whitley, 1999, 1992; Johnson, 1982; Witt and Redding, 2013) as well as East 
Asia-specific, and nuanced, VoC efforts (Walter and Zhang, 2012). Such accounts describe 
individual states; Whitley (1992), for example, develops characteristics of the business systems in 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Other typologies articulate institutional subsets 
(business systems, financial architectures, and labor market regimes) for several East Asian settings 
(such as Co-governed, State-led, Networked and Personalized) (Walter and Zhang, 2012: 8-17).  
 
To remedy these deficiencies, my East Asian typologies more fully acknowledge and 
differentiate the SME-financing relevant economic management norms in East Asia. In this way, 
the typologies are derived from differences in informal institutions (economic management norms). 
Together, the typologies cover the neoliberal to statist range of economic management norms 
(related to small firms and capital market support) across the non-Japan, China or Korea states in 
East Asia. The East Asian typologies developed here include the Nightwatch-man state, the Private 
Sector Promoter, the Financier and Director, and the Command Economy.  
 
                     
16
 Given the focus of the Taiwanese institutional context on SME production, Taiwan has been labelled “SME-Oriented 
Capitalism” in academic research (Chapter 12 in Witt and Redding, 2013). 
 
17
 In addition to this critique, these more descriptive typologies also do not address SMEs or the four East Asian states 
investigated in this research project. 
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Though the role of economic management norms in the diffusion process is my focus, this 
thesis also tests hypotheses from recent diffusion scholarship that identify sources of variance in the 
diffusion process (see Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer, 2014 for review of this state-of-the-art 
literature). To this end, Chapter 3 unpacks diffusion literature’s hypotheses for policymakers’ 
adaptations of policy items as a result of multiple policy items (see Falkner and Gupta, 2009) and 
varying levels of specificity (see Weyland, 2006; Lenshow et al, 2005). Briefly, the diffusion 
scholarship’s hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 are that the existence of multiple policy items, and 
less specific policy items, are likely to drive diverse outcomes. In contrast, single models that are 
highly specific blueprints are expected to lead to more convergence.  
 
To draw this section to a close, I summarize the three primary hypotheses that my thesis tests: 
 
1) Policymakers’ economic management norms are the central force shaping states’ 
unique bounded learning processes – beginning with agenda setting, to research, evaluation and 
policy design – to ultimately make policy items “fit” local environments. 
2) Multiple diffusion items, and less specific diffusion items, contribute to variance.  
3) Economic structures in this empirical area (SME activity levels and the bank vs. capital 
market character of financial sector) determine the timing of VC policy diffusion. 
 
 In advancing these hypotheses, I aim to challenge the globalization thesis. The globalization 
literature argues that there will be convergence on neoliberal policies as a result of states’ 
competitive pressures to attract and retain capital (see Garrett, 1998; Strange, 1996; Mosley, 2000; 
Goodman and Pauly, 1993; Haggard and Maxfield, 1996; Keohane and Milner, 1996).
18
 Given the 
diversity of policies in this empirical area – particularly amongst regional clusters – the 
                     
18 Scholars on the other side of the states versus markets debate have found that the state may still have “room to move” 
(Mosley, 2000) or is not experiencing a positive or negative change in its power. Instead, they have argued that states 
are experiencing a transformation into an economic actor expected to deploy some level of industrial policy (Cerny, 
2005; Rodrik, 2004; Spencer and Brander, 2001).  
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globalization hypothesis does not explain my diversity amidst convergence large-N VC policy 
outcome. The patchwork shape of VC policy choices – in which neoliberal states have adopted 
direct funding tools while developmental states have resisted government funding, and in which 
regional clusters have myriad of funding, tax and regulatory strategies – the competition mechanism 
has not had a uniform impact. The competition mechanism’s inability to explain the shape of the 
VC policy diffusion trend led me to formulate an alternative hypothesis: that each state’s learning 
process, guided by local policymakers’ economic management norms, propels the adoption of VC 
policies with the same objective (to create a local version of the Silicon Valley VC cluster) but with 
different specifications in line with each local normative context. 
 
1.3. Research Methodology 
 
Consistent with the objective outlined by King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 7), my research 
“seeks to make descriptive and causal inferences about the world.” In this vein, my thesis brings 
qualitative arguments and description to an under-researched issue: the diffusion of information on 
the Silicon Valley policy environment. To investigate this phenomenon, I pursue two stages of 
research. The first stage is a large-N canvassing of international VC policy choices and the second 
stage consists of a small-N dive into four case studies.  
 
The first component of my research is the compilation of a large-N dataset of the VC 
policies deployed in 46 ICT market competing countries (OECD members, G-20 states, the Asian 
Tigers
19
 and Vietnam). The dataset of national VC policies includes specific details on the funding, 
taxation and regulatory components of each of the (41) states that deployed VC policies. The 
dataset is contained in an Excel spreadsheet, organized by region (The Americas, Europe, Middle 
East and Africa, and Asia Pacific). Within each regional tab, there are country-specific columns that 
                     
19
 Asian Tigers are Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Korea (World Bank, 1994). 
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detail the following information for each country: the date that each VC policy element was 
deployed and the precise specifications across the tax, regulatory and funding VC policy elements 
(see Annex I for a sample of the dataset’s contents). To compile this broad, detailed dataset I 
consulted a number of sources, including VC industry associations, such as the EVCA, the NVCA, 
and the LAVCA, international organizations (the OECD, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
“APEC,” and the Inter-American Development Bank “IADB”), the European Investment Fund, 
government agencies and academic literature.  
 
Within the large-N dataset, the following details are specified. For the funding category, 
each column specifies the FoVCFs’ launch dates, names, AuM, repayment terms, other terms and 
international versus domestic VC manager requirements. In addition, the dataset indicates whether 
each country has directly managed VC funds, rather than a FoVCF. For the VC tax policy details, 
the dataset specifies the tax rate that VC managers are subject to, as well as any tax credits for VC 
managers or investors. The regulatory section details the structures available (LP structure or paper 
company, for example) as well as any variations on these structures from the Anglo-American LP 
model. The regulatory rows also identify restrictions on the ability of investors to access the VC 
asset class to determine whether an ERISA-like regulatory change has been made. Finally, the 
regulatory section identifies if and when a national VC industry association was formed and the 
details of any second tier, or technology SME-focused, stock exchanges.  
 
The large-N data is not analyzed quantitatively; instead, the large-N dataset frames this 
research project. The large-N dataset reveals the global VC policy diffusion pattern as diversity 
amongst convergence, since 41 of the 46 states were found to have deployed varied VC policies. As 
mentioned in the earlier discussion of Figure 1.1, the VC policies identified in the large-N data 
collection vary in numerous ways – within regions, culturally similar states, and amongst states of 
similar regime type. They vary in terms of the FoVCF terms, by giving different amounts of money 
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to the initiative, by requiring different repayment terms, and by requiring local or international 
partners. Furthermore, numerous states were found to have not deployed any FoVCF, and instead 
either managed VC funds directly, or chose not to manage any VC-related funds at all.  
 
On the tax front, the large-N dataset found a potpourri of states offering tax credits – either 
for investments made, or losses suffered – and different tax rates for VC profits. The regulatory 
front has seen large degrees of variation, as the LP structure has not been universally adopted, and 
even when adopted, there has been adaptation towards a local form. ERISA-like regulations that 
allow institutional investors to invest in the VC asset class, which were credited with much of 
Silicon Valley’s success, were only employed in a handful of cases. More commonly, restrictions 
have persisted for local investment managers, particularly related to their ability to obtain funding 
from, or sell their portfolio companies to, international investors. 
 
In light of the large range of adaptations found in the large-N dataset, and the finding that no 
two states have deployed the same combination of VC policies, the large-N research was essential 
to establishing the thesis’ narrative: numerous policymakers have deployed VC policies in an effort 
to build their own Silicon Valley-like VC cluster, but they have all done so differently. The large-N 
dataset compilation also helped me to develop categories that encompass the range of VC policy 
instruments that have been deployed by 41 states. By tracking what has been deployed across the 
globe, I am able to (1) ensure that this thesis presents the full range of VC policy choices made and 
(2) categorize this complete range of VC policy elements. 
 
To properly investigate the precise drivers of the diversity amidst convergence trend, the 
lion’s share of my research focused on small N, in-depth, qualitative case studies. I investigated the 
impact of the diffusion process on VC policy choices in four case studies within a regional cluster: 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Vietnam (case selection rationale is discussed in Section 1.4). 
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In line with the central hypothesis of my research project, my case study research primarily focuses 
on examining the role of five economic management norms in shaping VC policymaking, beginning 
with their impact on agenda setting through to policy evaluation, design and implementation. To 
test the existing diffusion literature’s theories, I also examined the role of the diffusion mechanisms 
(competition, coercion, learning and emulation), as well as the existence of multiple diffusion items 
and diffusion items of varying levels of specificity. My small-N research of these factors began with 
a review of primary government communiqués and reports as well as academic and IO literature.  
 
Then, given that my research primarily focuses on policymakers’ economic management 
norms, I conducted 46 semi-structured interviews with policymakers, VC managers, VC industry 
association leaders, IOs, academics, angel investors, and high-tech entrepreneurs. My sample of 
interviewees was determined through a two-step process. First, I identified the senior policymakers 
responsible for VC policymaking in each case study. For example, in Singapore I identified the 
policymaker in the 1990s committee that launched the funding component of the government’s 
Technopreneurship-21 initiative, and then went on to manage the government FoVCF. In three out 
of four states,
20
 I interviewed these senior VC policymakers to ascertain which VC policy models 
they studied, how they acquired their information and then how and why they pursued their specific 
VC policy choice. The goal of these few, but high-profile, interviews was to understand the VC 
policy diffusion process from inception to outcome, so it was of primary importance that I speak 
with the key individuals, rather than many policymakers each offering glimpses into the process. 
 
I then employed a snowballing technique to identify additional interview subjects in each 
case (see Clark, 2006: 419 for a discussion of snowballing methodology). At the end of each 
interview, I asked my interviewee which two or three other policymakers or industry participants 
                     
20
 In Taiwan, the senior VC policymaker was K.T. Li who is deceased. In this case I sought out policymakers who were 
close contemporaries of K.T. Li who were able to share insights into the influences and processes surrounding K.T. Li’s 
VC policymaking in the early 1980s. For more recent Taiwanese VC policymaking, however, I was able to speak 
directly with the individuals responsible. 
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that they felt were critical to the VC policymaking process, or had interesting insights into the 
agenda-setting, evaluation, and design segments of the VC policymaking process. I then followed 
up on these referrals to conduct the next round of interviews in each case, and repeated the same 
procedure of asking for another few referrals from these contacts. When I felt that I had reached the 
point of saturation, I stopped conducting interviews.  
 
1.4. Case Selection 
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, diffusion research often examines how policies diffuse to 
and within geographically or culturally proximate clusters (see Simmons and Elkins, 2004; 
Meseguer, 2008; Weyland, 2006). Spatially-organized diffusion analyses contend that policies 
diffuse in a certain manner because of their co-location. Given that my research project aims to 
extend diffusion theory, I chose my case studies in a similar manner to the majority of diffusion 
studies: as a geographic cluster. In so doing, my research project investigates VC policy diffusion 
from Silicon Valley to one specific cluster, rather than to some other cross-section of states.
21
 By 
exploring the sources of varied policy choices within one cluster I believe my research best 
contributes to policy diffusion literature.  
 
In order to choose which region to investigate, I turned to my large-N dataset to identify a 
geographic cluster that adopted varying VC policies, including at least one state that has not (yet) 
adopted a VC policy. Then, since my primary hypothesis is that different economic management 
norms are essential to diffusion, I sought a cluster of states that consisted of notably different 
economic management norms. The idea being that the clearly different economic management 
norms would not just lead to variance across the cluster of states, but that each state’s policymakers 
                     
21 
An alternative case selection would not hold geographic or cultural proximity as the defining characteristic, and 
would instead choose comparative states according to size (e.g. Katzenstein, 1985) or economic competitiveness (e.g. 
Breznitz, 2007).  
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economic management norms would propel their VC policy choices to fit their local environment. 
 
These criteria led to the selection of a regional cluster whose policymakers’ possess 
different economic management norms as well as states that adopted VC policies at different stages: 
the East Asian states of Taiwan (early), Hong Kong (mid), Singapore (mid) and Vietnam (late / 
non-adopter).
22
 As previously mentioned, though IPE literature often groups the East Asian states 
together as interventionist states that “govern the market” (Wade, 1990), the region offers economic 
management norm variety; after all, it includes the “most free economy in the world!”23 The four 
East Asian case studies range from the “most free economy” of Hong Kong, to Taiwan’s focus on 
tax supports for local SMEs, to Singapore’s financing to attract international firms to the 
Vietnamese state’s historic public command of production.24 While no real world cases are ever 
perfectly comparable, through this selection process I found sufficient similarities as well as 
analytically important differences in the East Asian cluster.  
 
The East Asian VC policies implemented as a result of policymakers’ studies are markedly 
different from one another. Hong Kong’s VC policy efforts include the offering of the LP structure 
and deploying a USD 100 million FoVCF that paid a management fee to established VC managers 
in 1998. Taiwan, in contrast, launched a 20% tax credit for VC investors in 1983, used a paper 
company structure and extended its first official FoVCF as a bilateral initiative of USD 160 million 
with New Zealand in 2012. Singapore deployed a tax credit only for start-up investment losses and 
adopted the LP structure in 2002. Singaporean policymakers also deployed an internationally-
                     
22
 Latin America was the other final cluster choice, but since the IADB had launched a FoVCF for several states 
(Argentina, Mexico and Chile) in the region, the VC policy choices of each individual state would have been muddied.  
 
23
 The Heritage Economic Freedom Index has ranked Hong Kong the most free economy in the world for more than 15 
years. 
 
24
 The fourth Asian Tiger (Korea) was not selected in light of its economic management norm similarities with 
Singapore in terms of its large firm preferences and private sector financing as well as its similar timing of VC policy 
adoption. In addition, the existing comparative typologies for Asia have already depicted the Korean policymaking 
context, so my bringing the “Asian” typology focused on national champions would not have added to the further 
understanding of SME and capital market policymaking context in East Asia. Instead, I chose to investigate VC policy’s 
initial diffusion into Vietnam, as it offered a more unique normative environment and only initial VC policy diffusion. 
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focused USD 1 billion FoVCF in 1999, a domestically-inclined FoVCF in 2008 and offered 
permanent residency for Singaporean VC fund investors. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, yet 
again different to the other East Asian states, recently began leveraging donor funding to deploy 
preferential loans (not equity investments or FoVCFs) directly to its start-ups. 
 
The East Asian case studies were also chosen because empirical exploration of these cases is 
lacking. Kenney et al (2002) and Dietrich (2003) provided accounts of the national VC policies 
deployed across Asia Pacific countries. However, their findings are no longer comprehensive as 
they were conducted at least a decade ago. Furthermore, their studies detail the policy differences 
but do not explore the origins of East Asian VC policy choices. The four East Asian states and their 
ICT industrial policy choices have been examined by numerous scholars, including Alice Amsden’s 
(2001) ‘rise of the rest’ and Douglas Fuller’s (2010) exploration of Hong Kong’s laissez-faire 
limits. IPE research such as Dan Breznitz’s 2007 book on Innovation and the State and economic 
history books such as J. Megan Greene (2009) looked at VC policy as one product of the Origins of 
the Developmental State in Taiwan. Yet, these closest accounts do not investigate the origins of 
East Asian VC policies.  
 
1.5. Conclusion 
 
This thesis investigates the puzzle of why diffusion drove varied, interventionist VC policy 
choices, rather than convergence on a Silicon Valley-like VC policy environment. What’s more, it 
examines why variety occurred despite policymakers’ learning efforts in response to similar 
competitive pressures and shared desires to replicate Silicon Valley. In order to explain the 
occurrence of this puzzling diffusion outcome, the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 introduces 
the VC policy area including the VC asset class, VC policies, VC policy diffusion items and VC 
policy diffusion intermediaries. Chapter 3 develops existing diffusion scholarship’s 
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conceptualization about sources of diversity in the diffusion process, including the impact of 
multiple policy items and their varying levels of specificity. I also further delineate the 
hypothesized impact that the four policy diffusion mechanisms are expected to have on policy 
choices. Then Chapter 4 develops hypotheses for the domestic sources of policy variance in East 
Asia. The analytical framework developed in Chapter 4 focuses on the Weyland-inspired use of 
economic management norms in shaping bounded learning processes, and also delineates the formal 
institutions and economic structures of each state.  
 
Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 examine the sources of VC policy choices in Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Vietnam. The case study chapters are analytically guided accounts of how specific 
elements of the policy diffusion process impact each state’s unique VC policy choice. Though the 
same factors are examined in each case study, the relative weight of discussion for the factors varies 
according to the role that the factors play in each case. As an example, if the coercion mechanism 
was not found to be at work in a case, I do not deliberate over why it was not present. Instead, the 
case study chapters present the factors that matter most in each case. Chapter 9 examines the case 
study findings by comparing results and identifying themes across the empirical investigations. 
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis by applying the findings to larger IPE debates and outlining areas 
for further bounded rationality theory development and empirical research. 
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2. VC Policy 
 
2.1 Venture Capital: History and Macroeconomic Importance  
 
The working definition of VC in this thesis is “financial capital provided to start-up companies 
(“start-ups”) with high growth potential in exchange for equity (e.g. preferred stock) or equity-
related stakes.” Within the capital markets sector, VC is a subset of the alternative investment class 
of “private equity,” which refers to investments in companies that are not publicly traded (e.g. not 
listed on a stock exchange). VC constitutes a specific form of private equity, as it only includes 
investments in start-ups that often have small revenues and even negative profitability. In this way, 
VC managers are incentivized to invest in high-risk start-ups because of the potential for 
exponential returns as the start-up grows. Though VC investments have the potential for producing 
outstanding returns, VC is a risk-laden asset class given the lack of collateral,
25
 the illiquid nature of 
the investments
26
 and start-ups’ high failure rates. The early investment stages that VC managers 
participate in range from the Series A Round (which is effectively the investment stage after friends 
and family and angel investments) through to later stages of growth capital (which constitutes more 
mature companies seeking funding to expand their product line, geographic reach, etc.). Below, 
Table 2.1 outlines the various stages of start-up funding and how VC investments fit into the 
spectrum:  
 
                     
25
 What makes start-up equity-based investments even more risky is that there is little or no collateral provided by the 
start-up to their investors should they fail. In contrast, when banks make asset-based loans, such as mortgages, they are 
able to take ownership of the house (the asset) and sell it to help recoup their losses. In VC investments there is no such 
collateral available to VC managers so they are therefore more susceptible to total losses.  
 
26
 VC investments are illiquid, and therefore patient forms of investment, as they typically take at least five (maybe ten) 
years to mature so investors do not have public ways to liquidate (sell or cash out) of their investments over this time 
period (they could try to sell their stake to another private investor or back to the company management). Because of 
the long holding period, VC has ‘patient capital’ characteristics even though VC is focused on high-risk innovation that 
is more associated with impatient capital (e.g. stock market centric systems) (see Cumming, 2010: 306 for further 
discussion of the patient capital nature of VC investments).   
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Table 2.1: Early-Stage Funding 
Financing 
Stage 
Period 
Risk level Activity to be financed Typical Investor 
(years) 
Initial 
financing / 
Seed 
7-10 Extreme For supporting an idea or  
R&D for product 
development 
Friends, family, 
government grants and 
business angels 
Start up  
(Seed Round) 
5-9 Very high Initializing operations or 
developing prototypes 
Angel, government 
grants, seed funds  
First stage 
(A Round) 
3-7 High Start commercial 
production and marketing 
VC Managers 
Second stage 
(B Round) 
3-5 Medium to 
High 
Expand market & growing 
working capital need 
VC Managers 
Later stage 
(Growth 
Capital) 
1-3 Medium Market expansion, 
acquisition & product 
development 
Private Equity (or 
follow on rounds from 
VC Managers) 
Buy out-in / 
Mezzanine / 
IPO 
1-3 Low to 
Medium 
Acquisition financing Multi-national 
companies, private 
equity, and IPOs 
Source: MBA Knowledge Base 
 
In terms of the sectors in which VC managers invest, VC funds typically invest in technology, 
healthcare and biomedical start-ups. As an illustration, as of May 2012, the top sectors in terms of 
VC deals were as follows: internet 27%, healthcare 18%, software and related 14%, clean 
technology 9%, other information technology 7%, and telecoms and media 7% (Kenyon, 2012: 6). 
As this shows, VC managers primarily invest in technology-related, early-stage start-ups. 
 
Facebook provides an illustrative example of both the high risks that VC managers take 
when investing in high technology start-ups, and the huge returns they can earn when their 
investment is successful. Shortly after Mark Zuckerberg came up with the idea of an online 
yearbook at Harvard, his newly formed company, Facebook, needed capital to hire staff, buy 
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servers, and further develop the technology. As a result, the Facebook team sought early-stage 
funding. In 2004 they received investment from angel investor Peter Thiel (a PayPal co-founder) of 
USD 500k. Then a year later (in 2005) Accel Partners (a Silicon Valley-based VC manager) 
invested USD 12.7 million based on a USD 100 million valuation for the high-growth social 
network start-up (VentureBeat, 2012). The year that Accel invested was not a profitable one for 
Facebook. In fact, the company took a USD 3.6 million loss in 2005.  
 
Accel’s investment in a company making a loss exemplifies the early-stage, high-risk nature 
of VC managers’ investments in start-ups: VC funds provide significant sums of capital in exchange 
for equity, even when the company is not profitable, in the hopes that it will see exponential growth. 
Said another way, Accel’s investment of USD 12.7 million in Facebook bought them less than a 
15% ownership stake in a company operating at a loss. Obviously this investment represents a large 
amount of money given to a start-up company that may have failed, which could have resulted in 
Accel’s USD 12.7 million investment in Facebook vanishing into zero. But, in this case, within five 
years of their investment, Accel Partners sold an estimated one fifth of their Facebook equity at a 
USD 35 billion valuation – earning Accel a 350 times return given that their 2005 investment had 
been based upon a USD 100 million valuation (Arrington, 2010). 
 
Of course, not all the start-ups that VC managers invest in achieve outstanding returns on 
par with Accel’s investment in Facebook. Instead, VC managers diversify their portfolios of 
companies,
27
 expecting approximately 10% of the start-ups they invest in to outperform.
28
 To help 
increase their odds of success, VC managers reduce the information asymmetry inherent in private 
company investment by conducting extensive research on any company in which they would invest. 
                     
27
 The start-ups that VC firms are invested in are called “portfolio companies.” The singular of the term is used to refer 
to a specific company (portfolio company) and the terms “portfolio” or “portfolio of companies” are used to refer to the 
set of companies in which a VC manager is invested in.  
 
28
 The performance expectation in the VC industry is that one in ten investments produce very high returns, four out of 
ten produce moderate returns, and others produce negative returns or collapse completely. Outperformance in VC terms 
is typically thought of a five times return on investment. 
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Before they invest, VC managers conduct due diligence on many start-ups. In fact, VC managers on 
average invest in only 1% of all the start-ups they have received business plans from (Fenn, Liang, 
and Prowse, 1995). Then, after investing, VC managers closely monitor, provide expertise and 
make introductions for their portfolio companies. Though VC managers are highly selective and 
provide operational support to the start-ups they invest in, there is no guarantee that even 10% of 
their portfolio companies will outperform. Given the risky nature of VC investing, VC managers 
take significant equity stakes in the start-ups they invest in, averaging 30% ownership stakes and 
often requiring seats on the start-ups’ board of directors (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). In summary, 
VC investments are high-risk as VC managers make long-term, illiquid investments in start-ups that 
may fail, but in exchange VC funds take significant equity ownership stakes in promising, early-
stage start-ups that may produce exceptional returns. 
 
The formation of the first professional VC management firms first took place in the US and the 
UK around the time of WWII. The two entities most often cited as the first VC managers were in 
the United States: the American Research and Development Corporation (“ARD”) and J.H. 
Whitney and Company (Lerner, 2009: 9-12). On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, in 1945, a VC 
investment firm called 3i was formed by the British government with GBP 15 million in capital. 
These American and British pioneer VC entities represent the first time that the financial support of 
start-ups shifted out of the hands of high-net worth individuals (what we would today call “business 
angels”29) and into organized investment management businesses. Following in the footsteps of 
those early VC management firms, in 1958, Draper, Gaither, and Anderson launched the first fund 
that was LP structured (Gompers & Lerner, 1999: 7). The LP structure then quickly became the 
Anglo-American standard regulatory structure for VC funds. By the 1980s the VC industry had 
grown as it had performed remarkably well in the United States. Despite 3i’s success, the UK VC 
                     
29 Business angels are private, individual investors who invest in start-up companies. The amount of money that angels 
provide to start-ups is typically less than VC managers, and typically at an earlier stage of investment, as illustrated in 
Table 2.1. 
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market did not grow at the extraordinary rate as the American VC industry based in Silicon Valley.  
 
Since then, the VC market has grown from a cottage industry of a few hundred million to an 
industry with AuM of USD 100 billion across more than 500 funds by 2000 (Lerner, 2002). Despite 
the VC industry’s growth, its AuM is still relatively small in terms of global asset classes. For 
comparisons sake, at the end of 2012 the global hedge fund industry had nearly USD 2 trillion AuM 
(BarclayHedge, 2012) and sovereign wealth funds managed more than USD 5 trillion (SWF 
Institute, 2012). Despite its small stature, the VC industry is said to have a large, positive impact on 
economic activity (OECD, 1997). This sentiment is supported by the disproportionately large 
impact of VC investment on the American economy. More specifically, US-based VC AuM, which 
only accounts for 0.2% of US GDP, is said to have financed 21% of American GDP (NVCA, 2011).  
 
Spectacular returns earned in cases like Accel’s investment in Facebook, or Kleiner Perkins 
Caufield & Byers’ investment in Google and one of ARD’s investments that turned USD 50,000 
into USD 350 million, have brought significant attention to the VC asset class. In addition, some of 
today’s most ubiquitous global companies received VC support while still in the start-up stage. 
These include Facebook, Google and Genentech, which were all aided by VC financing, network 
introductions and operational expertise (Lerner, 2009: 28). As mentioned on page 14, as 
predecessors of these success stories achieved unprecedented IPO valuations, the VC market’s 
profile has grown as a result of these highly successful “exits.”30 Despite these successes, the VC 
industry’s preeminent think tank, the Kauffman Foundation, published a 2012 report demonstrating 
that for the last twenty years the average VC fund has failed to even return investors’ money after 
fees are accounted for (Malcahy, et al, 2012: 3-4). In this way, the great interest in the VC asset 
class has been a function of the perceived value that investors and policymakers have given to 
initial success and headline returns (like Accel’s return on their Facebook investment) rather than 
                     
30
 An “exit” is the way in which the VC investor gets out of an investment. Exits often come via IPOs or strategic 
acquisitions, where the VC funds’ ownership is bought by another investor.  
Robyn Klingler-Vidra 37 All Politics is Local 
 
rational analyses of the overall performance of the asset class.  
 
VC remained a predominantly American industry through the 1990s (Doidge, et al, 2011), 
but VC investments and high-technology firms’ IPO activity levels have become increasingly 
international (Aylward, 1998). The reduction in the American dominance of the VC industry has 
come as international VC markets have been growing at an average annual growth rate of 5% (Ha, 
2009). As a result, through 2008, 70% of the VC industry’s funding activity had taken place in 
North America, but by 2012 that percentage dropped to 61% (Kenyon, 2012: 11). As further 
evidence of the internationalization of the VC industry, the largest VC market per capita has been 
Israel (Senor and Singer, 2009) and key VC hubs now include China and India (Kenyon, 2012). 
Speaking to the scale of these key VC hubs outside the US, China-based VC managers raised USD 
5.4 billion in AuM in 2010 alone (BusinessWire, 2011). The growth of VC markets around the 
globe has been the result of a rise in cross-border investments as Western investors seek investment 
opportunities in high-growth markets, but also the product of the deployment of VC policies across 
a number of states.  
 
The VC policies that have helped facilitate the internationalization of the VC industry have 
been motivated by policymakers’ beliefs about the VC industry’s macroeconomic importance. More 
specifically, the VC industry has been purported to drive innovation, employment and economic 
growth through the financing and operational expertise that VC managers’ invest in start-ups 
(NVCA, 2011; Lerner, 2009). The macroeconomic importance of VC industries can be broken 
down into three categories. The first is policymakers’ desire to fill the “equity gap” that early-stage 
high-technology start-ups face. The term “equity gap” (or funding gap) refers to the (perceived) 
inability of early-stage start-ups to find funding, which results in an insufficient amount of risk 
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capital available for entrepreneurs (OECD, 1997).
31
 The second category includes the positive 
externalities of VC investments on innovation, private sector research and development (“R&D”) 
expenditure, job creation, etc. (OECD, 1996). VC has been linked with innovation and economic 
growth given its investment in SMEs in the technology sector (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; European 
Commission, 1995). The third macroeconomic contribution of VC is the non-financial benefit that 
VC investment activity brings, such as industry-specific operational expertise and professional 
networks with companies and investors abroad. Rather than a bank simply giving the start-up 
money, VC managers are believed to be “smart money” because of their technology savvy, product 
development expertise and rolodex of potential customers and acquirers.  
 
2.2 VC Policy Elements
32
 
 
Silicon Valley’s VC industry growth came from a generally enabling, rather than VC-
market-specific, regulatory environment. However, as Silicon Valley VC policies have diffused 
there have been new policy elements introduced by adopters: funding and taxation.
33
 These 
instruments each offer several opportunities for variance (OECD, 1997: 20). Figure 2.1 provides an 
illustration of the three VC policy elements, then the ways in which VC policy instruments vary are 
discussed in the following paragraphs that address each VC policy element in turn: 
 
 
 
                     
31
 The shortage of VC funds, and therefore the existence of an equity gap, is debated. Several studies give evidence to 
the contrary, such as the European Central Bank’s January 2005 working paper (#430).  
 
32 
As discussed by Avnimelech and Teubal (2008), I acknowledge that VC policy elements do not operate in a vacuum. 
Instead, they are part of a three-phase innovation and technology policy life cycle in which business sector R&D and 
innovation support is a necessary prior to VC policy. Avnimelech and Teubal (2008) argue that business sector support 
is Phase 1 and VC policy is Phase 3.  
 
33
 The OECD (1997: 4) outlined their categories for VC policy: direct supply of capital to firms, financial incentives to 
VC funds or firms and regulations. The delineation of VC policy elements here builds on these existing categories, just 
adding the taxation component. 
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Figure 2.1: Three VC Policy Elements  
 
The VC policy environment in Silicon Valley consisted of a favorable regulatory framework 
for VC managers to operate in. The legal structure employed by Silicon Valley VC managers is the 
LP structure. The LP structure reduces the potential liability of the VC funds’ managers and 
investors by ensuring that their personal assets are not liable should the fund management company 
(and its portfolio companies) encounter financial difficulty. In addition, LP structures correspond to 
capital gains tax treatment in many jurisdictions, which means that VC funds’ profits34 are subject 
to a lower tax rate than the (typically) higher corporate tax rate. Finally, LP structures also allow for 
the distribution of equity in underlying investments across the VC fund management team and its 
employees.  
 
While the LP structure has been employed in Silicon Valley and numerous international 
jurisdictions, other legal structures, such as company structures, have been deployed instead of the 
LP structure in states such as Japan
35
 and Taiwan. Company structures, in contrast to the LP 
structure, do not shield the personal assets of investors or managers, do not correspond to a capital 
gains tax rate and do not endow employees of VC management firms with equity in the underlying 
investments. However, only differentiating between these two different types of structures (the LP 
and the paper company) does not capture all the types of regulatory structures that have been 
                     
34
 The VC industry refers to “profits” as “carry” so in this thesis, the terms carry and profits will be used 
interchangeably to describe the returns that VC funds make. 
 
35
 Japanese regulation did not follow the LP structure until 1998 (via the Limited Partnership Act for Venture 
Investment in 1998) (Walter and Zhang, 2012: 144). Prior to the LP structure being available, Japanese investors in VC 
potentially risked their personal assets given the lack of a limited liability structure (Liang and Peng, 2010).  
Funding: Funds of VC 
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utilized by VC managers as modified LP structures have been deployed across numerous states.
 
For 
example, in 2002 Australia deployed an adaptation of the LP structure. In an effort to limit the 
potential for foreign firms to exploit the LP structure’s favorable tax treatment, Australian 
policymakers adjusted the LP structure to require that “each company backed by a venture 
partnership have at least half its assets in Australia” (Lerner, 2009: 158). 
 
 In addition to the legal structure, there are other restrictions and incentives that constitute the 
regulatory element of VC policies. Direct restrictions on VC investment activity relate to the types 
of investors (e.g. pension funds) who are able to invest in VC funds given the high risk nature of the 
asset class (OECD, 1997). The first pro-VC market regulation in this regard was the US’ 
reinterpretation of its Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) in 1979 that 
allowed pension funds to invest in VC funds and helped catapult Silicon Valley VC investment 
activity. In contrast, in some states, ERISA-like regulations have not been enacted and so 
restrictions on the types of VC investors remain. There have also been regulatory tools used to 
incentivize VC market activity. These regulatory tools include Singapore’s offering of residency in 
exchange for foreigners’ investment in domestic VC funds. Finally, indirect restrictions on VC 
activity include caps on foreign ownership of domestic firms, rules on when companies are eligible 
to list on a public exchange (e.g. five years of continuous profitability or a minimum market 
capitalization), and the white space in which private companies can operate.  
 
 The VC policy funding element includes various versions of the FoVCFs structure. FoVCFs 
allocate investment capital to VC managers, the rationale being that there is a private market failure, 
because private investors (e.g. pension funds, insurance companies, and high net worth individuals) 
are not allocating sufficient amounts. FoVCFs can invest in VC funds alone, or as is most often 
done, alongside private investors. In the case when FoVCFs invest alongside private investors, the 
government requires that a certain amount of funding to come from private investors before the 
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government money is available to the VC manager (as in Figure 2.2 below). By requiring private 
sector investment, the FoVCFs incentivize VC managers to raise capital from private investors 
instead of relying on government FoVCF money. This design aims to decrease future dependence 
on state funding by ensuring that the VC managers are competitive enough to raise funding from 
private investors. Figure 2.2 illustrates how the public FoVCF structure works: 
 
Figure 2.2: FoVCF Structure 
 
 
Public FoVCFs have varied in four main ways in their deployments thus far. They have 
differed according to their repayment terms, duration, international involvement and AuM sizes. 
First, FoVCFs vary according to their repayment terms. FoVCFs have given their VC managers the 
option to buy out their government investors at a nominal interest rate (e.g. 5%) or as a share of the 
investment return (e.g. equal to the FoVCFs’ equity stake). Second, FoVCFs have varied in their 
duration. In this way, FoVCFs have been deployed with set end dates (such as the five years given 
to Israel’s Yozma Fund) and have also been structured as “evergreen funds” that do not close (such 
as Finland’s FoF Growth structure that reinvests exit proceeds for future investments).36 Depending 
upon their duration, FoVCFs have been said to be a one-time jumpstart or an ongoing aid to the VC 
industry. Third, FoVCFs have varied in terms of their involvement of international investors. To 
                     
36
 For a discussion of the implications of the evergreen fund structure on the FoVCF’s incentives and performance, see 
Lerner (2009: 116-117). 
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this end, some FoVCFs have required matching funding from international investors or have given 
FoVCF money to international VC managers, while others are wholly focused on domestic 
investors and VC managers. Last but not least, FoVCFs have differed in size. The AuM of FoVCFs 
has ranged from less than USD 100 AuM up to the USD 1 billion FoVCFs in Russia and Singapore.  
 
Taxation is the third and last VC policy element. Tax policy includes the ways in which VC 
profits are categorized for tax purposes – either as capital gains, income, corporate, or tax exempt. 
The VC manager tax treatment is the tax rate applied to VC funds’ carry.37 VC tax rates can range 
from zero (tax exempt), to capital gains (typically around 15%-20%), to corporate or income tax 
rates (that can be more than 40%). In addition to tax rates on VC funds’ profits, tax policy has also 
included tax incentives that target VC managers’ operational revenue derived from management 
fees. Said another way, incentives have reduced operating revenue income, not just revenues from 
investment activity. 
 
Tax policies have also taken the form of credits given to VC fund investors. In this way, 
governments have incentivized investment in the VC asset class through tax credits, such as the 
UK’s Enterprise Investment Scheme tax credit that has been given for start-up investments (see 
HMRC, 2013). The tax credit given to investors in the VC asset class has been intended to 
encourage private VC investment by lowering the overall risk taken on by investors by limiting 
their downside. An illustrative example is the Taiwanese VC tax policy, where 20% of the amount 
invested in Taiwanese was given as a tax rebate for individuals (from 1982) and corporations (from 
1991), so investors would only potentially lose 80 cents on the dollar they invested (Kenney, et al, 
2002). Tax credits have also been offered as compensation for investors losses in start-up 
investments. This form of tax credit was offered in Singapore as a way for the government to help 
mitigate private investors’ losses in start-ups. 
                     
37
 “Carry” is the VC industry term for profits made on exits from investments. 
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 To aid the comparability of the VC policy elements, the three elements of the VC policy 
area are conceptualized to correspond to different levels of state intervention: regulation (low), 
taxation (medium) and funding (high). Of the three components, the lowest level of state 
intervention is regulation. The “low” categorization of regulatory policies is due to this industrial 
policy instrument being most closely aligned with the state as a provider of rules that enable 
markets to operate. Said another way, VC market regulations engender (or undermine) private 
sector activity by providing an institutional framework that enables (or constrains) the constitution 
of a market. In this way, in the regulatory area, states are not endowing the VC industry with 
financial resources or otherwise directing investment activity.  
 
 The tax instrument is categorized as mid interventionist because this tool encourages VC 
market activity either by offering low tax rates specifically to VC managers or by extending tax 
credits for private investment into the VC asset class. Whereas regulation only provided the legal 
infrastructure, tax incentives are categorized as the medium level of intervention as they explicitly 
encourage and reward VC investment activity. Taxation does not constitute the state giving 
financial resources directly to specific VC managers; tax rates and tax credits consist of the state 
indirectly conceding financial revenue (tax revenue) to encourage VC investment and fundraising 
activity. As a result, taxation steers market activity towards this specific sector whereas market 
regulations simply provide a platform on which firms can operate. 
 
The FoVCF policy instrument constitutes the top end of the interventionist spectrum as the 
state is giving money directly to specific VC managers. In doing so, government VC funding is 
categorized as a “high” interventionist approach as the state directly allocates capital to specific 
firms and therefore risks crowding out private sector investment. In this way, FoVCFs grant 
policymakers the power and budget to pick winners, rather than just fostering an enabling 
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environment in which the private sector decides where to allocate capital. It is important to note that 
although the state does pick specific VC managers to invest in, FoVCF investment in several VC 
managers is choosing the seemingly most capable firms in an attempt to support the sector, not to 
build national champion VC management firms. Public FoVCFs are highly interventionist, but not 
state-promoted national champions nor state-owned enterprises, which would be an even higher 
form of market intervention. In sum, the three VC policy elements represent the following positions 
on a spectrum of government intervention: 
 
Figure 2.3: VC Policy Elements on a Neoliberal to Statist Continuum 
      Low   Medium  High 
      
   Regulation  Taxation  Funding 
 
Regulation is the low category in Figure 2.3 as the legal and regulatory environment broadly 
enables or constrains private sector activity. Taxation is categorized as more interventionist, and 
therefore at the medium position, as tax treatment and credits promotes or discourages industry-
specific forms of private investment. Funding, particularly FoVCFs, is placed at the high end of the 
spectrum as this policy instrument consists of the State allocating to specific VC managers.  
 
2.3 VC Policy Diffusion Items 
 
The original VC policy model is the policy context responsible for helping to aid Silicon 
Valley’s success.38 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Silicon Valley VC market is said to be 
                     
38
 The source model is intentionally referred to as Silicon Valley, and not the American model. This is because there 
were different approaches to supporting the VC markets across American states, so a singular American model did not 
exist. In addition, empirical work revealed that policymakers and members of the epistemic community in this policy 
area have specifically referred to the US Silicon Valley, and not the entire US system.   
Neoliberal Statist 
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the product of neoliberal, pro-market regulations and the confluence of a number of factors.
39
 
Rather than a specific set of policies, observers have pointed to the confluence of a number of 
factors; American research and development spending, the presence of top universities, the co-
location of large technology firms and start-ups, a positive regulatory environment, and access to 
exits via stock market IPOs (Avnimelech and Teubal, 2004). In this way, though Silicon Valley has 
been a highly successful technology start-up ecosystem that others want to replicate, its success has 
not been synonymous with specific VC policies.  
 
To this end, the Silicon Valley model has not consisted of a FoVCF, tax breaks or other specific 
VC industry policy tools. The American government has directed money to its regional VC markets 
via many American cities and states launching their own VC funds (see Lerner, 2009: 138-142 for 
examples). However, these FoVCFs have not targeted Silicon Valley. The funding program that 
tangentially aided the success of the Silicon Valley VC market has been the US Small Business 
Administration’s 1958 Small Business Investment Company program that gave funding and 
incentives to SMEs. Thus, though direct (state-level FoVCFs) and indirect funding (i.e. the SBIC 
program) have been deployed by the US government to support SMEs, the Silicon Valley VC 
market has not been the target, or product, of specific government funding or tax breaks. 
 
Instead, regulations such as the LP structure and the 1979 relaxing of the national ERISA 
Prudent Man rule have contributed to the growth of the American VC market. But, again, these 
regulations were not focused on the Silicon Valley region specifically (Avnimelech and Teubal, 
2004). Further, they have not alone been identified as the precise policy tools that drove Silicon 
Valley’s VC industry success. With that said, the US Department of Labor’s 1979 national ERISA 
                     
39
 Some researchers have pointed out the interventionist government role in Silicon Valley, particularly the Department 
of Defense contracts, the launch of the Small Business Investment Company program, etc. In this way, Lerner (2009: 
41) laments that “Silicon Valley was far from a creation of unfettered capitalism” as during World War II public 
subsidies helped “catalyze its growth and shaped its critical features.” With this said, the intervention that Lerner and 
other scholars point to, were government military contracts and national programs to boost entrepreneurship; the efforts 
were not specifically focused on building Silicon Valley as a hub of entrepreneurial and VC activities. 
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rule reinterpretation, in particular, sparked private investment in VC as it allowed American pension 
funds, university endowments and foundations to invest in high risk asset classes including VC 
(Lerner, 2009: 39; Gompers and Lerner, 1999). The LP structure, from a legal perspective, has 
meant that VC investors are only liable for their share of the investment in the VC fund, not for any 
further damages or losses resulting from the portfolio company operations. Another major benefit of 
the LP structure is from a tax perspective, as the carried interest (“carry” or the profit earned) of the 
VC fund is transparent, or passed through to its investors, instead of being ‘double taxed’ on the 
management company level. As a result, returns on a VC investment in the US are taxed as capital 
gains (15 to 20%), instead of the higher income tax rate of 30 to 45%.  
 
In light of the non-specific nature of the Silicon Valley VC policy environment, Silicon Valley 
has been an idea that other states want to replicate, but has not served as a specific VC policy 
blueprint to follow. To be sure, Silicon Valley, which so many states have strived to replicate, 
achieved its success due to a broadly enabling environment. There was no US government funding 
for the Silicon Valley VC market, and the ERISA reinterpretation, capital gains taxation rates and 
LP structure were generic, non-VC specific American measures. The Silicon Valley VC cluster has 
not prospered due to government policy targeting the VC market in northern California’s Silicon 
Valley. As a result, the Silicon Valley diffusion item’s level of specificity is low. The vague nature 
of the Silicon Valley policy environment has meant that there has been plenty of room for 
interpretation on which elements of its context drove its success.  
 
 Unlike the broadly enabling policies associated with Silicon Valley, subsequent VC adopter 
states have deployed policies that specifically seek to build a local VC market. The two VC policy 
innovations cited as models for East Asian policymakers interviewed for this thesis were: Taiwan’s 
20% tax incentive in 1983 and Israel’s 1993 Yozma (Hebrew: initiative) FoVCF. Over time, these 
more specific policy items have been diffused as blueprints for how countries can create local 
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versions of Silicon Valley. In doing so, they have expanded the menu of policy diffusion items 
available to VC policy adopters.  
 
 The first state outside the US to create a VC policy innovation, Taiwan, launched a tax 
credit in 1983 as the Ministry of Finance issued the Regulations for the Administration of Venture 
Capital Enterprises. As will be more fully explored in Chapter 5, Taiwan’s Minister without 
Portfolio, K.T. Li, and the then current Minister of Finance, implemented the tax credit shortly after 
learning about VC while on a study trip to the US and Japan. More specifically, the Taiwanese 
policymakers chose to deploy a 20% tax deduction to first-time investors in VC, as long as they 
maintained their high-tech VC investment for a minimum of two years (TVCA, 2011). In addition, 
tax exemptions were also offered for earnings from VC investments that were reinvested (Koh & 
Wong, 2005: 26). Taiwanese policymakers were innovators in their use of tax credits to spark VC 
market activity as such efforts were not part of the source Silicon Valley policy environment. The 
Taiwanese VC tax innovation has diffused as awareness of the tax incentive’s role in the creation of 
Asia’s most active VC market, centered in Taipei and Hsinchu Science Park, has spread.  
 
 The second VC policy innovation that has become a VC policy diffusion item is Israel’s 
FoVCF.
40
 Given their success, Israel has been named as a policy model for a number of VC policy 
adopters. In June 1992, Israel’s Office of Chief Scientist created the Yozma Venture Capital Ltd. 
(which launched in 1993) with USD 100 million AuM (Lerner, 2009: 155-156). Yozma was led by 
Yigal Erlich, then Israel’s Chief Scientist, to build an international and private investor-linked VC 
market. Over the next five years, Yozma invested via ten drop-down funds and also made direct 
investments in start-up companies. The Yozma fund required that the local Israeli VC managers had 
foreign partners (i.e. Walden, an American PE firm and Kyocera in Japan) before they were eligible 
                     
40
 Here, it should first be said that although the FoVCF structure had been deployed before Israel’s Yozma, its previous 
attempts had not been nearly as effective in sparking local VC industry activity. Thus, though the FoVCF was not a new 
instrument, Israel has been perceived as an innovator due to their successful design and implementation of the FoVCF. 
See Rogers, 1995 for a discussion of why this perception of novelty, rather than necessarily pure policy innovation, is 
what matters. 
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to receive the money in an effort to “bring foreign venture capitalists’ investment expertise and 
network of contacts to Israel” (Lerner, 2009: 156). The Yozma Fund was privatized in 199841 and 
Yozma offered its private investors to buy out the Yozma investment at cost plus a nominal interest 
rate and a 5-7% share in the future profits of portfolio company exits (Mathonet and Meyer, 2007: 
268; Lerner, 2009: 156; (Avnimelach and Teubal, 2004). Following the Yozma Fund’s kick start, 
the Israeli VC market became the second biggest VC market in the world on an absolute basis and 
the world’s largest on a per capita basis (Baygan, 2003).  
 
 In sum, Silicon Valley has served as the source VC policy environment and Taiwan and 
Israel innovated new VC specific policy tools in their attempt to create their local Silicon Valley-
like VC cluster. Other states have gleaned information on all three VC policy items in efforts to 
create local Silicon Valleys. Together Silicon Valley’s regulatory policy environment, Taiwan’s 
taxation and Israel’s funding policy items fit on this neoliberal to statist continuum as low, medium 
and high, respectively.  
 
Figure 2.4: VC Policy Items on a Neoliberal to Statist Continuum 
       Low    Medium  High 
         (Silicon Valley)             (Taiwan)           (Israel) 
 
      
   Regulation  Tax Incentives  Funding 
 
As depicted in Figure 2.4, the Silicon Valley VC policy environment fits on this continuum as the 
Low indicator (see American flag above). The later, more interventionist policy innovations, the 
                     
41
 The Yozma Fund was unique in that it was designed to be discontinued within five years, so as not to become an 
subsidy to the VC market. As detailed as ways that FoVCFs can vary, some states’ FoVCFs, such as Finland’s FoF 
Growth, have annual budgets for investment and also reinvest all exit proceeds. In doing so, these evergreen funds 
continue to support the VC industry rather than provide a jump start at inception. 
Neoliberal Statist 
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Taiwanese tax credit and the Israeli FoVCF, involve the state conceding revenue or allocating 
funding to the VC market, respectively. Thus, these policy items are placed increasingly towards 
the statist end of the spectrum. Together, the possible VC policy choices range from being centered 
on regulation as the Silicon Valley model did, to ratcheting up the statist nature of involvement by 
offering tax incentives (Medium) or FoVCFs (High). 
 
2.4. VC Policy Diffusion Intermediaries 
 
Now I briefly turn to identifying the international actors (referred to here as “intermediaries”42) 
that disseminate VC policy diffusion. This is done in the same way that policy diffusion – 
especially policy transfer – scholars have mapped out “who is involved in policy transfer” (see 
Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 9). In Dolowitz and Marsh (2000:10) terminology, the actors involved 
in diffusion include: elected officials, political parties, civil servants, pressure groups, policy 
entrepreneurs and experts, transnational corporations, think tanks, supra-national governmental and 
nongovernmental institutions and consultants. In the same vein, here the actors involved in the VC 
policy arena primarily include the IOs, source items’ policymakers, VC industry associations, VC 
managers and high-technology industry participants. Given the East Asia focus of this research 
project, the impact of personal networks (guanxi - Chinese for “networks”) is specifically 
examined. Here, guanxi refers to the personal networks within states, as well as across, typically 
with members of the VC, or ICT, sector. 
 
These intermediaries propel diffusion from the points of origin to the points of adoption. In this 
way, they may impact how policy information is framed, the level of detail that the receiving states 
have access to, etc. For example, Israeli policymakers, including the former Chief Scientist who 
                     
42 Intermediaries are also called “social agents” (Solingen, 2012), “policy entrepreneurs” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) 
and “carriers” (Scott, 2003). 
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designed and managed the Yozma FoVCF, have directly shared policy information and consulted to 
several states. In fact, information on the Yozma model was transferred so directly that the founder 
of Yozma, serving as a consultant, sat with New Zealand policymakers to create the New Zealand 
Venture Investment Fund and even choose the FoVCF’s manager (Author Interview, Tel Aviv, 6 
October 2013). In so doing, intermediaries such as Yigal Ehrlich have shaped the (positive) 
perception of policy items by sharing data on the policy item’s precise structure and performance. 
Also, they have directly advised other policymakers on how the policy item should be implemented 
in their local context. To be sure, the intermediaries need identifying in each case as they have 
shaped the level of detail and perception of VC policy choices at points of adoption. 
 
IOs diffuse VC policy information via their funding, forums and policy advice (see Holzinger et 
al, 2008; Sharman, 2011). The IOs that have been involved in VC policy diffusion are the World 
Bank (“WB”), the WB Group’s private sector-focused entities: the International Finance 
Corporation (“IFC”) and InfoDev, the OECD, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), the United 
Nations (“UN”), the Asian Development Bank (“ADB”), APEC and the IADB. These IOs’ policy 
papers, financing and consulting have spread VC policy information across borders. More 
specifically, the World Bank, the OECD and the IMF began lamenting the benefits of government 
support of VC markets in the 1990s (see, for example, the OECD 1996 report on ‘Venture Capital 
and Innovation’ as well as the 1997 UNCTAD paper on ‘The Experiences of Country Funds and 
Venture Capital Funds in Developing Countries’).43 Some IOs have even gone further than giving 
advice on VC policies. To this end, in 1994 the IADB launched a regional FoVCF to build up VC 
markets across Latin America (in Argentina, Chile and Mexico, in particular) and the European 
Union has managed the European Investment Fund. In total, IOs have been intermediaries in VC 
policy diffusion as they have distributed policy information and they have even funded FoVCFs 
                     
43 IO rhetoric around VC’s impact on innovation, entrepreneurship and economic growth followed the late 1980s shift 
of the World Bank towards promoting private sector development. Prior to that time, private sector funding was not 
given for fear of competing with or crowding with existing activity (Kogut and Macpherson, 2008). 
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(going beyond just being an intermediary).  
 
High-technology industry participants, consultants, VC investors and academics constituted 
epistemic communities (and guanxi) that diffused VC policy information across localities. The VC 
policy-specific epistemic community (see Haas, 1992) has consisted of consulting firms, VC 
industry associations, academics, investors, entrepreneurs and high-technology sector executives 
who share knowledge of VC policy best practices and pitfalls. Members of this epistemic 
community have presented their VC policy evidence and suggestions to policymakers in numerous 
states. However, it is important to remember that the epistemic community’s influence, in VC 
policy and other issue areas, is “dependent on local political conditions” (Kogut and Macpherson, 
2008: 107). More specifically, the receptiveness of policymakers to the involvement of private 
sector actors in the policymaking process is expected to empower or undermine the power of 
guanxi. Here, we assume that more neoliberal states (the Nightwatch-man State and the Private 
Sector Promoter) are more inclined to leverage guanxi for VC policy information than the more 
state-led types (the Financier and Director and Command Economy). 
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3. Policy Diffusion Literature Review 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter examines how state-of-the-art diffusion research expects the policy diffusion 
process to lead to convergence, transformation and variation. This is achieved by reviewing existing 
diffusion scholarship and then outlining hypotheses for how the varying levels of specificity of 
multiple diffusion items and the diffusion mechanisms contribute to varying policy choices. My 
literature review builds on a new, but growing, area within policy diffusion scholarship – the 
examination of the means by which diffusion leads to only degrees of convergence rather than 
complete convergence.  
 
The state-of-the-art diffusion research examines sources of degrees of convergence. In doing 
so, these studies show that, as they diffuse, norms, ideas, and practices often change in form and 
content. Painter and Yeo (2011) examine what they call the ‘transmutation’ of a global model of 
telecom regulation as it diffused to China and Vietnam. In a similar way, Acharya (2004) reveals 
how international norms were localized as they diffused into ASEAN institutional context. Also, 
Radelli (2005) found that different “institutional riverbeds” led to incomplete convergence on the 
American regulatory impact assessment when it diffused across European Union member states. 
Pointing to the impact of multiple diffusion items on policy choices, Falkner and Gupta (2009) 
argue that the existence of two competing models of genetically modified organism regulatory 
policies led to diversity in the policies adopted in developing countries. 
 
As a starting point for my literature review, I discuss how International Relations research has 
used several terms to describe similar, but distinct, phenomena: diffusion, convergence, transfer, 
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transmutation, transformative approaches and isomorphism. Given the conceptual overlap in this 
area, before going any further, these terms are defined in the context of this thesis. Diffusion has 
been defined as “the spread of something within a social system” (Strang & Soule, 1998: 266) and, 
more specifically, as “the process in which an innovation is communicated through certain channels 
over time among the members of a social system” (Rogers, 1995: 5; Italics added for emphasis). In 
this thesis, diffusion refers to the process of policy ideas and instruments crossing borders. In this 
way, diffusion describes the spread of policy information that may or may not result in certain 
policy choices.  
 
Policy convergence, transfer and isomorphism, on the other hand, are more specific terms that 
describe outcomes of the diffusion process characterized by greater degrees of similarity. Policy 
convergence is evidenced by “narrowing gaps” in national policies over time (Drezner, 2007: 11). 
In this way, convergence refers only to increased similarities in policy forms across an adopting 
universe in a temporal context. Another term used here, policy transfer, is defined as “the process 
by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one 
political system (past or present),” is used in another political system (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 
5). In contrast to convergence, policy transfer has more of a focus on process tracing what happens 
between the point of origin and point of adoption. The origin to endpoint focus of policy transfer 
research constitutes a different lens than policy convergence, which identifies patterns across the 
adoption universe (Dolowitz and Sharman, 2009). The third term used in this vein is isomorphism. 
Unlike the others, isomorphism has been used to refer specifically to the spread of institutional or 
organizational designs, rather than policies (Knill, 2005: 768). To be sure, though transfer, 
convergence and isomorphism differ in the precise phenomenon they describe, they all portray an 
increasing similarity in choices as the result of the spread of information. Diffusion, on the other 
hand, describes the process of the information being transmitted internationally without describing 
the result of the process. 
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In addition to the terms used to describe the replication of diffusion items elsewhere, there are 
also terms used to describe changes to the diffusion item as the result of policy diffusion processes. 
These terms are transmutation and transformative approaches (Yeo and Painter, 2011). 
Transmutation and transformation both describe processes in which there is adaption to the 
diffusion item between the point of origin and the point of adoption. As such, these terms speak to a 
singular diffusion between two entities, as policy transfer also did, rather than broad patterns across 
adopting populations. However, when using these terms, scholars specifically refer to an outcome 
characterized by adaptation and differences rather than increasing similarity.  
 
Policy transfer literature has also developed terminology for specifying the forms and degrees 
of convergence that encompasses these different results of the transfer process. According to Knill 
(2005: 769), the two most common forms of convergence studied in the policy diffusion literature 
are (1) increasing similarities between the point of origin and the point of adoption and (2) 
increasing similarities amongst adopter populations. These are what he calls δ- and σ- convergence, 
respectively.
44
 Policy transfer literature delineates the range of convergent outcomes stemming from 
the diffusion from point of origin to point of adoption. Rose’s (1991) schema distinguishes between 
duplication, adaption, hybridization, and synthesis.
45
 Duplication describes diffusion processes that 
essentially replicate the source model, thus leading to complete convergence. In contrast, adaption 
(i.e. the selective employment of elements of the source model), hybrid adoption (i.e. selecting 
components of more than one source policy), and synthesis (i.e. deployment of various elements of 
different models in markedly new ways) are used to describe different degrees of transformation. In 
addition to this spectrum, rejection has also been identified as a potential result of the diffusion 
                     
44
 Besides σ- and δ-convergence, Knill distinguishes two other types of convergence: β and γ: “First, β -convergence 
occurs when laggard countries catch up with leader countries over time, implying, for instance, that the former 
strengthen their regulatory standards more quickly and fundamentally than the latter. Second, γ -convergence is 
measured by changes of country rankings with respect to a certain policy.” (Knill, 2005: 769). 
 
45
 Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 13) also offered categories to describe the range of potential policy transfer choices. They 
are similar to Rose’s: copying, emulation, combinations, and inspiration. 
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process (Acharya, 2004; Rogers, 1995:21). Rejection, or ’nondiffusion’ as it is called by Weyland 
(2006: 16) and ‘policy failure’ as used by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 17-18), describes a situation 
in which actors gain knowledge of the diffusion item and actively decide not to deploy any form of 
the source model(s). 
 
This literature review focuses on how and why the policy diffusion processes lead to varying 
degrees of convergence. As a result, here I use the term diffusion to describe the spread of policy 
information that may produce complete convergence, transformation, hybridization, synthesis, 
adaption, or rejection between the point of origin and points of adoption. In doing so, my thesis 
primarily examines the drivers of δ convergence, or transformation between the point of origin and 
the point of adoption. Then, as a result of investigations of transformation between points of origin 
and individual points of adoption, it addresses the degrees of σ convergence that results across the 
adopting population.  
 
Taking a step back from these tools for explaining diversity amongst convergence, I briefly 
discuss the broader policy diffusion research agenda. Diffusion tools were initially employed in IPE 
as scholars looked at the impact of increased capital mobility and economic competition to attract 
capital on the increasing similarity of national policies. In so doing, research such as that conducted 
by Simmons and Elkins (2004) have identified the constraining impact that the diffusion of policy 
ideas and structural pressures have had on policymakers. They have found that these differing 
pressures have resulted in a convergence towards neoliberal market policies. In this vein, diffusion 
scholarship has helped explain the spread of policies across numerous issue areas. These include 
financial liberalization and democratization (Simmons et al, 2008), tax rate decreases (Swank, 
2008), state lottery policy (Berry and Berry, 1990), privatization (Kogut and Macpherson, 2008), 
regulatory regimes (Drezner, 2007; Levi-Faur, 2005), telecommunication sector regulation (Painter 
and Yeo, 2011), Europeanization (Börzel and Risse, 2012), environmental policies (Lenschow et al, 
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2005), and genetically modified organisms policy (Falkner and Gupta, 2009).  
 
Over time, policy diffusion research has expanded beyond the economic competition and 
learning mechanisms. Now, the policy diffusion analytical toolkit leverages a broad swath of IPE 
frames, including realist (coercion) to liberal (competition), as well as rationalist (learning) and 
constructivist (emulation) strands. These mechanisms identify ideational and material, as well as 
structure and agent-based, elements of the diffusion process. Across the mechanisms, policy 
diffusion scholarship has harnessed the S-shaped curve of policy innovations to explain why and 
how policies diffuse within a social system (Simmons et al, 2008).  
 
In doing so, IPE scholars have extended Rogers’ diffusion of innovation theory that 
articulates the ways in which innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards 
adopt innovations over time (1995: 22). According to his theory, the timing of each adopter’s action 
is determined by their cost-benefit analysis of how the innovation may impact them. More 
specifically, this analysis depends upon the potential adopters’ perception of the following: relative 
advantage, compatibility, trial-ability, observe-ability and level of complexity (Rogers, 1995: 16-
17).While diffusion of innovations research is helpful in explaining the temporal aspect of policy 
diffusion, analytical frameworks employing these analytical tools have only initially attempted to 
formalize theories of how the diffusion process can spawn the spread of varied policy forms – 
which is where this thesis seeks to contribute to the further the development of diffusion research.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Attention is first paid to introducing the 
arguments around the impact of the multiple VC policy items and varying levels of specificity on 
policy choices. Section 3.3 then identifies how the diffusion mechanisms are expected to contribute 
to varying degrees of convergence. Drawing on the literature review in the early sections of the 
chapter, Section 3.4 distills hypotheses for how multiple diffusion items, varying levels of 
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specificity and the different diffusion mechanisms are expected to impact policy choices.  
 
3.2. Multiple VC Policy Diffusion Items 
 
The number of diffusion items, and the mode by which policies are diffused, has also been 
casually linked to impacting the results of policy diffusion. In this way, when there is more than one 
model, scholars have found that there is a propensity for adopting states to vary in their policy 
choices. Falkner and Gupta (2009) showed this in the genetically-modified organisms area, as they 
found that states in the global South combined elements of the two competing models (the US and 
European Union regulations), and also synthesized their own approaches. In addition to the 
existence of competing policy modes, diffusion processes can also be “iterative” in nature. In an 
iterative process, there is the “adoption of policies across a number of different nations” temporally 
such that adopters innovate different versions of the source model, and as a result, the menu of 
potential versions of the policy grows over time (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). March (1999: 199) 
called this “chain mode” whereas the diffusion of a single model is the “broadcasting mode.” Said 
another way, an iterative policy diffusion is characterized as one in which there are additional 
diffusion items stemming from the original innovation.
46
  
 
For iterative models the hypothesis is, particularly as time goes on, that there will be variation in 
policy choices. The following logic leads us to this hypothesis. The menu of policy items to choose 
from grows as additional diffusion items are created. With a growing number of diffusion items for 
adopting policymakers to choose from, adopters may come to a variety of policy choices. In this 
way, they may adopt one single diffusion item, adapt a diffusion item, combine existing 
innovations, create their own innovation or reject the diffusion items all together. If the policy area 
was instead characterized by just single model diffusing, then the potential for combining, or 
                     
46 Here we note that innovations only need to be “perceived as new” by individuals or units of adoption, rather than 
entirely new (Rogers, 1995: 475). 
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creating hybrids of, models would not exist.  
  
3.3. Diffusion Items’ Varying Levels of Specificity 
 
Diffusion items differ in their levels of specificity, ranging from precise policy blueprints to 
more general styles or ideas. More precisely, scholars have defined the main dimensions of 
diffusion items – in order of specificity – as the overarching ideas, the instruments, and the precise 
settings (Hall, 1993, Lenschow et al., 2005). To this end, Lenshow et al. (2005) provide examples 
of the three policy dimensions for the field of environmental governance. In their example, the 
overarching diffusion idea is the concept of human stewardship over nature and the diffusion 
instruments are governance techniques such as direct regulation, fiscal instruments or voluntary 
agreements. The most specific dimensions in their empirical illustration, the precise settings, are the 
levels of emission standards or taxes (Lenschow et al., 2005: 803). In a similar way, Weyland 
(2006: 18) posits that principles are "general and vague on details" whereas a model is a "concrete, 
specific blueprint." He suggests that the Bismarckian welfare state and the Chilean-style pension 
system are examples of specific models. In contrast, examples of more loose principles include the 
notion of capital account liberalization or central bank independence (Weyland, 2006: 17).  
 
 Weyland (2006) and Lenschow et al (2005) hypothesize how diffusion items’ varying levels 
of specificity impact the degree of transformation and variance across adopting states’ policy 
choices. If the level of specificity is low, these authors argue that there will be variation in how the 
diffusion item translates into concrete policy language. The logic here is that the low level of 
specificity of principles and ideas creates room for interpretation. Said another way, items 
characterized by low specificity chart “an overall direction but not a specific course of action” 
(Weyland, 2006: 18). As a result, adopters may each decide on a different version of how to 
operationalize the principle. Then, even when the actors attempt to deploy local duplications of the 
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idea, their choices differ as they have varied understandings of what they are trying to replicate. If 
the diffusion item has a high level of specificity, on the other hand, then convergence on the source 
model becomes more likely. That is because adopters have more precise information about what to 
reproduce and how, and therefore there is less room for interpretation (Lenschow et al, 2005).  
 
 As an illustration of how the different levels of specificity impact policy choices, Weyland 
(2006) describes differences in the diffusion of health and pension system reforms in Latin 
America. In the case of the diffusion of the Chilean pension system, all of the Latin American 
countries studied by Weyland instituted the “core” of the Chilean model. In contrast, although some 
similarities could be observed, national healthcare reforms were found to be much more diverse. 
Weyland traces these different choices back to the fact that Chile provided a clear blueprint for 
pension reform, whereas no model of similar specificity existed in the area of healthcare reform 
(Weyland, 2006: 18-20). Following from this, in this thesis I test the hypothesis that low levels of 
specificity beg transformation while high diffusion item specificity drives convergence.  
 
For the VC policy context, in Lenschow et al (2005) terms, the lowest level of specificity, 
the idea, is that policymakers believe that they should deploy VC policies in an effort to support VC 
markets. The notion of wanting to replicate Silicon Valley is an idea in this sense as it does not refer 
to one specific policy tool. The middle level of specificity, the instruments, refers to the policy tools 
(FoVCFs, tax incentives and regulations). The Taiwanese and Israeli models, as will be elaborated 
shortly, refer to specific instruments. In this way, they are more specific than the Silicon Valley 
policy environment. Finally, the most specific diffusion items are the specifications of the FoVCFs’ 
amounts of funding and repayment terms or precise tax rates and credits. VC policy elements, in 
Weyland (2006) categories, would similarly be as follows. Silicon Valley would best be understood 
as a “principle” and the later, more specific policy tools created Taiwan and Israel would be 
categorized as “models.”  
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3.4. Policy Diffusion Mechanisms  
 
As background, the four diffusion mechanisms – competition, coercion, learning, and emulation – 
have been identified as the primary ways in which policies and organizational structures are 
diffused across states, international and transnational organizations (Shipan & Volden, 2008). Some 
policy diffusion research has clearly pitted policy diffusion mechanisms against each other, such as 
Meseguer’s (2006) analysis of the spread of neoliberal policies, which specifically tested for 
evidence of learning, imitation and coercion. Research projects that delineate diffusion mechanisms 
can bear greater analytical weight than studies that simply show that policies do diffuse across 
borders. While it is valuable that diffusion studies are able to specify precisely how policies are 
diffused, the four mechanisms are not so distinct from each other in practice (Kogut and 
Macpherson, 2008). Instead, in reality, the diffusion mechanisms may drive one another or occur 
simultaneously (Meseguer (2009) makes the point that emulation and learning are not mutually 
exclusive).
47
 This chapter acknowledges diffusion mechanisms’ distinct yet interrelated nature and 
takes this delineation a step further.  
  
When policymakers work to design policies for new issue areas, with which they are not yet 
familiar, policy learning or emulation may occur. Such proactive efforts may occur as the successful 
deployment of a policy in one locality may create an “information externality” (Swank, 2008: 77) or 
“public good” (Kogut and Macpherson, 2008: 110) for other policymakers. This essentially means 
that by virtue of a policy’s employment in one locality, other policymakers may hear of such a 
policy innovation as they become familiar with the issue area. If, in this process, policymakers 
                     
47 In light of the time required to see the outputs of other policies and to conduct sufficient research, policy learning and 
competition may be associated with slower policy adoptions, whereas emulation and coercion may be swift (Shipan and 
Volden, 2008). A cluster amongst a number of states does not alone suggest emulation. Though timing can be used as a 
ways to determine if learning or emulation has occurred I do not pursue this strategy. Instead, my qualitative case 
studies investigate the ways in which policymakers acquired and evaluated policy information to determine if they have 
learned of policy items, or simply imitated them. 
Robyn Klingler-Vidra 61 All Politics is Local 
 
study a set of policies that have been successfully deployed elsewhere, then learning is said to occur 
(Berry and Baybeck, 2005: 505). The core of learning is that it entails a rigorous review of the 
policy information. Whereas policy learning is focused on researching the merits of other policies, 
policy emulation is a mechanism in which policymakers imitate other policies merely in an effort to 
appear similar (Shipan and Volden, 2008). In this way, emulation consists of policymakers 
“mindlessly” duplicating policies from other states (often economically larger countries, or states 
more successful in the particular issue area) without researching the precise policy attributes and 
choices (Meseguer, 2009: 4).
48
  
 
The emulation mechanism, in contrast to learning, is expected to be conductive to convergence. 
This is because emulation is expected to propel similar choices across adopting populations as 
policymakers try to copy the already proven policy items. In many cases, this occurs as actors hope 
to gain legitimacy, and ultimately, enhance their survival prospects, in uncertain environments. For 
example, Sylvia Maxfield (1998) found that developing country politicians push for central bank 
independence in an effort to imitate policies in industrialized countries. By appearing similar to key 
industrialized states, the developing country policymakers strived to signal credibility to 
international investors. In emulation, localization may have less of a role in the policy choice as 
policymakers strive simply to reproduce what has been successful or what will help them to signal 
greater credibility. 
 
However, depending upon the level of information available and the structural differences 
between the point of origin and the point of adoption, emulation may involve an unavoidable 
adaption away from the source model. Such adaption is expected when the imitator does not possess 
the “blueprints” of what they are trying to imitate. In this way, if policymakers do not have access 
                     
48
 However, given that national systems differ, 100% duplication of the source model is unlikely in international policy 
diffusion. Some adjustments are expected to be needed to make the policy fit the local environment. If, in contrast, we 
were looking at emulation across provinces or states within a nation, such as the United States, then we may expect 
more perfect imitation. 
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to the documents, or policymakers responsible for the policy item, they do not have the ability to 
fully duplicate the details of the original. In addition, when there are substantive differences in 
national systems, for example in the legal system, even if policymakers wanting to duplicate a 
policy may have to change the terminology or provisions just to fit with their legal system. For 
these reasons, international emulation is almost always an imperfect duplication of the original. 
Against this background, I expect that the accuracy of emulation will depend on the information 
available to the emulator and the similarity between the point of origin and the point of adoption in 
terms of legal, or other, frameworks.  
 
Learning – which is understood here to be boundedly rational, rather than rational – is 
investigated for the role that cognitive heuristics, or shortcuts, have on how policymakers ascertain, 
evaluate and localize policy information. Normative, or cognitive, biases are expected to lead 
policymakers studying the same information to arrive “at very different conclusions about the 
consequences of policies” and hence choose “divergent policies” (Meseguer, 2009: 19). Weyland 
(2006) has blazed the trail for cognitive bias conceptualization in IPE research, particularly in his 
development of how three cognitive heuristics (availability, representativeness and anchoring) 
affect the bounded learning process. Drawing upon cognitive psychology tools, Weyland envokes 
cognitive biases to explain policy diffusion trends concerns “human information processing in 
uncertain and risky environments”, such as social policymaking (McDermott, 2008: 2). 
 
Weyland (2006: 50-51) specifies how availability, representativeness and anchoring heuristics 
propel the diffusion of core policy elements, but not mimicking. The first coginitive heuristic, the 
availability bias, refers to “people’s reliance on vivid, concrete, salient examples, which remain 
disproportionately cognitively ‘available’ in making choices about appropriate examples for 
emulation” (McDermott, 2008: 2). Said another way, availability is the cognitive tendency to study 
the policy experiences of leaders (e.g. US or EU) or peers (geographically or culturally proximate). 
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National policymakers are more motivated to learn about successful external policies that are 
proximate to their existing belief system (Volden, Ting, and Carpenter, 2008). Peer countries with 
“similar policy orientations and legacies (e.g. shared traditions of political development and form of 
state interventions) framed within shared histories of political development, institutional patterns, 
and cultures” are expected to be interested in each other’s policies (Swank, 2008: 78). The 
availability heuristic skews policymakers’ attention towards studying policy items of states they 
believe are their peers or leaders.  
 
Representativeness, the second cognitive bias, refers to a tendency to assume that one 
country’s (positive) policy experience is likely to be representative of the experience elsewhere 
(Weyland, 2006: 50; McDermott, 2008: 2). Policymakers’ beliefs shape the perceived value of 
potential policy choices (Knill, 2005), which clearly impacts the valuation stage of the 
policymaking process (Weyland, 2006: 50). More specifically, representativeness biases lead 
policymakers to conclusions about the expected performance of the policy they are studying.  
 
Weyland’s third heuristic that shapes the bounded learning process, anchoring, describes 
people’s tendency to ‘focus on the ‘anchor’ of the original model’ (McDermott, 2008: 2). The 
anchoring heuristic affects policy design as Weyland portends that anchors lead to policymakers 
being “reluctant to diverge radically” from the original model (Weyland, 2006: 51). This, he argues, 
is why we see patterns of policy adoption – as policymakers overlook their local context because of 
their cognitive bias in favor of not deviating from the anchor. 
 
Moving on from learning, the remaining two diffusion mechanisms, competition and coercion, 
are the mechanisms that describe unsolicited external forces that shape policymakers’ policy choice 
sets. Depending on their strength, these pressures are expected to lead to similar policy choices 
across adopters. In the case of competition, the globalization thesis has posited that states converge 
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towards the model that appears to enjoy the competitive advantage. More specifically, convergence 
is expected on policies that successfully attract capital holders. As an example of how this 
mechanism works, Simmons and Elkins (2004) found that the adoption of capital account 
liberalization policies in one state changes the competitive landscape for its peer states and this in 
turn constrains policymakers’ policy choice sets (and this pressure intensifies as the number of 
peers that liberalize their capital accounts increases). The strength of economic competition is 
investigated by measuring policymakers’ concerns that capital would be redirected elsewhere 
(Berry and Baybeck, 2005). To be sure, the globalization thesis expects that, when faced with 
increasing competitive pressures, policymakers are pressured to deploy internationally orthodox, 
market friendly policies. As a consequence, policymakers dealing with heightened competitive 
pressures are not expected to adjust policies in the way that states learning about policies do.  
 
The coercion mechanism describes diffusion cases where power asymmetries create conditions 
in which policy choices are forced by external actors. Such diffusion via coercion may occur when 
an IO, such as the IMF, requires economic reforms as a condition for funding. As scholars work to 
identify instances of coercion, their empirical investigations strive to demonstrate the impact of 
formal conditionality or “persuasive opportunities” on policy choices (Simmons et al, 2008: 13; 
Kogut and Macpherson, 2008). Then, the strength of coercive forces is determined by the financial 
need of the less powerful state, as well as the capabilities of its policymakers. In this way, 
policymakers that feel most in need of external financing and least capable of formulating policies 
are expected to be more susceptible to coercive pressures.  
 
 In sum, according to diffusion literature, only the (bounded) learning mechanism is expected 
to drive low degrees of convergence. If competition, emulation and coercion are the primary 
diffusion mechanisms, then a high degree of convergence is expected. There are caveats; the 
globalization hypothesis has been refuted by studies showing that economic competition has not 
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made states converge on a singular model (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or trigger a global “race to the 
bottom” (Mosley, 2005). In a similar vein, Weyland (2006), Swank (2008) and others point to the 
centrality of domestic contexts in undermining the competition and coercion mechanisms. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
 This chapter examined state-of-the-art policy diffusion research to identify how elements of 
the diffusion process, particularly multiple diffusion items, diffusion items’ varying levels of 
specificity and diffusion mechanisms, are expected to lead to varying degrees of convergence. To 
do so, the chapter has delineated the ways that the diffusion mechanisms frame VC policy options 
available to policymakers. In this chapter I have synthesized diffusion literature to argue that 
coercion, emulation and competition are hypothesized to result in little adaptation. Bounded 
learning, however, is hypothesized to produce adaption, synthesis or hybridization as policymakers 
at the point of adoption assess the policy items differently in light of their cognitive biases. Thus, if 
coercion, emulation and competition are primary mechanisms then I expect high degrees of 
convergence. If, however, bounded learning is the primary mechanism, the hypothesis is that there 
will be lower degrees of convergence. 
 
 With respect to the impact of the level of specificity on policy diffusion, the less specific 
diffusion item (Silicon Valley) is expected to propel transformation. The Silicon Valley policy 
environment’s low specificity is expected to lend to different interpretations. In light of the role of 
interpretation, adopters are expected to transform VC policies in line with their different normative 
contexts. In contrast, more precise policy blueprints (Taiwan and Israel) are expected to lead to 
higher degrees of convergence across states that deploy these policy items. This is expected because 
highly specific diffusion items are not as open to interpretation and localization since they 
effectively offer a blueprint of what to do. In sum, diffusion of the Silicon Valley idea is expected to 
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drive low degrees of convergence while diffusion of the Taiwanese and Israeli innovations is 
expected to result in greater convergence as these highly specific models are replicated.  
 
With that said, if policymakers combine the multiple diffusion items, even if they do not 
adapt the individual diffusion items that much, hybrid VC policy combinations are expected to be 
the result of diffusion. Here, the iterative nature of VC policy diffusion comes into play as the 
existence of multiple policy items is expected to lend to hybridization or synthesis. In this way, the 
iterative character of the VC policy area leads me to expect combinations of diffusion items or new 
innovations by policy adopters over time. As such, as the policy innovations came into being 
(Taiwan in 1983 and Israel in 1993), subsequent adopters are more likely to deploy more than just 
one VC policy instrument. For example, late adopters and laggards may deploy LP regulatory 
structures alongside tax credits and a FoVCF. So, as mentioned before, while there may be less 
transformation of the specific tax and FoVCF blueprints, adopting policymakers may combine 
multiple blueprints, which would still represent an adaption from any of the singular diffusion 
items. All together, the existence of multiple policy items of varying levels of specificity leads me 
to expect varied interventionist policy choices over time. Since the Taiwanese and Israeli policy 
innovations have been medium to high interventionist in character, policy adopters that have been 
exposed to information on these policy items are expected to choose more interventionist VC 
policies than the original Silicon Valley policy environment.  
 
Multiple policy diffusion items, varying levels of specificity and different diffusion 
mechanisms offer hypotheses for what VC policy adoption patterns are expected to look like. But, 
these hypotheses cannot explain the precise policy choices in different states. Said another way, 
these hypotheses about the degrees of convergence cannot alone account for why one state chooses 
to deploy a large FoVCF while another focuses on tax credits. To do that, Chapter 4 formalizes 
hypotheses for how domestic economic management norms and economic structures shape policy 
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choices. Thus, the next chapter develops typologies that map out how the differing roles of the state 
in the market in East Asia shape VC policy diffusion. In doing so, the next chapter draws 
domestically-generated predictions into the diffusion toolkit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robyn Klingler-Vidra 68 All Politics is Local 
 
 
4. Analytical Framework 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter advances a bounded-learning diffusion framework to explore how, in policy 
diffusion, “all politics is local.” While local contexts have been argued to be important to explaining 
specific choices (see Lenschow et al, 2005; Painter and Yeo, 2011; Acharya, 2004), as of yet, IPE 
scholars have not sufficiently developed structured tools to investigate the role of different domestic 
environments in policy diffusion processes. Here, I address this gap by developing typologies and 
hypotheses for the ways in which domestic economic management norms adapt policy items to fit 
local contexts. To be sure, my hypotheses strive to determine the extent to which VC policy choices 
are the product of policymakers’ local economic management norms. If they are, then my aim is to 
draw generalizations from these findings that the diversity across the large-N dataset is the result of 
each state’s policymakers’ unique economic management norms. 
 
In much of the diffusion research, the process by which diffusion items enter the local context is 
conceptualized as a binary accept or reject decision (Rogers, 1995: 364). Scholars have criticized 
this “black box” treatment of domestic environments in the diffusion process (Yeo & Painter, 2011: 
379). In so doing, these scholars argue that the local context needs to be investigated for its impact 
on how practices are received and implemented (see Acharya, 2004; Lenschow et al, 2005). In this 
way, they have pointed to the role of the prevailing normative context, political institutions, and 
economic structures in the diffusion process.  
 
Before going any further, it is first necessary to clearly define institutions and their application 
within this thesis. Here, institutions are conceptualized in a manner consistent with the three 
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categories articulated by Douglass North in his classic 1990 text Institutions, Institutional Change 
and Economic Performance: informal institutions, formal institutions and organizations. North 
defines informal institutions as norms and cultural understandings that guide actors’ behavior and 
shape their choice sets. In this VC policy study, the informal institutions that are investigated are the 
five norms that guide the state’s role in economic management. For North, formal institutions are 
the laws and rules guiding economic and political interaction.
49
 My investigation of formal 
institutions focus on the government regime types, democratization, legal systems, and the 
distribution of budgetary power. Finally, North’s conceptualization of organizations points to the 
(governmental) agencies, firms and departments. Organizations, in this project, are the bodies that 
make VC policy choices. In the VC policy context this includes Hong Kong’s Innovation and 
Technology Commission (“ITC”), Singapore’s Economic Development Board (“EDB”) and 
Vietnam’s Agency for SME Development (“ASMED”). 
 
The next sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4) define the economic management norms, economic 
structures and formal institutions that are investigated for their impact on VC policy diffusion. 
Then, Section 4.5 develops the four typologies of East Asian states in terms of economic 
management norms and economic structures. Section 4.6 links the typologies to VC policy choice 
hypotheses in terms of the low, medium or high interventionist continuum developed in Chapter 2. 
Finally, Section 4.7 details how these East Asian capitalism typologies guide the case study 
examinations. Section 4.7 brings together the hypotheses developed in the Literature Review 
chapter as well as the hypotheses developed in this chapter.  
   
4.2. Economic Management Norms  
 
Norms, as argued here, shape the entire policymaking processing – the agenda setting, 
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 Lenschow et al define institutions quite similarly: “organizational structures, formal and informal rules, and policy-
making procedures” (Lenschow et al, 2005: 802). 
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evaluation, design and implementation stages. The agenda setting stage of policymaking is impact 
by domestic norms as they play a significant role in filtering external policy models for further 
studying (Gilardi, 2010: 651). This is the case both because of their role in determining the 
institutional fit of external policies and also because national policymakers are more motivated to 
learn about successful external policies that are proximate to their existing belief system (Volden, 
Ting, and Carpenter, 2008). In this way, norms determine which policies are studied in the first 
place. Peer countries with “similar policy orientations and legacies (i.e. shared traditions of political 
development and form of state interventions) framed within shared histories of political 
development, institutional patterns, and cultures” are expected to learn about or emulate each 
other’s policies (Swank, 2008: 78). This is effectively what Weyland refers to as the availability 
heuristic. At the next stage, policymakers’ beliefs shape the perceived value of potential policy 
choices (Knill, 2005), which clearly impacts the valuation stage of the policymaking process. 
Weyland’s representative heuristic most closely corresponds to this idea – that local policymakers 
determine the extent to which foreign models would achieve the same result in their context. 
 
 But, the relationship between the foreign information and local norms is not static; instead, 
diffusion between external practices and local norms creates frictions that can alter diffusion items. 
In this way, cultural similarities and differences are said to affect the “rate and form” of diffusion 
(Hall, 1993; Strang and Soule, 1998; Lenschow, et al, 2005: 799). External information’s entrance 
into the local context does not only lead to policymakers’ acceptance or rejection of the diffusion 
item. Policy items are expected to be reframed to increase their fit with the local normative 
environment. This is what Acharya refers to as “localization” (2004: 240-241), in which adopters 
reinterpret an external item (which affects the policy design and implementation), in order to 
increase its “fitness” with prevailing local norms.  
 
In light of the localization that occurs in the diffusion process, I believe that Weyland’s 
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heuristics give insufficient attention to domestic policymakers’ area-specific beliefs in explaining 
diffusion outcomes. To start with, the availability heuristic does not sufficiently account for how 
policymakers’ industry-specific biases determine which models are studied. While the availability 
heuristic provides insight into the idea that normative biases shape which models are selected for 
study (and that they generally lend to the studying of peers or leaders), it does not give predictive 
insight into which foreign model(s), specifically, will be studied for that particular policy area. I 
argue that policymakers choose which states they study (e.g. what models they hold as “available”) 
as a result of their preferences in that particular policy area.  
 
Representativeness and anchoring heuristics, similarly, can be more accurately conceptualized 
as derivative of policymakers’ policy area-specific norms. Policymakers do not simply believe that 
successful policies elsewhere are representative of the results that they will have (which the 
representativeness heuristic contends). Instead, I contend that the representativeness of the model is 
determined by the extent to which the foreign model is a fit with specific domestic norms. If local 
norms are a fit with the policy item, then there may be a strong degree of representativeness and 
therefore minimal adaptation. However, if policymakers’ biases are not close to that at the source 
model, then they will not hold the diffusion item’s experience as fully representative, and will come 
to the conclusion that adaptation is needed. Similarly, rather than policymakers not adjusting the 
policy model due to anchoring, I argue that policymakers’ degree of adjustment of policy items can 
be better predicted by identifying specific local norms, rather than the success of the model. By 
delineating policymakers’ area-specific norms we can hypothesize about the unique localization 
that will occur in each state.  
 
In sum, I argue that greater domestic normative delineation is needed to determine how 
cognitive biases shape bounded learning processes. To this end, my framework builds on 
Weyland’s work by identifying how contextual economic management norms determine 
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policymakers’ biases, and therefore the extent and direction of adaptation. Thus, rather than 
Weyland’s three general heuristics, I delineate the precise economic management norms that 
determine policymakers’ biases in the policy area that I am investigating (VC policy): (1) 
interventionist orientation, (2) private sector financing norms, (3) international or local firm 
preferences, (4) large or small firm preferences, and (5) bank or capital market preferences. Due to 
differences in these five economic management norms, my hypothesis is that policymakers come to 
unique conclusions about the extent to which the model’s experience is representative, and the 
extent to which they deviate from the (Silicon Valley) anchor. 
 
 The five economic management norms help to explain why VC policy information may be 
interpreted, evaluated and reconstituted in different ways. For example, economic management 
norms that favor private sector financing going directly to select firms, are expected to encourage 
policymakers to seek out information about the FoVCF policy item. In such a case, the hypothesis 
is that the FoVCF would be diffused and then adjusted depending upon the other economic 
management norms, like local or international firm preferences. Similarly, in cases where 
policymakers hold pre-existing economic management norms in favor of the state staying out of 
market activity, there may be rejection of such interventionist VC policy tools. In such neoliberal 
normative environments, policymakers are expected to study and attempt to replicate the hands-off, 
but enabling, Silicon Valley regulatory environment.  
 
 The first economic management norm examined is policymakers’ belief about the 
appropriate level, and form, of state intervention in the economy. Said another way, interventionist 
orientation norms inform the level, and ways in which, policymakers believe their state should 
intervene in the economy. As an illustration, some Asian policymakers, according to Chalmers 
Johnson’s work on Japan (1982), have gone so far as to say that the private sector would not know 
what to do unless told. Others, such as the colonial Hong Kong government, have been avid 
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believers that the markets can better manage production and the allocation of resources than the 
state. Policymakers approach their policymaking for new issue areas according to these preferences 
for the general level of involvement and the tools they prefer to use.  
 
 This interventionist orientation is similar to the notion of “path dependence” and informs the 
background by which policymakers consider industrial policies. Policymakers’ orientation towards 
neoliberal or interventionist roles in the economy sets the tone for how they are expected to evaluate 
and adapt VC policy information. More specifically, it speaks to whether, and how, policymakers 
are likely to accept, adapt or reject regulatory, tax or funding policy information. For example, in 
laissez-faire Hong Kong, neoliberal policies that achieved success abroad may be adopted with few 
alterations by Hong Kong policymakers. In contrast, more interventionist policy items are expected 
to be discounted or adjusted towards less heavy-handed forms in Hong Kong.  
 
 The second economic management norm investigated here concerns policymakers’ 
preference for using finance to support private sector activity. More specifically, the private sector 
financing norm informs whether and how policymakers fund private sector activity. Private sector 
financing norms in East Asia range from states that direct large sums of financing to many private 
firms, to states that do not allocate any financing to any private firms. There are two extreme private 
sector financing norms that are both expected to reject the adoption of private sector funding 
initiatives, such as FoVCFs. First, rejection of the FoVCF item is expected in neoliberal states 
where policymakers hold private sector financing norms that oppose directing funding to specific 
private firms. Second, FoVCF rejection is expected where private sector financing norms dictate 
that the state should solely invest in state production (i.e. SOEs). In this way, these policymakers’ 
anti-private sector financing norms would similarly preclude private firm funding as they prefer to 
invest in public production. Thus, FoVCF rejection is expected to come either as a result of extreme 
liberal or statist private sector financing contexts.  
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 The third economic management norm investigated in this research area is policymakers’ 
preference for international or local firm support. This norm informs whether policymakers focus 
on supporting local companies or if they spend resources attracting foreign firms. States where 
policymakers’ preferences dictate that they focus on promoting local SMEs, compared to states that 
invest in attracting MNC production, are expected to adapt VC policy items differently. In states 
where policymakers prefer to support local VC firms, VC policy choices are expected to be 
designed to drive the growth of local VC managers. This may manifest into the deployment of 
regulations inconsistent with international orthodoxy as well as financial or tax incentives being 
restricted to local participants only. Policymakers’ international preference, on the other hand, is 
expected to prompt the adoption of orthodox regulatory environments as well as international 
investors’ eligibility for FoVCFs and tax credits. 
 
 Fourth, policymakers’ preferences for supporting large or small firms, specifically SMEs, 
MNCs or SOEs, are investigated for their impact on policy choices. These preferences dictate 
policymakers’ propensity to study and design policy initiatives for small, often new, firms or for 
larger, often more experienced, firms. Because VC policy, in its essence, is focused on SMEs, this 
norm is explored for its impact on VC policies in two ways. First, it is expected to determine 
policymakers’ interest in learning about a policy to supply financing to SMEs – VC policy being 
one of those options. The logic here is that policymakers inclined to support SMEs may be more 
likely to learn about VC policy as one way to improve its SMEs access to capital. Second, within 
the VC market there are, as in virtually every industry, small and large firms. Policymakers that 
prefer to support large firms may be more inclined to direct VC policies towards big financial 
institutions or blue-chip VC managers. On the other hand, policymakers that prefer to support small 
businesses are expected to be more inclined to help small, fledgling VC firms. The large or small 
firm preference is expected to impact whether tax credits focus on VC managers with certain AuMs 
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(e.g. a minimum AuM to be eligible) and in terms of whom FoVCF money is allocated to – small 
VC managers or to larger, more established VC firms.  
 
 Finally, the fifth economic management norm is policymakers’ preference for supporting 
either the bank or the capital markets sector. Similar to the other economic management norms, 
there has not been one uniform norm motivating how East Asian policymakers interact with their 
financial systems.
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 Policymakers’ preferences for debt or equity instruments inform whether they 
support the bank (debt focused) or capital markets (equity) sectors. Since the VC asset class is 
situated within the capital markets segment of the financial sector, a preference for banks over 
capital markets is expected to facilitate a low level of interest in VC policy. Furthermore, a 
preference for credit rather than equity instruments is expected to favor loan-based SME financing 
schemes rather than equity-based VC policy items. The preference for capital markets, or banks, is 
expected to contribute to, or detract from, policymakers deploying equity-based capital market 
development policies such as VC policy. In cases where policymakers have a strong preference for 
banks (and debt), we can expect VC policies to be slow to diffuse and to take the form of loans, 
rather than equity, instruments. 
 
As mentioned, these five economic management norms are not set in stone, they can change 
as a result of “critical junctures” (Streeck and Thelen, 2009: 103). Because of their ability to shift, 
the empirical work investigates any changes in these norms over time. So, in addition to identifying 
these five norms in each case, my research investigates changes in each norm over the period of 
investigation. Changes towards neoliberalism or interventionism, as well as changes in favor of 
SME support (and away from large company support), for example, may shape subsequent policy 
studying efforts as well as policy choices.  
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 The singular ‘Asian model’ (Amable, 2003) portends that the Asian state pushes banks to lend to firms and industries 
of its choosing. State-bank relations have not been uniform across banking systems or industrial sectors within Asian 
states (Walter and Zhang, 2012).  
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4.3. Economic Structures 
 
 Scholars argue that states at different levels of economic development, or with different 
economic structures, are not expected to adopt internationally diffused policies in the same way. 
Swank (2008) advances an argument that American neoliberal tax policies diffuse differently across 
economic systems depending upon the economy’s degree of sector-coordinated capitalism. In this 
way, Swank argues that the US tax model diffused according to whether the state’s economy was 
predominantly liberal or coordinated in character. Taking the relationship between economic factors 
and policy diffusion results a step further, scholars suggest that socio-economic factors are 
particularly impactful in determining the settings of policies, such as thresholds, funding and exact 
legal language (Lenschow, et al, 2005: 810).  
 
 In this thesis, economic structures are hypothesized to determine the timing of VC policy 
diffusion. The economic structure characteristics are not expected to explain the neoliberal or 
interventionist character of VC policy choices in a way that Lenschow et al (2005) argue. Instead of 
determining the precise specifications of the policies, here it is argued that economic characteristics 
help explain the timing of VC policy diffusion. To further develop this hypothesis, the following 
paragraphs explain why two aspects of states’ economic structure are expected to matter most to the 
timing of VC policy diffusion: high-tech, SME activity levels and the bank versus capital market 
nature of the financial system. 
 
Technology-sector SME activity is a determinant of the timing of VC policy diffusion given 
the relationship between VC and technology start-ups. This is because VC funds primarily invest in 
high-growth, early-stage SMEs. Technology start-ups are a favored area for VC investors since 
technology-focused firms are thought to be capable of delivering disruptive products and services. 
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Similarly, technology start-ups rely on VC managers for early-stage funding since banks do not 
give adequate credit, and banks and other types of investors lack the operational expertise and 
networks to help start-ups grow. As a result of the mutual dependence that technology start-ups and 
VC managers have on each other, the number of high-growth ICT start-ups constitutes the amount 
of natural demand for VC markets. What’s more, the levels of start-up activity indicate the health of 
the environment that VC managers need to operate locally. In this way, technology start-up activity 
levels indicate private sector actors’ (start-ups and VC managers) need for VC policies.  
 
 Said another way, if an economy has few SMEs and those few firms are not competitive in 
the technology sector, there is no catalyst for VC policy diffusion. Where there is low technology 
start-up activity levels, VC policy action would not be responding to the needs of high-tech start-
ups. On the other hand, in economies where high-tech SME activity is strong, VC markets are 
desired as a means to provide early-stage financing and operational expertise to capital hungry high-
tech SMEs. In either case, the levels of technology SME activity, and changes in those activity 
levels, are expected to indicate the timing of VC policy diffusion. 
 
 The bank versus capital market nature of the financial sector is the second economic 
characteristic investigated. My examination of the impact of the financial system on industrial 
policymaking is not unique, as differences in national financial structures, it is argued, can help 
explain why states have taken varied approaches to driving economic growth (see Zysman, 1983; 
Whitley, 1999). This economic structure characteristic is closely related to the banks versus capital 
markets economic management norms. Just as variety exists in the normative contexts, in some East 
Asian states, the banking sectors have been (increasingly) balanced with weighty stock markets, and 
banks have been independent of credit decision pressure from the state (i.e. Hong Kong). In 
contrast, in other East Asian states, the state has owned credit decision-making via state-owned 
banks, and capital markets have been nearly non-existent (i.e. Vietnam through the end of the 20
th
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century).  
 
 Though there are differences, I do not want to minimize the strong nature of banking sectors 
across East Asian financial systems. In this way, historically East Asian states’ financial systems 
have been broadly characterized as bank-centric, and debt instruments have been noted as being 
crucial to corporate financing (Walter and Zhang, 2012: 11). However, equity markets have grown 
across East Asia, in absolute terms as well as a percentage of financial transactions, driven by 
market forces (i.e. the Asian financial crisis) and by the states’ industrial policies to support capital 
market development (Rethel, 2010: 493-494). My empirical investigations of the financial systems 
in East Asia appreciate the relative differences and changes within states and across the region over 
time. It does so by assessing the balance of bank lending versus capital market, equity-focused, 
fundraising on VC policy diffusion.  
 
4.4. Formal Institutions 
 
Formal institutions (i.e. political regime types, the distribution of budgetary power, legal 
system, etc.) function as filters through which diffusion items pass. In this regard, Radelli (2005: 
933-939) shows how different institutional “riverbeds” influence the ways in which EU states have 
adopted the American practice of regulatory impact assessment. He argues that different 
institutional contexts explain the variability in terms of who has had power over impact assessment 
across countries and thus how the practice has been implemented differently across member states. 
David Vogel (1986) similarly found that the degree of similarity in national regulatory styles 
affected the spread of environmental policy in the US and Great Britain. The formal institutions 
examined in this empirical area are the distribution of budgetary power to policymaking bodies, 
democratization, government regime types and legal frameworks. Though not included in the 
typologies, these formal institutions are examined for their impact on VC policy item adaptations.  
Robyn Klingler-Vidra 79 All Politics is Local 
 
 
Policy diffusion processes are expected to be impacted by the different political 
environments, specifically regime types and democratization shifts. Policymakers are charged to 
deliver economic policies in line with the objectives (and oftentimes, ethos) of the current 
Government. When the regime is democratic, the ruling party is subject to removal from office 
should the voting populace not approve of their policy choices. Democracies, it is argued, are more 
likely to instill property rights, and other beneficial institutions, as a result of such political 
pressures (see, for example, Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Rodrik, 1997, 2000; Knack and Keefer, 
1995). In authoritarian or single-party regimes, in contrast, policy choices can be made in 
accordance with the Government’s strategic vision without fear of unseating. Oftentimes, 
authoritarian regimes are therefore able to design and implement longer-term industrial strategies, 
because they do not have to accommodate political opinion on a short-term basis. Following this 
logic, more open, democratic political environments are thought to endow greater scrutiny on 
policymakers’ industrial policies, particularly their use of budget. In contrast, more closed, 
authoritarian regimes are expected to shield policymakers from direct public scrutiny of their policy 
and budget allocation decisions. 
 
There is a rich range of political regimes within the East Asian arena, ranging from 
authoritarian states, to one-party democracies, to an autonomous state within the PRC to multi-party 
democracies. To be more precise about the degree of authoritarian or democratic character of the 
East Asian states investigated in this thesis, I draw on the polity categorization data provided by the 
World Bank Political Institution Database and the Polity IV Project (Systemic Peace) led by Monty 
Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr. Before relaying their coding of the regime types and changes in 
democratization in Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam, I first note that both databases do not specify 
the polity type in Hong Kong, in light of its status as a Special Autonomous Region within China.  
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Because Hong Kong is not included in these datasets, I draw on recent work on the political 
system in Hong Kong to depict its regime type and changes in democratization. Cheng (2013: 224) 
notes that most analysts describe Hong Kong’s executive-led system as a “hybrid regime type with 
varying levels of democracy in various political institutions.” He laments that fifteen years after 
Hong Kong’s transition began (in 1997), there “has been no significant progress in democracy” 
(Cheng (2013: 226). But, a more genuine level of democratization may take place in the future in 
Hong Kong. A major protest for democracy took place in Hong Kong on the 1
st
 January, 2014, with 
protestors expressing their “dissatisfaction with the pace of democratization” and, specifically, their 
desire to directly elect the Chief Executive (Yung, 2014: 1). In line with recent calls for further 
democratization, the Chinese government promised that the Hong Kong populace can elect their 
Chief Executive in the 2017 election, and elect all seats in the Legislative Council in the 2020 
election (Cheng, 2013: 242). In summary, despite transition from the British colonial leadership to 
an SAR within the People’s Republic of China in 1997, Hong Kong’s government type is still 
categorized as hybrid (rather than democratic) without significant advances in democratization. 
 
 For Taiwan, the World Bank categorization of its regime type changed from an “Assembly-
elected President” to a “Presidential” regime in 1996 (Beck et al, 2001; Keefer, 2012). Taiwan’s 
democratization process began following Chiang-Kai-shek’s death in 1975, and then political 
parties were legalized in 1987 as the Martial Law era ended (Marshall and Gurr, 2010: 1-2). 
However, major constitutional changes did not occur for another decade, as the populace was only 
allowed to elect the president in 1996 (Beck et al, 2001) – which explains the timing of the World 
Bank re-categorization. What’s more, it was then only in the 2000 election when a rival political 
party, the Democratic People’s Party (“DPP”) won government, as the Kuomintang (“KMT”) had 
held power since Taiwan’s founding in 1949. To be sure, the March 2000 election “brought the first 
transition of executive power from one party to another in Taiwan” (Marshall and Gurr, 2012: 1-2). 
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The World Bank Database of Political Institutions codes Singapore a “Parliamentary” 
system for the entirety of their dataset (1975-2012). The Parliamentary coding means that 
Singapore’s chief executive (the Prime Minister) is elected by the legislature, not directly by the 
people. The legislative party that has been effectively choosing the Prime Minister since 
Singapore’s inception in 1965 is the People’s Action Party (“PAP”). Singapore’s PAP has achieved 
a remarkable proportion of votes at each election, with its worst ever election result coming in 2011, 
as the PAP only won approximately 60 per cent of the popular vote, and won only 81 of the 87 
parliament seats (Gopalakrishnan and Lim, 2011).
51
 In addition to Singapore’s categorization as 
Parliamentary, it should also be noted that the PAP dominated legislature have only chosen three 
Prime Ministers since 1965 – with founding father Lee Kuan Yew serving 24 years, his right-hand 
man Goh Chock Tong for 14 years and Lee’s son, Lee Hsien Loong, for nearly nine years (Beck, et 
al, 2001). Finally, Singapore’s Parliamentary system has been described as being particularly strict 
given the PAP’s historic discouragement of genuine opposition parties. Lee Kuan Yew, in 
particular, has been:  
 
dead-set against allowing anything more than a token opposition in Singapore, 
warning factions would weaken the government, scare off investors and undermine 
prosperity. From the 1960s to the 1980s, he…bankrupted opposition leaders figures 
with defamation lawsuits” (Kennedy, 2011: 2).   
 
Though the Singaporean political system’s categorization in the Polity IV project and the World 
Bank Political Institution Database remains static, recent election results – particularly the 2006 and 
2011 elections which saw only 66 and 60 per cent of the vote go to the PAP – have increased 
sentiment that democratization, or at least politicization – is on the rise (Klingler-Vidra, 2012: 69).  
 
 Vietnam’s system retained the same classification throughout the period – an “Assembly-
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 PAP historically dominated, winning every single parliamentary seat from the nation’s founding until the 1981 
election (Kennedy, 2011: 1). 
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elected President”, according to the World Bank Political Institution Database (Beck et al, 2001). 
Vietnam remains dominated by its Communist Party of Vietnam (“CPV”); the Polity IV project 
laments that although there were political reforms via the 1986 Sixth National Congress of the CPV 
in 1986, through today, “Vietnam remains for all practical purposes a one-party communist 
dictatorship” (Marshall and Gurr, 2010b: 1). Political parties are not permitted to operate, the 
judiciary does not have independence from the CPV, and the CPV’s Politburo and Standing Board 
have a very central role in policymaking (Marshall and Gurr, 2010b: 2). In Vietnam, though there 
has been liberalization through new constitutions – its regime type has seen little change in terms of 
democratization or politicization.  
 
 The different regime types represent, as discussed above, a range of public scrutiny into the 
industrial policymaking process. The level of involvement of the public, as well as politicians, is 
expected to shape the speed of policymaking as well as the potential choosing of interventionist 
forms of VC policy. For instance, my Taiwanese exploration addresses the impact that different 
political parties have had on the sustainability of VC policy choices and the PAP’s recent election 
results are examined for how Singaporean policymakers may be more constrained in their ability to 
quickly deploy finance-laden industrial policies.  
 
The third formal institution examined is the distribution of budgetary power. The 
distribution of budgetary power is expected to affect the extent to which interventionist policy 
diffusion items (the tax credit and FoVCF) are given funding, implemented swiftly, held to public 
scrutiny, etc. In this way, differences in budgetary access are expected to affect the funding element 
of VC policy choices. For example, in Hong Kong’s case, the ITC has needed legislative approval 
to deploy funding. My fieldwork in Hong Kong investigates how the ITC’s need to ascertain 
approval affects policymakers’ ability to deploy VC policies. In Singapore, on the other hand, the 
bodies responsible for creating and implementing economic policies, do not need sign off from 
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other entities to secure funding. Singaporean policymakers’ ease of access to funding is examined 
to ascertain if, and how, this affects their implementation of interventionist policies.  
 
Finally, the legal framework is examined for its impact on the range of possible VC policy 
choices, especially regulations. The legal system affects which, and how, policy items can be 
implemented locally. The existing legal treatment of investment vehicles affects the starting point 
for VC regulatory structures. As an example, states that do not have limited liability structures 
would need to change the treatment of fund managers in order to accept the LP diffusion item. For 
example, the Vietnamese legal framework for private company operations has made incremental 
strides in opening areas for private firms to operate. But, when the Vietnamese regulatory 
framework restricted SME production (until the 1986 Doi Moi reforms private businesses were not 
allowed in Vietnam), the adoption of VC regulations, tax incentives or FoVCFs would have been 
beyond the realm of possibilities.  
 
All together, the regime types, democratization patterns, distribution of budgetary power, 
and legal systems are expected to shape VC policy diffusion, The formal institutions discussed in 
this sections, which will be explored in the East Asian case study chapters, are summarized in the 
Table below: 
 
Table 4.1: East Asian Formal Institutions 
 Hong Kong Taiwan Singapore Vietnam 
Regime Type Hybrid 
Assembly-elected 
President (until 
1996); then 
Presidential 
Parliamentary 
Assembly-elected 
President 
Democratization  
Increased 
politicization, 
democratization, 
following 1997 
transition to PRC; 
Initial 
democratization 
steps in 1975; end 
of Martial Law in 
1987; first change 
Recent advance 
by opposition 
parties; PAP 
results in last two 
elections (2006 & 
Little change; 
CPV maintains 
complete control 
of political 
system despite 
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further suffrage 
promised  
in political party 
in Government in 
2000 
2011) worst ever 
(“only” 66 and 
60% of votes) 
changes to the 
constitutional 
landscape  
Distribution of 
Budgetary 
Power 
Policymakers 
must request all 
budget from 
Legislative 
Council 
Policymaking and 
Budget separated 
Policymakers 
hold budgetary 
power 
Budget comes 
from donors and 
State Bank 
Legal System 
Common Law  
(British heritage) 
Civil Law 
(Japanese and 
Chinese heritage) 
Modified 
Common Law  
(British heritage) 
Civil law and 
communist theory 
(French heritage) 
Regulatory 
Environment for 
Private Sector 
Open 
Restricted during 
Martial Law; 
Open since 1987 
Open 
Restricted;  
Improving 
following initial 
doi moi reforms 
in 1986 
 
4.5. East Asian Capitalism Typologies 
 
By pulling together the five economic management norms detailed in Section 4.2, I now 
develop the East Asian capitalism ideal types.
52
 The typologies constitute the four positions of 
policymakers’ norms in approaching VC policymaking. They are as follows: Nightwatch-man, 
Private Sector Promoter, Financier and Director, and Command Economy. Their varied normative 
contexts are expected to be the primary driver of each case study’s unique VC policy diffusion 
outcome. Table 4.2 summarizes the typologies’ economic management norms as well as their East 
Asian proxies: 
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 Though Sections 4.3 and 4.4 delineated economic structures and formal institutions in the four case studies, the 
economic structures and formal institutions are not included in the typologies. The previous discussions of economic 
structures and formal institutions add to the contextualization of this East Asia research project, but not the analytically-
derived typologies. The typologies center on the five economic management norms’ role in shaping bounded learning 
processes – which is the primary focus of this investigation. 
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Table 4.2: Typologies of Asian Capitalism 
 
The anchors at the ends of the neoliberal to statist spectrum are the Nightwatch-man state and 
the Command Economy. The Nightwatch-man state’s policymakers possess norms that the state 
should allow the market to operate freely and only provide an institutional framework to facilitate 
the market’s operation (Evans, 1995). At the opposite end is the Command Economy, in which 
policymakers’ norms dictate that the state should run production and suppress private sector activity 
in favor of public activity. These extreme ends of the ideal types do not fully exist in practice; 
however, there are two East Asian states that approximate their characteristics. Hong Kong is the 
Nightwatch-man state proxy since it has been named the freest economy in the world while 
Vietnam is the Command Economy proxy since the CPV, until 1986, completely suppressed private 
sector activity.
53
  
                     
53 Since the doi moi reforms in 1986, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, the Enterprise Laws and the 2007 WTO 
accession, the Vietnamese economy has increasingly allowed space for private sector activity. However, the private 
sector’s operations are still restricted, and the state runs public enterprises (“equitized” and SOEs). Though the 
Typologies  
Nightwatch-man  
State  
Private Sector 
Promoter  
Financier and 
Director  
Command 
Economy  
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
 M
A
N
A
G
E
M
E
N
T
 N
O
R
M
S
 
(1) Pre-existing 
Government 
intervention 
Neo-liberal ideal   
Promotion of 
industry via tax 
credits and R&D 
Direction of 
industry and 
large financing 
State production 
(2) Private 
sector financing  
Low Moderate High Low 
(3) Company 
size preference 
No preference Small Large Large 
(4) 
International 
versus local  
No preference Local International Local 
(5) State-bank 
relations 
Banks privately 
owned and 
managed 
Some state 
direction of 
credit 
Little state 
direction of 
credit 
State directs 
credit 
Proxies  Hong Kong Taiwan Singapore Vietnam 
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In terms of the Nightwatch-man State and Command Economy economic management norms, 
for polar opposite reasons, these two types both indicate a propensity for rejection of interventionist 
VC policy diffusion items. This is because their policymakers’ economic management norms 
dictate the state’s limited role in the market or the state’s preference for public production, 
respectively. The two typologies in the middle of the spectrum, in contrast, possess elements of 
state direction and neoliberalism, as well as varying bank versus capital market preferences, local 
versus international, and small versus large, firm focuses, private sector financing norms and pre-
existing economic management norms.  
 
The Private Sector Promoter ideal type, which is one step away from the neoliberal ideal, 
envisages the government as the supporter, but not director, of private sector activity. This typology 
is inspired by, and consistent with, Karl Polanyi’s assessment, in Great Transformations (1944), 
that the state’s employment of policies that encourage private activity is a prerequisite for markets 
to occur. To this end, the Private Sector Promoter provides a broadly enabling regulatory arena and 
moderate financial support. The Private Sector Promoter policymakers’ pre-existing economic 
management norms dictate that the state concedes revenue through tax concessions to industry 
participants and offers general incentives for R&D or similar activities. As a result of the Private 
Sector Promoter’s preference for non-direct financial support, direct funding to selected VC firms 
via a FoVCF is not expected.  
 
The Private Sector Promoter prefers to support local companies; this preference means that its 
policymakers focus on building local firms’ capacity, rather than attracting foreign firms. As such, 
this type’s VC policy adaptations are expected to be domestically oriented. Taiwanese policymakers 
are therefore expected to develop regulations and tax incentives that favor local activity rather than 
                                                                    
relationship between state and private sector is now less antagonistic, norms and the economic structure in Vietnam are 
still not tilted in favor of private SMEs. 
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offer an environment attract to international investors. In terms of firm size preference, 
policymakers’ prefer to support SMEs over large firms, including MNCs and SOEs. In this way, 
VC policy choices are expected to focus on growing new, small VC managers instead of attracting 
large, existing VC firms. The last economic management norm shaping the Private Sector 
Promoter’s VC policy choices is the bank versus capital market preferences. Though there is some 
state direction of credit in this type, these policymakers do not exhibit a strong preference for banks 
over capital markets. Taiwan acts as a proxy for the Private Sector Promoter ideal type given its 
reticence to allocate government funding directly to private sector actors and for its policymakers’ 
preference for local SMEs.  
 
The Financier and Director type is one step closer to public command of the economy. This type 
centers on economic management norms that prefer the state’s overt direction of capital and 
organizing of private interests. The Financier and Director type is akin to Gerschenkron’s vision of 
the state’s role as one of addressing market failures by investing in private activity and in 
organizing financial markets (Forsyth and Verdier, 2003) and not one where the state crowds out 
private activity in favor of public production. The Financier and Director type is supportive of 
private activity, but unlike the Private Sector Promoter, its policymakers’ pre-existing economic 
management norms prefer a more interventionist approach. More specifically, this type’s 
policymakers prefer to give financing and other incentives to select firms. In this way, the Financier 
and Director policymakers are guided by private sector financing norms that motivate them to 
allocate financing directly to the private sector.  
 
The Financier and Director type prefers to support large firms rather than small firms, and 
international over local firms. Due to its company size and international versus local preferences, its 
policymakers attract MNCs and place a lower priority on SME and local production support. Its 
policymakers do not have a preference for bank or capital markets solutions. The East Asian state 
Robyn Klingler-Vidra 88 All Politics is Local 
 
that best embodies strong government direction and financing of the private sector is Singapore 
given Singaporean policymakers’ concerted efforts to attract international MNCs and neutrality for 
debt or equity instruments. As part of its strategy, Singapore, unlike Japan or Korea, has not strived 
to build national champions.  
 
The typologies developed here help formulate hypotheses for the impact of economic 
management norms, specifically the state’s pre-existing economic management norms, private 
sector financing norms, company size preferences, local versus international company focus, bank 
or capital market preferences, on VC policy diffusion in East Asia. The five economic management 
norms are investigated for how they shape policymakers’ biases and actions throughout the 
bounded learning process. The SME technology sector activity in the economy and the bank versus 
capital market character of the financial sector are the economic structure characteristics delineated 
in Section 4.3 that are assessed for their effect on the timing of VC policy diffusion. Formal 
institutions (political regime type, the distribution of budgetary power and the legal framework) are 
described for their role in calibrating policy choices in each case.  
 
4.6. VC Policy Choice Hypotheses  
 
As policymakers learn of policy diffusion items through bounded rational processes, 
policymakers are expected to rely on cognitive biases. My framework extends the bounded learning 
tools by delineating the economic management norms that result in unique VC policy choices 
across the neoliberal to command economy range of varied normative contexts. Policy diffusion 
literature hypothesizes that the existence of multiple diffusion items and diffusion items’ varying 
levels of specificity drive transformation and variation in policymakers’ VC policy choices. By 
testing the relative strengths of these ways in which transformation can occur, my framework helps 
to develop diffusion scholars’ ability to explain why diffusion does not always, or even frequently, 
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result in “universal convergence.”  
 
There are similarities in the hypotheses for VC policy choices in the extreme typologies, the 
Nightwatch-man state and the Command Economy. In an ideal type where the state drives 
production via SOEs and controls credit allocations (the Command Economy), I expect rejection of 
diffusion items centered on equity-based capital market building. The Command Economy is 
therefore expected to reject VC policy items all together, across the regulatory, tax or funding 
elements. Such rejection is expected to occur even though VC policy information diffuses. 
Rejection is expected to occur either because policymakers decided that they do not want to develop 
a local Silicon Valley or because they come to believe that the policy environment has not been 
responsible for the VC industry’s success or is not something they would like to replicate. To be 
sure, rejection would occur if the Vietnamese policymakers are found to be aware of the VC policy 
items and have decided not to employ any VC policies, across the regulatory, tax or funding areas.  
 
On the other hand, in the Nightwatch-man state, I expect a favorable regulatory framework to be 
deployed as the state’s offering to help facilitate market activity. However, due to its policymakers’ 
neoliberal norms, I do not expect VC specific tax treatments or FoVCFs to be pursued. In this way, 
in both extreme cases, the hypothesis is that FoVCFs or tax credits will not be deployed. The 
Nightwatch-man type, if they are to act, is instead expected to implement “low” forms of VC 
policies, particularly the LP structure and the ERISA-like legislation, given the policymakers’ 
norms opposed to financing private sector activity and their orientation towards generally enabling 
regulatory environments. Table 4.3 below puts these typologies’ hypotheses together, along with 
the hypotheses for the two middle types. It also includes hypotheses for the timing of VC policy 
diffusion, based upon the economic structures discussed in Section 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: Hypotheses 
 
In the Private Sector Promoter type, policymakers’ norms dictate that they support private sector 
activity, especially small, local firms through non-financial means. In this way, the hypothesis is for 
adaption of VC policy item(s) towards tax-centric VC policy choices. The Private Sector Promoter, 
in light of the economy’s robust technology sector and SME activity levels, is expected to have VC 
policy diffusion occur early on. Taken together, the hypothesis is that, when acting in response to 
their natural VC policy demand (vis-à-vis high-technology sector SME activity levels), the Private 
Sector Promoter’s economic management norms shape VC policy choices towards tax instruments 
focused on local VC managers.  
 
In the fourth and final type, the Financier and Director state, the economic management norms 
point to either no VC policy action (rejection), or highly interventionist, internationally-focused VC 
policy choices. The late, but interventionist, VC policy choice hypothesis stems from the following 
economic management norms. The state’s private sector financing norms favor funding-intense 
policies and policymakers’ company size and international versus domestic firm preferences, which 
prefer large and international firms. In this way, the state is expected to use funding instruments 
Typologies  
Nightwatch-man  
State  
Private Sector 
Promoter  
Financier and 
Director  
Command 
Economy  
VC Policy 
Choice 
Hypotheses 
Regulatory-
focused VC 
policies that 
please 
international 
investors 
Tax-centric VC 
policies focus on 
local VC 
managers 
Large, 
internationally-
focused funding 
for VC policies 
Rejection 
 
Timing 
Majority  
(early or late) 
Innovator or 
early adopter 
Majority  
(early or late) 
N/A 
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such as the FoVCF to attract international VC managers or investors. In sum, the Financier and 
Director state is not expected to be a natural supporter of VC policy in light of norms favoring the 
support of MNCs and due to its moderate levels of technology and SME activity. But, if the state 
does decide to implement VC policies, it is expected to do so by using the large coffers it typically 
brings to attracting international firms to establish local operations.  
 
In summary, my overarching hypothesis is that the four typologies’ varied domestic normative 
contexts’ are the central driver of their unique VC policy choices. In light of the above discussions 
of each typology’s economic management norms, the proxy states’ expected VC policy choices are: 
 
Figure 4.1: VC Policy Choice Hypotheses on a Neoliberal to Statist Continuum
54
 
     Low   Medium           High 
        
             Regulation        Tax Incentives          Funding 
   
         (Hong Kong)  (Taiwan)           (Singapore) 
  Nightwatch-man State    Private Sector Promoter  Financier and Director 
  
As demonstrated by the above Figure, the Nightwatch-man state is expected to favor neoliberal, 
regulatory-focused VC policies akin to the broadly enabling regulatory environment that Silicon 
Valley benefited from. The Financier and Director (see the Singapore flag), on the other hand, is 
place on the high end of the spectrum as it is expected to direct large amounts of funding, such as a 
FoVCF, if and when they do deploy VC policies. Yet again different, the Taiwanese flag is place at 
the middle of the spectrum as the Private Sector Promoter is expected to focus on tax incentives 
rather than funding. Finally, the Command Economy is left off of the above continuum as it is 
expected to reject VC policy items altogether.  
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 Vietnam not included as it is not expected to adopt any VC policy item. 
Neoliberal Statist 
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 Now that the domestically-generated hypotheses have been expressed, I bring back in 
diffusion literature’s hypotheses for how the diffusion process is expected to impact policy 
diffusion outcomes. The attributes of the VC policy diffusion process, which I refer to as “external” 
in this thesis, beg the following hypotheses: 
 
Table 4.4: Diffusion Literature’s Hypotheses  
  
As detailed in the table above, the level of specificity of the diffusion items predicts less 
convergence when vague principles are diffused and more convergence when specific models 
diffuse. Given the existence of multiple VC policy diffusion items, depending upon when and 
which item(s) are diffused, there may be more or less convergence. More specifically, if the Israeli 
or Taiwanese policy innovations are diffused, then I expect more convergence across the policy 
choices. However, when the less specific Silicon Valley policy environment is diffused, I expect 
states to adapt the policy item to better fit their domestic normative environment.  
 
 Bringing the hypotheses together, I expect states most similar to Silicon Valley in terms of 
norms to have less adaption away from the neoliberal approach. In this way, I expect a 
                  Convergence 
                        More Less 
Level of 
Specificity 
High Low 
Multiple 
Diffusion 
Items 
N/A 
Increased likelihood for hybridization and 
adaptation 
Diffusion 
Mechanisms 
Competition, coercion and 
emulation  
(Bounded) learning 
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predominantly neoliberal VC policy choice in Hong Kong. Similarly, if more interventionist 
Singapore strives to develop a local Silicon Valley, we expect – given the combination of the 
Silicon Valley diffusion item’s vague character and Singaporean policymakers’ finance-laden 
norms – adaptation towards more interventionist VC policy choices (particularly FoVCFs). More 
interventionist states are expected to study more interventionist diffusion items – i.e. Taiwan’s tax 
incentive or Israel’s FoVCF. In this way, though Silicon Valley may still serve as the goal for the 
Financier and Director state, the more specific, and interventionist, tools (i.e. tax credits and the 
FoVCF) are expected to be used as blueprints as a means for creating their local Silicon Valley.  
 
 The selected diffusion item(s) in each case, taken with the amount of congruence between 
economic management norms at the point of origin and the point of adoption, are investigated to 
determine the degree of convergence across VC policy choices.
55
 The underlying hypothesis is that 
the local context matters more to the degree of convergence when the vague Silicon Valley policy 
environment is the primary diffusion item. When the Israeli and Taiwanese blueprints are diffused, 
however, I expect less room for interpretation because of their specificity, and therefore less 
adaptation of those diffusion items. To be sure, the degree of convergence with the Silicon Valley, 
Taiwanese or Israeli policy items could not be determined simply by the policy item’s level of 
specificity alone. Instead, the level of specificity along with the impact of local economic 
management norms in shaping the adaptation needs to be defined before we are able to expect a 
certain degree of the difference between the source model(s) and the policy choice.     
 
 The iterative character of VC policy diffusion (the existence of more policy items over time) 
as identified through the large-N research, means that the menu of diffusion items has grown over 
time, so the number of potential combinations of VC policy items continues to grow. As such, 
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 The congruence of economic management norms with that at the policy item (e.g. Silicon Valley, Israel or Taiwan) is 
one reason why a qualitative research design best fit this project. The coding and analysis of economic management 
norms across the large-N dataset, in addition to trying to identify the diffusion items at work, simply lends to a better 
formulated small-N case study design. 
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instead of later policy adopters just employing an adaptation of the Taiwanese tax innovation, they 
may choose to employ the tax credit as well as the LP structure. Another adopter, however, may 
deploy a FoVCF and legislation similar to the ERISA reinterpretation, but no tax incentive, and so 
on, and so on. Thus, the iterative nature of VC policy diffusion suggests at least the same amount of 
variance in VC policy choices over time. This hypothesis is in contrast to hypotheses for greater 
convergence over time, which comes from the logic that as there is more (positive) evidence of the 
policy item’s performance, deviation from replicating the proven model becomes less attractive 
(Meseguer, 2009).  
 
 The bounded learning mechanism is the glue that binds the external and domestic realms 
together. This is because bounded learning is determined by domestic policymakers’ economic 
management norms. These norms determine how policy items are sought out, evaluated and 
translated into local adaptations. Bounded learning is therefore hypothesized to take different 
shapes in each case (according to each state’s policymakers’ economic management norms). This 
stands in stark contrast to Bayesian or rational updating, in which learning leads to policymakers 
reaching the same beliefs and conclusions. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has extended tools for researching the impact of East Asian policymakers’ 
economic management norms on VC policy diffusion. As mentioned earlier, the singular ‘Asian 
model’ advanced in comparative research thus far has not adequately captured the range of 
normative settings in East Asia. To remedy this gap, this chapter has furthered the tools available 
for structured investigations of the impact of economic management norms. To provide further 
context for the East Asian study, formal institutions and economic structures have been discussed 
for their impact on VC policy choices. In doing so, the typologies articulated here help move 
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diffusion research beyond the “black box” treatment of domestic contexts.  
 
Hypotheses have been drawn about VC policy choices in the proxy states based upon the five 
economic management norms. Altogether, the hypotheses are as follows. The Nightwatch-man state 
of Hong Kong will deploy VC policies that are characterized as “low” level of interventionism. 
Hong Kong’s regulatory-focused policies are expected to be deployed during the “majority” stage 
of adoption. The Private Sector Promoter, Taiwan, is hypothesized to deploy VC policies in the 
“medium” level of intervention, meaning that they will focus on tax policy. Taiwan is expected to 
deploy their VC policy as an “innovator” or “early adopter”. Singapore, the Financier and Director, 
is hypothesized to deploy VC policies characterized by their “high” interventionist nature given the 
focus on funding instruments. Singapore is expected to be a “majority” adopter of VC policy. 
Finally, the Command Economy of Vietnam is expected to be a rejecter of VC policy action. The 
chapter also advanced the premise that varying economic structures affect the timing of VC policy 
diffusion to a state, but has not claimed that functionalist explanations alone can account for the 
shape of VC policy choices. In this way, the economic structure characteristics inform hypotheses 
about timing – specifically whether each state will be an early adopter, majority or laggard adopter. 
The chapter also delineated how formal institutions (regime type, democratization, distribution of 
budgetary power and legal systems) are expected to shape VC policy choices.  
 
The thesis now applies this analytical framework to investigate VC policy diffusion to the East 
Asian empirical cases – Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam – in the following four 
chapters. The framework is applied by analyzing the impact of the economic management norms, 
multiple diffusion items and varying levels of specificity. The diffusion literature’s expectations 
(about the impact of multiple diffusion items, varying levels of specificity and diffusion 
mechanisms) are referred to as “external factors” throughout the case studies while the economic 
management norms, economic structures and formal institutions are covered under “domestic 
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factors” headings. The case study findings are drawn together in Chapter 9 (Analysis), to identify 
themes and analyze what the analytically-driven empirical investigations tell us about the sources of 
varying degrees of VC policy convergence. Of particular importance is the testing of my central 
hypothesis that policymakers’ economic management norms are the primary drivers of the precise 
shape of policy diffusion in each state.  
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5. Hong Kong: Nightwatch-man State 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
“The words ‘industrial policy’ make me curl up inside”  
– Last Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten: East and West (1998): 243. 
 
 Hong Kong has been ranked the freest economy in the world by the Heritage Economic 
Freedom Index for more than fifteen consecutive years. To this end, Hong Kong is a state whose 
policymakers have historically been guided by neoliberal economic management norms. It is also a 
state with an economic structure with little high-technology SME activity and a financial system 
consisting of thriving banking, as well as capital markets, sectors. The Nightwatch-man state 
hypothesis, in light of these characteristics, is that Hong Kong would only be a late adopter of an 
attractive regulatory framework for the VC market. Yet, my research found that competitive 
pressures to attract and retain capital, particularly from international investors accessing the Chinese 
start-up market and fear that their Asian Tiger peers were outpacing their innovation and technology 
prowess, has driven a normative shift amongst its policymakers in favor of interventionist 
innovation-related policies. This normative shift facilitated Hong Kong policymakers’ deployment 
of a FoVCF in the late 1990s and a VC tax incentive in 2005. As a result of the choice of these 
interventionist policies, Hong Kong’s VC policy choices have not been as hands off, or as Silicon 
Valley-like, as expected – this chapter investigates the drivers of these VC policy choices.  
 
Hong Kong’s neoliberal norms have been long established as it served as an entrepôt hub during 
100 years of British colonial rule. Today, Hong Kong remains a low tax, open trading post and one 
of the top 10 global economies per capita, in purchasing power parity terms (Latter, 2007). Hong 
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Kong’s leadership has lamented that the neoliberal nature of its role in the economy is the result of 
its belief that the private sector can better allocate resources than it can (GIS, 1992; Info HK, 2002). 
Hong Kong politicians’ strongly negative views of interventionist policies, at least until the British 
handover of Hong Kong in 1997, is demonstrated in the last Governor of Hong Kong’s colorful 
statement about industrial policy that opened this chapter. Think tanks have affirmed the reputation 
of Hong Kong as a laissez-faire bastion; the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute have given 
the number one global ranking to Hong Kong for economic freedom for 15+ and 35+ years, 
respectively. However, in recent years scholars have been increasingly critical of the notion that 
Hong Kong’s government takes a truly neoliberal approach in practice (Fuller, 2010; Latter, 2007; 
Youngson, 1982: 132-136; Choi, 1994: 42).
56
  
 
The Hong Kong VC industry, like the broader Hong Kong economy, is effectively entrepôt, 
as funding comes from abroad and investments are made into SMEs based across Asia (HKVCA, 
2013). The remarkable growth of Hong Kong’s VC market has come as Hong Kong has had a 
formidable position as a global financial center and exceptional access to the mainland Chinese 
market (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 3 January 2012). As a product of this enabling environment 
and competitive positioning, Hong Kong’s VC industry overtook Japan’s VC market as Asia’s 
largest VC center by the year 2000. At that time, Hong Kong VC managers’ AuM had already 
reached USD 26 billion (Dietrich et al, 2003: 4). The Hong Kong VC market is just slightly larger 
now – with approximately USD 30 billion in AuM (HKVCA, 2013).  
 
In line with the neoliberal narrative, the large and internationally-inclined Hong Kong VC 
industry has been said to have grown in the absence of government VC policy (see Dietrich, 2003; 
Kenney et al, 2002). However, this thesis’ research found that there has been more government 
intervention in Hong Kong’s VC market than what has thus far been recognized by academics and 
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 With this said, even critics acknowledge that Hong Kong does remain closer to the neoliberal ideal than many, if not 
all, other states.  
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industry analysts. My finding is that previous studies were correct in that the Hong Kong VC 
policies were largely absent until the 1990s. In this way, through the 1980s, the government VC 
strategy was consistent with Hong Kong’s broader “positive non-intervention” approach to 
economic management (Mole, 1996: 1). However, by 1990s, the Hong Kong state’s approach 
changed as its policymakers began to feel the “limits of laissez-faire” economic management 
(Fuller, 2010).  
 
It was then, in the late 1990s, that Hong Kong policymakers first learned about and then 
launched VC policies. Hong Kong policymakers’ initiation of VC policy learning sprung from 
concern that private investors might not shoulder the necessary risk of financing early-stage 
companies, and therefore government action was deemed necessary (Wong, 1996: 29). This 
interventionist mantra purported that VC investments were needed to spark entrepreneurial activity 
in the local technology sector, to maintain Hong Kong’s position as the investment gateway to 
China and to further develop a local culture of technology investments (see Hong Kong Trade and 
Industry Bureau, 1998). Hong Kong policymakers’ VC policy choices that have been made as a 
result of the competition and learning mechanisms have included over USD 100 million in a 
FoVCF and a tax exemption. The deployment of these interventionist VC policy efforts are in 
addition to the Hong Kong regulatory environment’s longstanding offering of the non-VC specific 
LP structure.  
 
As mentioned at the outset, this chapter examines the drivers of Hong Kong’s more-
interventionist-than-expected VC policy choices. This examination of the Hong Kong VC policy 
choices provides a lens for viewing the changing nature of the Hong Kong state’s intervention in its 
economy. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 outlines Hong Kong’s VC policies and its 
VC industry to help us compare how they fit the Nightwatch-man state’s regulatory-focused VC 
policy hypotheses. Section 5.3 examines the external factors that impacted Hong Kong’s VC policy 
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choices, including the diffusion mechanism(s) and the existence of multiple diffusion items of 
varying specificity. Then, Section 5.4 investigates the impact of domestic factors – particularly 
economic management norms, formal institutions and economic structures – on Hong Kong’s VC 
policy choices. The Conclusion assesses how these external and domestic factors interacted to shape 
Hong Kong’s VC policy choices.  
 
5.2. Hong Kong’s VC Policy Choices and VC Market 
 
The 2003 APEC-sponsored research report on Asia Pacific VC ecosystems commented that 
“all Asian APEC economies in this study, except China Hong Kong, have special laws and special 
regulatory authority designated by law or regulation for venture capital firms” (Dietrich, 2003: 22). 
While Hong Kong still lacks VC-specific regulations, this statement is misleading as it suggests that 
no policy action has been deployed by the Hong Kong state. As mentioned earlier, this thesis’ 
empirical research has revealed that there has been more government involvement in supporting VC 
than what these reports have previously recognized. More specifically, the Hong Kong government 
has employed tax incentives and a FoVCF. The below table details Hong Kong’s VC policies: 
 
Table 5.1: Key Dates in Hong Kong’s VC Policy Choices 
Year Milestone 
1993 
Applied Research Fund (“ARF”), a government VC fund managed by the 
Applied Research Council with USD 32m in budget, began administering financing 
(mostly loans) to SMEs with a target annual return of 5% 
1998 
ARF took the shape of a FoVCF, following a Legislative Council review, and 
received another USD 96m in funding; in November 1998 the ITC appointed 
three private VC fund managers – Walden Technology Management, AsiaTech 
Ventures and HSBC Private Equity Management – to manage the Fund  
1999 ARF added Softech Investment Management as the fourth VC manager and the 
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Innovation and Technology Fund (“ITF”) was launched with HK$5 billion as a 
means of supporting the transition of local industries to higher value-added 
activities (the ITF subsumed the Industrial Support Fund (which had been launched 
in 1994) and the Services Support Fund (which had been launched in 1996))  
2000 
Applied Science and Technology Research Institute (“ASTRI”) was created to 
conduct industry-oriented R&D, using Taiwan’s ITRI as a model  
2000 
The Innovation and Technology Commission (“ITC”)57 was formed along with 
the 1 July 2000 re-organization of the Trade and Industry Bureau into the 
Commerce and Industry Bureau 
2001 Small and Medium Enterprise Fund was set up in 2001 to improve SME financing 
2004 
The ITF set up the Small Enterprise Research Assistance Program to finance start-
ups’ R&D; re-payment is contingent on their success (producing a profit or exiting) 
2005  
Revenue Bill (Profits Tax Exemption for Offshore Funds) 2005 ensures that 
offshore VC funds domiciled in Hong Kong are entitled to a tax exemption and 
China passed its first VC legislative package - Provisional Measures for the 
Administration of Venture Capital Enterprises 
2007 
Hong Kong passed the avoidance of double taxation legislation for Chinese 
investments  
Sources: HKVCA, ISD (2000, 2005, 2009), Kenney et al (2002: 100-105); Au and White (2009: 
13); Shih and Chen (2010: 117). 
 
Table 5.1 illustrates that Hong Kong policymakers have invested in the local VC industry, 
particularly by allocating capital to private VC managers via the 1998 ARF FoVCF. The 
government has been an investor in VC managers and has conceded tax revenues, which rebuffs the 
misconception that the Hong Kong government has not funded its VC industry and also shows that 
Hong Kong’s VC policy choices have not fit with the Nightwatch-man hypotheses. 
 
As detailed above, Hong Kong’s first government VC funding initiative was the Applied 
Research Fund (“ARF”) (GIS, 1995). The ARF was originally called the Applied Research and 
                     
57 The ITC is the government agency with oversight for most of the initiatives relevant to VC policy and SME support. 
Since its creation, public funds for SMEs and VC managers, including the ITF, the ARF, DesignSmart Initiative and the 
Patent Application Grant schemes, have been under the ITC’s oversight. 
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Development Scheme and its funding totaled HK $200 million (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 
1999: 3).
58
 The first ARF, in 1993, came in the form of loans and grants administered by the 
government (a private entity wholly owned by the state) and its goal was to produce a 5% return on 
investment (Kenney et al, 2002: 104). The 1993 government-administered ARF was not deemed a 
success. Policymakers were motivated to pursue annual returns motivating loan-based (rather than 
equity) financing and the lack of early-stage investment expertise within the ARC (Hong Kong 
Trade and Industry Bureau, 1998: 2). As a result of the Legislative Council review of the ARF in 
1997, a new management strategy was deployed for the 1998 ARF (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 
21 December 2011; ISD, 2005).  
 
It was following this review that Hong Kong’s first, and only, FoVCF was created. Rather than 
have civil servants run the second incarnation of the ARF, the 1997 Administration review of the 
ARF recommended that “professional venture capital firms with the experience in technology 
investments” manage the ARF (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1999: 1). The goal of the ARF was 
to “prop up a local VC industry” (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 21 December 2011). In this way, 
the 1997 Administrative review affirmed that the goal of the ARF was to “promote technology 
ventures and to fill a gap in the local capital market” (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1999: 1). To 
reiterate the point, the involvement of VC managers in the ARF’s operations was to “further 
promote the capital market’s interest in technology projects” which was hoped to “help build up a 
culture of technology investment in Hong Kong” in the long term (Hong Kong Trade and Industry 
Bureau, 1998: 2). Following this advice, the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council 
approved this recommendation in March 1998 and appointed three VC firms to manage the ARF’s 
investment activity beginning in November 1998.  
 
Three VC managers were hired to manage investments for the 1998 ARF, making it a 
                     
58
 Funding for the first ARF came from the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council, as it approved HK$ 200 
million from the Capital Investment Fund in December 1991 (GIO, 1994: 87).  
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FoVCF. When explaining why more than one VC manager was selected to manage the 1998 ARF, 
the Trade and Industry Bureau commented that “we believe the involvement of more venture capital 
firms will create more synergy between the Government and the venture capital industry, and will 
gradually build up a culture of technology investment in Hong Kong” (Hong Kong Trade and 
Industry Bureau, 1998: 3). These VC managers were responsible for selecting investment targets 
and providing “management and network advice to the investee companies” (ISD, 2000: 111). The 
three VC managers were Walden Technology Management, HSBC Private Equity Management and 
AsiaTech Ventures and they were entrusted with HK $300 million (for Walden and HSBC) and HK 
$150 million for AsiaTech (Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel, 2000: 1). Then, in November 
1999, a fourth VC manager was added (Softech Investment Management Ltd) with HK $250 
million to manage following a two-stage selection process (Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel, 
2000: 2). All of the VC managers included in the ARF scheme were remunerated through a 3 to 4% 
management fee and a formula-based share of the profits (Hong Kong Trade and Industry Bureau, 
1998: 2). The ARF II did not have a 5% return target; it instead expected a best return achievable.
59
  
 
As of May 2000, the ARF, which was then operating as a FoVCF, had invested in 14 
technology companies with HK $230 million in funding (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2000: 2). 
These investments were hailed an “initial success,” as four of the portfolio companies had won 
1999 Hong Kong awards for technology and innovation and another portfolio company was 
acquired by a public traded company (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2000: 2). Despite the initial 
success, the ARF went on to lose over HK$ 240 million (Au and White, 2009: 15). In fact, the ARF 
has been described as “something of a disaster” as the fund had to write off over half of the invested 
                     
59
 An Industry and Trade Bureau review “pointed out the need to protect the seed capital and the requirement for a 5% 
return have created a hampering effect on the ARC in providing equity injection to approved projects because the return 
in the form of dividend in less certain. Consequently, most of the approved projects have been given loans with rather 
stringent conditions” (Hong Kong Industry and Trade Bureau, 1998: 2). 
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amount (Latter, 2007: 30).
60
 The poor performance of the ARF has been attributed to the “invasive 
government restrictions on investment opportunities” (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 21 December 
2011). In addition to transparency and (quarterly) reporting requirements, the private VC managers 
were subject to produce returns within an unrealistic timeframe (Au and White, 2009: 15-16). 
 
As a result of public scrutiny of its poor performance, in 2004 the ITC made the decision (at the 
recommendation of the Legislative Council Audit Committee) to wind down the structure (ISD, 
2005).
61
 The negative perception of the ARF’s performance and its subsequent winding down, as 
well as the antagonistic role of the LegCo in the budget approval process, have “made it difficult for 
the ITC to start, or continue, similar initiatives” (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 21 December 
2011). In sum, Hong Kong policymakers launched one FoVCF (as a means of outsourcing the 
investment sourcing and decision responsibility) in 1998 but started to wind it down by 2004.
 
 
 
The second VC policy area, the tax element, has also been pursued in Hong Kong. VC-
specific tax treatment has come in contrast with Hong Kong’s typical tax approach. As an 
illustration of its general tax environment, Hong Kong’s leadership has lamented that its 
“continuing success… is due to a simple tax structure and low tax rate” (GIO, 1992: 80). Hong 
Kong’s focus on its horizontally low tax rates was established by Colonial Regulations and its Basic 
Law
62
 as a SAR of China. In this way, Hong Kong has not historically offered tax incentives to 
select industries. Instead, Hong Kong policymakers have offered a generally low tax rate 
environment, across four types.
63
 Breaking with this tradition, in 2005, Hong Kong passed 
                     
60
 As of 31 May, 2011 the valuation of the 24 investments made by the fund managers was 50% of the corresponding 
total investment costs (Hong Kong Legislative Council Panel on Commerce and Industry, 2011: 2). 
 
61
 The ARF assets have been in liquidation ever since. As at the “end May 2011, 20 projects were exited while 4 are still 
active” (Hong Hong Legislative Council Panel on Commerce and Industry, 2011: 2). 
  
62 Articles 107 and 108 of the Basic Law lay out the objective of Hong Kong’s low-tax policy. 
 
63
 The Hong Kong tax regime consists of low tax rates across four types: profits tax (for corporations), salaries tax 
(individual tax), property tax and estates tax (Shu-hung, 1996: 40). 
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legislation for off-shore VC funds domiciled in Hong Kong to be tax exempt. This was 
accomplished by way of the Revenue Bill, also known as the Profits Tax Exemption for Offshore 
Funds. Prior to this 2005 bill, tax incentives to attract VC managers to Hong Kong had not been 
VC-market specific. Whereas Taiwan offered a 20% tax deduction for VC investors beginning in 
the 1980s and Singapore ensured that the VC asset class was tax-free early on, it was not until 2005 
when Hong Kong policymakers enacted a VC tax exemption.  
 
As for the third and final element of VC policy – regulation – Hong Kong policymakers have 
not deployed VC industry specific regulations. While Hong Kong still lacks its own VC regulatory 
framework, Hong Kong-domiciled VC managers have been able to use the LP structure that was 
first established by the British colonial government in Hong Kong in 1912 and then updated as 
Capital Ordinance 37, section 4 in 1950 (Hong Kong Legal Information Institute, 2013). The 
generally well-governed Hong Kong financial system, including the provision of the LP structure, 
has paved the way for its financial services sector to expand to VC investment activities (Kenney et 
al, 2002: 100). Though the use of the LP structure is consistent with the LP structure popular in 
Silicon Valley, the Hong Kong government has not duplicated legislation akin to the 1979 
reinterpretation of the US ERISA act, or what is known as the “Prudent Man Rule,” which enabled 
American pension funds to invest in VC funds. Instead, Hong Kong’s regulations stipulate that 
public funds (e.g. pension funds who would be investors in the VC asset class) are restricted to 
invest in publicly-traded equities, debts, warrants and futures – and have therefore not been able to 
invest in VC funds (Au and White, 2009: 24-25). In this way, Hong Kong policymakers have not 
deployed regulations in an attempt to be more like the Silicon Valley policy environment.  
 
Though the Hong Kong SAR regime has not deployed VC-specific regulations, the PRC has. 
The PRC’s VC regulations matter to Hong Kong as Hong Kong law has, since 1997, needed to be 
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consistent with PRC government legislation, given the “one country, two systems” arrangement.64 
So, Hong Kong’s VC regulations, if there were any, would need to be consistent with Chinese VC 
regulations. The first, national Chinese VC legislation came via the PRC’s “Provisional Measures 
for the Administration of Venture Capital Enterprises.” The Provisional Measures detail registration 
requirements for domestic and foreign VC managers operating in China, as a means for the PRC 
government to “promote the development of” VC, to “standardize their investment activities and to 
encourage them to invest” in high-technology SMEs (Wang & Co, 2006).65 The PRC’s Provisional 
Measures have named the regulatory authority, reporting requirements, structures available (e.g. the 
limited liability company) and the scope of business activities considered to be VC activity in 
China. Given that Hong Kong does not have its own regulatory package for VC markets China’s 
2005 VC legislation has not yet acted as a constraint on Hong Kong’s VC industry governance. 
However, if in the future Hong Kong policymakers design VC regulations, they would need to 
comply with the PRC’s provisional measures. 
 
In summary, Hong Kong’s VC policy choices to date have consisted of a FoVCF, a tax 
exemption and a broadly enabling (though not VC specific) legal structure. As expected, Hong 
Kong was a late adopter of VC policies, as its first efforts, the ARF, only occurred in 1998. 
However, in contrast to the Nightwatch-man state hypotheses, Hong Kong has not only deployed 
the Silicon Valley-consistent LP structure for its VC industry. Instead, Hong Kong policymakers 
broke with the generally low tax rate in 2005 by offering tax exemption to Hong Kong-based, 
offshore domiciled, VC managers. Even more interventionist than the tax incentive for its VC 
                     
64 Hong Kong operates a common law system and, as of 1997, has been ruled by the Basic Law since its handover from 
British colonial rule to being a SAR of China. The Basic Law is effectively a constitution which outlines the 
governance of Hong Kong across a number of economic issues, including the maintenance of its low tax policy (Shu-
hung, 1996: 47). 
 
65 The PRC’s 2002 research paper outlined the best practices for the government’s role in building the VC market, 
which laid the groundwork for the 2005 Provisional Measures: the need to produce a coordinated plan for the VC 
industry, strengthen macro guidance and governance for the VC industry, stimulate the industry through the provision 
of financial services, perfect law and regulation formulate to standardize VC, use favorable tax policies, standardize the 
securities market, establish information exchange and provide training to VC managers (PRC, 2002: 14-18).   
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industry, Hong Kong policymakers deployed a FoVCF (the ARF) in the late 1990s. The 
combination of these VC market initiatives means that Hong Kong has acted more interventionist 
than the Nightwatch-man typology expected. What’s more, Hong Kong policymakers have not 
attempted to replicate the Silicon Valley regulatory environment as they have not allowed its large 
retirement funds to invest in VC funds, as the America ERISA reinterpretation did. In total, Hong 
Kong did not deploy duplications of the Silicon Valley regulatory environment. Instead, its 
policymakers chose interventionist tools (FoVCF and tax exemption) to support its VC market.  
  
The remainder of this section provides a brief summary of the Hong Kong VC industry’s 
history. The Hong Kong VC market was initiated by the private sector in the 1970s as part of the 
island’s overall financial services sector growth (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 3 January 2012). 
The first VC managers in Hong Kong were corporate subsidiaries (Citicorp Venture Capital and 
Inter-Asia Venture Management) and were launched in 1972 (Kenney et al, 2002). The Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange (which was launched in 1986) produced exceptional returns, which brought 
international attention to equity investments in pre-IPO companies in Hong Kong (Au and White, 
2009: 9). Because of this IPO activity, investments in private equity grew, and Hong Kong was 
increasingly used as a base for VC managers investing across Asia. By the end of the 1980s, there 
were six VC firms operating in Hong Kong, two Prudential subsidiaries and one subsidiary of AIG 
(Kenney et al, 2002: 102). Figure 5.1 highlights milestones in the Hong Kong VC industry: 
 
Figure 5.1: Hong Kong VC Market Timeline 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Kenney et al (2002), AVCJ (2005), HKVCA (2013) 
1972: Citicorp Venture 
Capital and Inter-Asia 
Venture Formed 
1987: HKVCA 
Formed 
1989: Six VC firms 
operating in Hong Kong 
1999: The market 
has 165 VC funds 
2000: Over 200 VC 
funds and Asia’s 
largest VC market 
1981: Arral & 
Partners Formed 
2005: Hong Kong VC market’s 
AuM at USD 26 billion 
2013: Estimated USD 30 
billion AuM 
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As the largest VC market in Asia, Hong Kong has been a “hub” for VC managers investing in 
Asian start-ups (especially in China) since 2000 (HKVCA, 2009: 8).  
 
Hong Kong’s VC market remains an extension of its international financial services 
offering, rather than being integrated with its domestic technology SME sector (as Taiwan’s VC 
industry has been). With a strong banking history, VC professionals in Hong Kong have viewed VC 
investments as “pure play, late-stage financial transactions” as opposed to long-term financial and 
operational partnerships with early-stage start-ups (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 21 December 
2011). On the personnel level, staff joining VC firms in Hong Kong has typically come from 
banking backgrounds as opposed to having start-up or operational experience in the technology 
sector (Au and White, 2009: 30). In this way, Hong Kong VC has been an extension of its banking 
sector as opposed to an independent, early-stage investment arena. The bank-related nature of the 
VC industry in Hong Kong is further discussed in Section 5.4.  
 
5.3. External Sources 
 
Now that Hong Kong’s VC policy choices and the Hong Kong VC industry have been 
introduced, this section turns to examining the external forces that have shaped Hong Kong’s VC 
policy choices. To do so, it reveals the impact of Hong Kong’s efforts to maintain a competitive 
position vis-à-vis the other Asian financial centers on its VC policy choice. In addition, it examines 
how Hong Kong policymakers have learned what other regions, including Silicon Valley and Israel, 
have done to support their innovative ecosystems. In doing so, it identifies the primary diffusion 
mechanisms and the diffusion items (and their level(s) of specificity) in this case. It also discusses 
the impact of the existence of multiple diffusion items on Hong Kong’s VC policy choices. 
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 The competition mechanism has motivated VC policy diffusion in Hong Kong. Competition 
has mattered since, as a quintessential entrepôt trading post, Hong Kong has relied heavily on its 
hub position in the world financial system. More specifically, Hong Kong has competed for capital 
particularly hard against Singapore in line with China’s economic rise, as both states have vied to 
be the preferred hub for VC managers investing in the Chinese mainland (Author Interview, Hong 
Kong, 3 January 2012). In recent years, as China has improved its institutional infrastructure and 
investors, including VC managers, have gained confidence in operating in the mainland, Hong 
Kong has also competed to be the location for VC investment activity against Beijing and Shanghai. 
As Singapore and Chinese mainland cities have gained as regional financial hubs, Hong Kong’s 
position as the gateway to China has been increasingly contested (Kenney et al, 2002: 105). The 
threat of VC managers opening offices directly in China, and companies executing IPOs on Chinese 
exchanges, has “helped to motivate the Hong Kong government to support VC” (Author Interview, 
Hong Kong, 3 January 2012).
 
 
 
More specifically, increasing competition from other financial centers, particularly Singapore, 
has been named as a force that pressured Hong Kong’s policymakers to lower VC funds’ profit tax 
rates to zero. The Financial Secretary’s 2003 Budget Speech is evidence of the competitive 
pressures that motivated the government to implement its tax incentive: 
 
Hong Kong is facing keen competition from other major IFCs [international financial 
centers] in attracting foreign investments. Major financial centers such as New York and 
London as well as the other major player in the region, Singapore, all exempt offshore 
funds from tax. The financial services industry has expressed the view that it is vital for 
us to provide tax exemption for offshore funds, or otherwise some of these funds may 
relocate away from Hong Kong (Low Tax, 2011). 
 
Within two years of this speech, the Revenue Bill 2005 was passed to help Hong Kong better 
compete with other financial hubs (Chen and Lee, 2007). In this way, Hong Kong’s leadership 
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demonstrated their awareness of the growing competition and responded by offering a similar tax 
exemption to maintain their position as a regional fund management center. As evidence of the 
continued competitive pressures since 2005, in the spring of 2013, the Financial Secretary further 
extended the tax exemption specifications. This was done to “address local concerns that Hong 
Kong is losing ground to Singapore, which offers greater certainty on tax treatment and clearer 
regulation of private equity” (AVCJ, 2013).  
 
In response to these broad competitive pressures, Hong Kong policymakers have also 
learned what other countries have done to support successful innovation ecosystems. To this end, 
they have studied government policies to support technological development, particularly those of 
Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. As a SME-specific example, the following argument was 
made in the Hong Kong Legislative Council’s proceedings: 
 
In South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, there are officially sponsored organizations 
which have been set up to give support to small and medium-sized factories, but in 
Hong Kong there is as yet no such organization. This is an area which the Hong 
Kong Government should study carefully as to what is being done in the three places 
mentioned, and establish a similar type of organization adapted to Hong Kong 
circumstances (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1987: 715).  
 
This urging to study East Asian peers’ industrial policies, particularly Taiwan’s research institute, 
ITRI, has manifested itself in Hong Kong’s also looking “into the possibility of establishing a 
permanent research institute” and the later launch of ASTRI, its version of ITRI (Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, 1987: 728; Au and White, 2009; Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2011).  
 
 Hong Kong’s learning of VC policy items has been facilitated by their “cosmopolitan 
capitalists” (Hamilton, 1999) who have long established guanxi. Leveraging these private sector 
networks, Hong Kong policymakers have been said to be “keenly aware of Silicon Valley and have 
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imported information on how to build a Silicon Valley-like cluster” at home (Author Interview, 
Hong Kong, 21 December 2011). Hong Kong policymakers’ admiration for Silicon Valley has been 
expressed in numerous ways by innovation policymakers. As an example, the chairman of the Hong 
Kong Science Park said that the creators of the park “looked to the US, particularly Silicon Valley, 
and their incubation model” when designing the science park (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 20 
December 2011). In a similar vein, a Legislative Council report found that Stanford University’s 
science park “helped transform the Silicon Valley area from one of the poorest regions in the United 
States into a global center of technology, finance, education and research” (Hong Kong Legislative 
Council, 2011: 7). Specific to the role of the VC industry in Silicon Valley, the Hong Kong 
government learned that a:  
 
major factor behind the success of Silicon Valley as a leading R&D hub is the 
availability and contributions of private capital, in particular from venture capitalists, 
to support projects with good realization” (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2010: 6; 
Italics added for emphasis).  
 
To institutionalize its acquisition of knowledge on the Silicon Valley policy environment, 
the Hong Kong state has hired policymakers that possess Silicon Valley experience. The ITC’s 
senior manager for technology entrepreneurship funding (as of 2012) is a great example of this. He 
lived in Canada for over twenty years and “was sent to Silicon Valley to spend time researching the 
incubation model” while working for IBM (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 21 December 2011). 
Upon his return to Hong Kong in 2005 he was hired by the ITC to be the manager for its 
entrepreneurial funding initiatives. He said he won the highly competitive position due to his 
Silicon Valley knowledge and entrepreneurial experience.
 
These internationally experienced 
policymakers at agencies such as the ITC have helped acquire information on VC policy efforts – 
especially on Silicon Valley – through their knowledge and personal networks.  
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In addition to Hong Kong policymakers’ learning about Silicon Valley, evidence was also 
found of Hong Kong policymakers learning about the Israeli FoVCF. To this end, in May 2000, 
Hong Kong’s Financial Secretary, Donald Tsang, visited Israel “to gain first-hand knowledge on the 
country’s success in the development of innovation and technology” (ISD, 2000: 361). His trip was 
organized by Israel's OCS (the Israeli office responsible for the Yozma Fund and other VC policy 
measures), and had been designed to help Hong Kong policymakers “learn about how the Israeli 
Government provides assistance and support” (People’s Daily, 2000). Prior to his trip (which took 
place from May 25-30, 2000), Mr. Tsang commented: 
  
To enhance Hong Kong's competitiveness in an increasingly technology-driven 
world economy, we must harness the power of innovation and technology. I 
understand that Israel has been known as 'Silicon Valley II' in recent years, with 
sharply defined policies towards scientific and technological activities. The insights 
gained from the visit will be helpful in the formulation and implementation of our 
own innovation and technology policy (People’s Daily, 2000; Italics added for 
emphasis). 
 
Mr. Tsang’s statement indicates Hong Kong policymakers’ awareness and reverence for both the 
Silicon Valley and Israeli policy environments. In 2001, the HKVCA lamented that they “continue 
to update ourselves with venture capital developments in Israel through our regular contact with the 
Israeli Consul” (HKVCA, 2001: 2). These insights gleaned by the HKVCA have then been relayed 
to the ITC regarding their efforts to support technology entrepreneurship and VC activity in Hong 
Kong (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 3 January 2012). However, their learning of the Israeli policy 
item has not come through direct encounters with the Yozma team (Author Interview, Tel Aviv, 6 
October 2013) and has not been found to have driven the ARF II’s FoVCF structure in 1998. 
 
Instead, my research found that Hong Kong’s policymakers’ domestic policy 
experimentation and learning shaped their FoVCF design. Hong Kong policymakers’ use of the 
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FoVCF structure (in the 1998 ARF) was the product of their finding that the 1993 ARF’s operations 
(with the ARC running the VC fund itself) were not optimal (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 21 
December 2011). More specific to the rationale for its FoVCF structure, as previously mentioned, 
policymakers found that the ARC did not have the expertise to manage the VC investments, so 
external management was sought out. Hong Kong policymakers’ decision to select more than one 
external VC manager was the result of the desire to “diversify the risks involved” and “introduce an 
element of competition.” So, rather than the 1998 ARF being a duplicate of an external VC policy 
diffusion item (namely the Yozma Fund), its structure has been a reflection of internal reviews and 
policy learning derived from earlier policy experimentation (particularly the 1993 ARF). 
 
Contrary to the multiple diffusion item hypothesis, the existence of all three VC policy 
diffusion items by the time Hong Kong policymakers began to act was not found to account for 
Hong Kong’s VC policy choices. Hong Kong policymakers have learned about the Silicon Valley, 
Israel, Taiwan and Singapore clusters for ways the state could support high-tech growth (Author 
Interview, Hong Kong, 20 December 2011). But, Hong Kong policymakers have not duplicated 
what they have learned of the Silicon Valley policy environment (beyond the continued use of the 
LP structure), the Israeli Yozma Fund or the Taiwanese tax model. As a result, Hong Kong 
policymakers have not created hybrids of existing VC policy diffusion items. 
 
Instead, Hong Kong policymakers have synthesized their own versions of two policy 
elements (tax and funding). While Hong Kong policymakers knew about the VC policy items, they 
have not duplicated the specifics of these foreign models nor have they expressed a desire to 
replicate the VC policy diffusion items. In this way, Hong Kong’s FoVCF (the 1998 ARF) was not 
closely modeled after Israel’s Yozma Fund. In addition, Hong Kong’s VC tax exemption is also 
different than Taiwan’s 20% credit. Rather than Hong Kong policymakers replicating Taiwan’s VC 
tax credit, evidence was found of Hong Kong policymakers learning about and then replicating 
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Singapore’s tax exempt status due to its direct competition with Singapore. In short, these external 
inputs cannot alone account for the unique form of Hong Kong’s VC policy choices, so we turn to 
domestic factors to explain the precise shape of Hong Kong’s VC policies.  
 
5.4. Domestic Factors 
 
 The Hong Kong government’s self-proclaimed role in economic management has been 
described as merely “one of facilitation” as the state “neither protects nor subsidizes manufacturers” 
(GIS, 1992: 79). Their positive non-intervention approach has meant that the government strives to 
provide services that are “good for business,” including education, health, housing and 
infrastructure, without unnecessary interference in business and without high tax rates (Mole, 1996: 
4). Another popular mantra has been that Hong Kong policymakers are guided by their belief in 
“small government, big market” (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 21 December 2011). However, as 
already mentioned, scholars have found that the Hong Kong policymakers’ norms have become 
more interventionist in response to its hollowing out and loss of a competitive edge in technological 
innovations (see Fuller, 2010). It has been in response to these pressures as Hong Kong 
policymakers have embraced more interventionist norms in order to advance their “technology 
sector and further build out its financial services sector offerings” in an effort to better diversify the 
economy (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 20 December 2011).  
 
Under British colonial leadership, Hong Kong policymakers’ economic management norms 
were broadly oriented towards positive non-intervention. Britain’s approach to ruling Hong Kong 
involved not having a heavy hand in economic management and maintaining a balanced budget (Au 
and White, 2009: 8). The motivations for Britain’s economic management strategy was both the 
value of Hong Kong as an export-oriented trading post within the empire, and Britain’s desire to 
minimize its financial obligations involved in running colonies after World War II (Choi, 1994: 40-
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41). As a result of these economic management norms, Hong Kong’s industrial policymaking had 
been limited as the government refrained from implementing sector-specific policies. Growth, 
particularly of Hong Kong’s financial sector, was expected to continue without industrial policy. In 
this way, neoliberal norms prevailed in Hong Kong through the 1980s, even though there has been 
initial awareness that if Hong Kong was to maintain its competitiveness, more government support, 
such as an institute like the Japanese MITI, may be needed (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1987; 
Youngson, 1982: 147).
66
  
 
Neoliberal economic management norms delayed the onset of VC policy diffusion 
during the British colonial era. The idea that VC activity could contribute to Hong Kong’s 
economic and technological upgrading had been mentioned as far back as the Hong Kong 
Legislative Council’s 1987 proceedings. In the 14 January 1987 LegCo meeting, a participant 
suggested a new category of investment dealers that he called “venture capital investment dealers” 
and explained that VC manager’s use of equity investments could help promote start-ups, as well as 
VC managers’ ability to “provide managerial, technological or professional support” (Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, 1987: 714). But, in this representative anecdote, the very next person to speak 
reiterated the role of non-interventionism in Hong Kong’s economic success, effectively rebuffing 
the notion of overtly supporting the VC sector. In this way, through the 1980s, VC sector specific 
policy initiatives were not compatible with Hong Kong policymakers’ neoliberal pre-existing 
economic management norms. 
 
Beginning in the 1990s, however, there was a palpable shift in the pre-existing 
economic management norms, in a move away from its laissez faire approach. The shift came 
as policymakers started believing that “the government had to get involved as early stage R&D” 
and “risk [equity] investments would not have been picked up by the private sector” (Author 
                     
66 Some today blame Hong Kong’s weak positioning as a tech centre in Asia on the government’s neoliberal approach, 
and therefore its lack of industry-specific industrial policies, through the 1980s (Lall, 2004: 17; Fuller, 2010: 1-5). 
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Interview, Hong Kong, 21 December 2011). As a result of these shifting pre-existing economic 
management norms, in the 1990s the government:  
 
took steps to improve the technological infrastructure to support the move towards 
high value-added, technologically advanced industries, including the launch of a 
special fund for projects which enhance the territory’s technological and industrial 
development” (GIS, 1995: 103).  
 
Hong Kong policymakers’ normative shift can also be evidenced by the revolving fund that 
financed projects recommended by the Industry and Technology Development Council (GIS, 1995: 
110), the launch of the Cyberport and Hong Kong Science and Technology Parks Corporation 
initiatives and the ITC’s formation in 2000 (Shih and Chen, 2010: 114).  
 
 In addition, Hong Kong policymakers’ normative shift towards interventionism since the 
1990s has been expressed in speeches given by senior government officials, such as the 2002-2003 
budget speech given by Financial Secretary Mr. Antony Leung in March 2002. In this speech, Mr. 
Leung said that being a believer in a market economy does not mean that the “government should 
be passive.” Instead, he lamented that one of the roles of the state is to provide “infrastructure in 
which the private sector will not invest” (Info HK, 2002). In addition, Hong Kong’s Chief 
Executive’s 1997 Policy Address set out “his vision of developing Hong Kong into a center for 
innovation and technology” and appointed the ITC to advise him on how to achieve the vision 
(Hong Kong Trade and Industry Bureau, 1999: 4).  
 
Hong Kong’s private sector financing norms also shifted towards policymakers believing that 
they could add value to private sector activity by allocating government funding. The shift in favor 
of private sector financing resulted in the marquee SME funding initiative, the HK$ 5 billion ITF,
67
 
                     
67
 The ITF was launched to support “projects that will help upgrade the level of technology and promote innovation in 
the manufacturing and services industries” (ISD, 2000: 111). Through 2005, the ITF provided financial support of 
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which was established in June 1999 (Hong Kong Public Finance Ordinance, 1999). As further 
evidence of the 1990s shift in favor of private sector financing, SME financing schemes have been 
deployed to incentivize cross-border, technology sector focused activities with China. To this end, 
the 1995 CARDS (which was folded into the ARF in 1998) was “launched to support product 
development projects undertaken in collaboration with China’s research institutes” (ISD, 1996: 99). 
The ARF initiative, which was adjusted into a FoVCF in 1998, was made possible by this shift in 
favor of directing money to specific private sector firms. 
 
 Hong Kong policymakers’ company size and local versus international firm preferences 
began shifting in favor of local SMEs. This shift in favor of small, local firms has helped motivate 
policymakers to deploy efforts to “increase the high-tech start-up activity in Hong Kong” as part of 
the Silicon Harbor ambitions (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 20 December 2011). To this end, 
Hong Kong policymakers have created incubation centers such as the Hong Kong Industrial 
Technology Centre, which was opened in 1995, the Hong Kong Science and Technology Park, 
which launched in 2001, and the Cyberport that was initiated in 1999 (ISD, 1996; ISD 2005).  
 
 However, while local SMEs have been given greater priority in recent years, Hong Kong 
policymakers continue to be driven by their entrepot tradition of attracting large, international firms 
to set up a regional hub. To this end, as VC policymakers have deployed VC policies they continue 
to attract international investment and allocate money to large, international VC managers. As an 
illustration, the ARF II endowed money to Walden and other international VC managers, rather 
than to new, local VC managers. 
 
 The fifth and final economic management norm that is examined here is the policymakers’ 
                                                                    
approximately HK$ 2 billion to 758 projects (ISD, 2005: 121). Earlier, the Industrial Support Fund (which was folded 
into the ITF) invested HK$ 195.85 million across 122 research projects (ISD, 1996: 99). Between 2001 and 2002 alone 
the ITF launched four SME funding schemes – the SME Loan Guarantee Scheme, the SME Export Marketing Fund, the 
SME Training Fund and the SME Development Fund (ISD, 2005: 120-121). 
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preference for capital markets or bank sector promotion. In this economic management norm, Hong 
Kong’s policymakers’ have promoted the comprehensive suite of financial services offered by its 
entrepot financial hub. This balanced banking-capital markets sector norm comes as the Hong Kong 
state has not directed credit to the private sector vis-à-vis public banks as other East Asian states, 
such as Korea and Japan, have (Whiteley, 1992: 39-43). Overall, Hong Kong policymakers have 
strived to reinforce its “position as an international financial center in general and as a capital 
formation center, an offshore Renminbi (RMB) center and an asset management center” (ISD, 
2009: 66). While a major banking center, attracting international fund managers, offering a full 
suite of capital market services and developing its ability to be the financial centre for investments 
in China, has also been central to the Hong Kong financial sector policy.  
 
 In this vein, Hong Kong’s policymakers have conceptualized the VC industry as an 
extension of its banking sector. A working party was set up by the Hong Kong Association of 
Banks to assess “the demand for venture capital as a source of investment funds alternative to bank 
loans, examining how venture capital operations might be facilitated, and considering how such 
operations might help” SMEs (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1987: 742). Taken together, Hong 
Kong’s VC industry support has been propagated – and subsumed – by its banking sector, rather 
than being a reflection of its policymakers’ preference for capital markets or banks.  
 
 To bring this discussion of economic management norms to a close, Hong Kong’s pre-1990s 
economic policymaking was driven by policymakers’ adherence to neoliberal ideologies. However, 
since the 1990s there has been a shift in policymakers’ economic management norms towards 
greater intervention in the market, particularly with respect to financing private sector activity and 
supporting small, local technology start-ups. Hong Kong policymakers’ normative shift in favor of 
state intervention, particularly to aid technology-focused SMEs, as argued here, helps explains the 
deployment of interventionist VC policies, namely the ARF. Hong Kong policymakers’ capital 
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markets versus banking sector preferences have been relatively balanced, and this contributed to 
policymakers seeing their support of the local VC industry as a means for supporting the 
completeness of their financial system (though the banking industry took the initiative of treating 
VC as its extension). 
 
Turning to formal institutions, the Hong Kong policymaking process during British rule has 
been described as “executive led” as the Governor, key business people and civil servant elites set 
the policymaking agenda and had decision-making power. In the Colonial system, the Executive 
Council (“ExCo”) and the LegCo served advisory roles to the Governor; however they did not have 
binding power over the Governor’s policy decisions (Choi, 1994: 47). As a result, the Governor’s 
grasp on power during this era was not rivaled by the LegCo nor ExCo elites (Koehn, 2001: 98-99). 
Colonial policymakers, not beholden to public opinion and without fear of public scrutiny, were 
able to make swift policy choices in line with the vision of its leaders. The following passage 
reiterates these points on the concentration of power: 
 
The policy-making process in Hong Kong was very much executive-led…the 
Governor and the elite Administrative Officer grade dominated decision-making 
through the Executive Council…while the legislature mainly served to endorse the 
government’s proposals…carefully staged public consultation exercises were used 
largely to legitimize the policy process and civil society was relatively weak 
(Cheung, 2011: 114). 
 
This speaks to the Governor and top administrative officials’ authority over policy design. In 
addition to the concentration of power and shielding from public scrutiny, Hong Kong’s colonial 
leadership shared a consensus view in favor of neoliberal economic management. In light of this 
context, industrial policy, which made senior officials’ stomachs “curl up inside,” aimed at the VC 
industry was not a fit with the concentrated and neoliberal colonial policymaking process.  
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As Hong Kong’s transition to a Chinese SAR took shape in the 1990s, politicization and 
public scrutiny increased along with policymakers’ normative shift towards actively promote 
industry. Thus, just as economic management norms moved in favor of more intervention to 
support local start-up activity, Hong Kong’s policymaking process changed to mitigate its 
policymakers’ ability to deploy policies that used government coffers. In this way, the increased 
public scrutiny that has come alongside the rise in the politicized environment has contributed to “a 
risk-averse culture” amongst policymakers (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 3 January 2012; Latter, 
2007: 136). What’s more, in explaining the different environments across the two periods, an 
interviewee went so far as to say that “we never had politics before 1997, until the British left” 
(Author Interview, Hong Kong, 3 January 2012).  
 
Part of the steps towards democratization in Hong Kong has been the increased power of the 
LegCo over budget, which has been a central determinant of how the post-1990s policymaking 
process has discouraged intervention, even as norms shifted in favor of greater private sector 
financing. As a result of the democratic shift, the LegCo went from being an appointed body that 
only “rubber stamped” policies to a partially elected group that controls the choices of civil servants 
hoping to pass and maintain budget for policies (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 21 December 
2011).
68
 ITC policymakers have had to ask the LegCo for funding and approval if they want to 
make any substantive changes to existing programs (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 21 December 
2011).
 
The LegCo has directly impacted VC policies as it passed the Revenue Bill in 2005 
(taxation) and it has audited the ITC’s funding initiatives (notably the ARF in 2004, which led to its 
winding down). 
 
 
                     
68 During the British colonial period the LegCo members were largely the Governor’s appointments of prominent 
businessman and other elite members of society. The Hong Kong legislature has grown in its positioning vis-à-vis civil 
servants in their policymaking power, through the introduction of direct elections of 30 seats (Koehn, 2001: 107). Civil 
servants, no longer guaranteed legislative approval of policy, had to start lobbying the LegCo to gain sign-off in the 
Hong Kong SAR government. The LegCo, since the 1990s, questions officials via “value-for-money” audits or in 
asking for oral or written answers in response to their questions about operations (GIO, 1995: 27, 42). 
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To illustrate the impact of the LegCo on VC policy, in an April 2004 report, the LegCo’s 
Audit Commission found that the ITC Commissioner “should take vigorous actions to strengthen 
control over the disposal of ARF investments” (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2004). This critical 
finding was “the beginning of the end of the ARF initiative” as public pressures recommended that 
the ITC scrutinize ARF outputs and reconsider its operations (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 20 
December 2011). In total, the scrutiny that VC policymakers have endured when requesting funding 
from the LegCo has been significant and has resulted in the winding down of Hong Kong’s only 
FoVCF, the ARF. In addition, the LegCo’s control of budgetary power has deterred ITC 
policymakers from proposing other finance-laden VC initiatives (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 20 
December 2011). 
 
Moving on from the formal institutions, we turn to the impact of Hong Kong’s economic 
structure on the timing of its VC policy choices. First, Hong Kong’s financial sector is characterized 
by the relative balance of its bank and capital market components. Though Hong Kong’s banking 
sector is one of the world’s largest, with 70 of the world’s 100 top banking institutions operating in 
Hong Kong, it also has a formidable capital markets sector. As an illustration of the stature of the 
fund management industry in Hong Kong’s economy today, the asset management industry in Hong 
Kong has approximately USD 1.2 trillion in AuM (Asia Private Equity Forum, 2013). The growth 
of Hong Kong’s fund management industry, as well as Hong Kong’s development as a major 
financial services hub, came in the 1990s as the Hong Kong banking sector was liberalized 
(GuideMeHongKong, 2013). This relative bank-capital market balance, even following the 1990s 
liberalization efforts, has not been found to speed or slow Hong Kong’s VC policy diffusion.   
 
 The second economic structure characteristic indicator for the timing of VC policy diffusion 
here is Hong Kong’s technology SME activity levels. These levels still remain low today even as 
the government has ramped up its efforts to promote technology sector SMEs. Though Hong Kong 
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has about 282,000 SMEs (ISD, 2009: 105), Hong Kong SMEs have largely been traditional retailers 
and manufacturers, rather than high-technology start-ups. Though technology start-up activity levels 
remain low, the Hong Kong government has aimed to strengthen “technology development and 
application, build up a critical mass of fine scientists and engineers, skilled technicians and venture 
capitalists” (ISD, 2000: 103). Supporting technology start-ups has been an aim because Hong Kong 
has not had a large number of technology-focused SMEs. The amount of technology SMEs has 
grown since the 1990s, largely as the result of government efforts like the Cyberport and Science 
Park. But, I found that it has not been the growth of domestic technology start-up activity that has 
driven VC policy diffusion. Rather, VC policies have been pursued due to a desire to change Hong 
Kong’s economic structure in favor of more technology SME activity. In this way, the policymakers 
have promoted “innovation and technological improvement” to facilitate Hong Kong’s economic 
structure to shift in this direction (ISD, 2005: 107).  
 
 VC policy diffusion was expected to occur early in environments with high SME activity 
levels, and in line with increases in high technology start-up activity. However, as mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, despite Hong Kong’s persistently low levels of technology SME activity, in 
Hong Kong VC policy diffusion has come as an effort to develop Silicon Valley-like activity. This 
is because policymakers have believed that VC activity would drive SME activity and further 
develop its financial services offering. As such, the shift of Hong Kong policymakers’ economic 
management norms in favor of industrial policy, rather than an increase in start-up activities, 
prompted its late 1990s VC policy action. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
While categorized by Milton Friedman and others as a textbook example of laissez-faire, 
this chapter has found that Hong Kong has not acted as “low” interventionist, or a hands-off, state 
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in the VC policy area. Instead, Hong Kong policymakers began to deploy interventionist VC policy 
tools in the late 1990s. To this end, the Hong Kong VC policy choices have included the use of a 
tax exemption and a FoVCF. These interventionist policy choices have been found to be the result 
of a normative shift towards interventionist economic management norms, domestic policy learning 
and rising competition in the fund management sector from Singapore and China. Hong Kong’s 
policymakers have learned about successful policy items; however they did not replicate the Silicon 
Valley regulatory environment, nor the Israeli FoVCF or Taiwanese tax credit. Instead, Hong Kong 
policymakers came to their FoVCF structure via their own policy experimentation and offered a tax 
exemption instead of a tax credit. In this way, Hong Kong has not imitated the neoliberal Silicon 
Valley diffusion item as the Nightwatch-man typology expected. Instead, they have synthesized 
their own interventionist policies.  
 
The competition mechanism was found to have stimulated VC policy diffusion. Competitive 
forces stemmed from Hong Kong’s continuing bid to be a leading financial center, and more 
specifically, a hub for international VC investment in mainland Chinese start-ups. In this way, Hong 
Kong has competed against VC managers being based in Singapore and China, as Beijing and 
Shanghai have become preeminent investment and operational destinations. In addition, competitive 
pressures on low tax rates have come from peers, particularly Singapore, as these states have 
offered tax exemptions for VC funds’ profits. In response to this competitive pressure, in 2005 
Hong Kong lowered their horizontally low tax rate specifically for offshore VC funds to a zero rate.  
 
In response to competitive pressures, the Hong Kong government has intentionally recruited 
policymakers with Silicon Valley expertise and has conducted study trips to Israel and Silicon 
Valley. By leveraging their guanxi, Hong Kong policymakers have learned about the VC policy 
items. However, though Silicon Valley’s VC regulatory environment has been studied, it has not 
resulted in policymakers enacting legislation to allow its retirement fund managers to invest in local 
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VC funds. Moreover, though the Hong Kong state has worked to institutionalize knowledge of 
Silicon Valley in Hong Kong, this has not resulted in Hong Kong’s VC policymakers attempting to 
replicate the Silicon Valley policy environment. Competition in Hong Kong only prompted certain 
hiring decisions and learning efforts – it was not found to have propelled Silicon Valley duplication 
policy decisions. 
 
Despite the existence of all three VC policy items (Silicon Valley regulations, Israel’s 
FoVCF and Taiwan’s tax incentive) by the time Hong Kong policymakers began to act in the 
1990s, their policy choices have not mimicked any one of the existing diffusion items. Hong Kong 
did synthesize its own versions of the core elements of two of the policy items, as it has deployed a 
FoVCF and a tax tool, in addition to the use of its generic regulatory scheme. But its FoVCF and 
tax policies have been the result of its domestic policy experiences and awareness of other financial 
centers tax exemption offerings. More specifically, the 1993 ARF experience had been critiqued by 
the LegCo and the Trade and Industry Bureau. Their reviews led to the 1998 ARF moving from a 
VC fund structure to a FoVCF. This change was driven by the LegCo’s identification of suboptimal 
aspects of the running of the 1993 ARF, particularly the (lack of) management team expertise and 
the impact of the Fund’s target on incentivizing loan-based investment activity.  
 
In this way, Hong Kong’s policymakers changed the structure of the ARF II as a 
consequence of domestic politics and domestic policy learning via the ARF VC fund. Based upon 
the challenges experienced with the ARF, Hong Kong’s 1998 ARF II was structured as a FoVCF 
that paid 3 to 4% management fees and a market rate for performance fees. This was done rather 
than charge a 5% interest rate to the private VC managers as the Yozma Fund did. This 
management fee structure was developed since policymakers viewed the VC managers in the ARF 
FoVCF as outsourced service providers that they paid annual fees to, rather than partners they 
wanted to incentivize with large potential returns on equity investments. The ARF II structure 
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exemplifies how Hong Kong policymakers designed VC policies in line with their domestic 
environment rather than adapted what they learned from foreign sources.  
 
A shift in economic management norms was found to have aided the deployment of more-
interventionist-than-expected VC policies as Hong Kong VC policymakers. Hong Kong’s VC 
policymakers’ norms shifted from ensuring an open environment towards providing financial 
support to private sector firms, including small, local firms. In doing so, Hong Kong policymakers 
have come some distance from the last Governor of Hong Kong’s statement that the phrase 
industrial policy made him “curl up inside.” The shift in private sector financing norms was found 
to have aided the deployment of the ARF FoVCF, especially because the government started 
funding private firms in the 1990s.  
 
However, Hong Kong’s increased politicization, and the LegCo Audit Commission’s power 
over budget in particular, has kept the scale of VC funding initiatives in check. The LegCo’s 
growing power over the budget, and ITC policymakers’ need to respond to public pressure, were 
found to have had a direct impact on the winding down of the ARF. In this way, while changes in 
domestic economic management norms created the opportunity for VC funding efforts, the Hong 
Kong policymaking process (particularly access to budget and public scrutiny of policy 
performance) has restrained the deployment, and sustainability, of FoVCFs.  
 
Hong Kong’s economic structure, especially the low levels of technology SME activity 
levels, contributed to its late VC policy diffusion. Though technopreneurship activity levels remain 
relatively low even today, policymakers in the 1990s began supporting VC as a means of increasing 
technology SME activity as the “Silicon Harbor” and aiding the competitiveness of Hong Kong’s 
financial services sector. Their shifting economic management norms motivated VC policy action, 
even though there was not increased technology start-up activity that increased demand for more 
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early-stage equity capital. The balanced bank-capital markets nature of Hong Kong’s financial 
system enabled the support of equity instruments. The Hong Kong banking sector conceptualized 
VC as part of its service offering, so policymakers have not had to choose a preference for bank or 
capital market sector initiatives. 
 
Finally, the Hong Kong VC policy case study finding is contrary to the globalization thesis’ 
hypothesis for the widespread adoption of neoliberal policies. The finding that Hong Kong chose to 
deploy interventionist VC policy tools is particularly interesting given Hong Kong’s ranking as the 
freest economy in the world during this same period. If even the neoliberal poster child was 
pressured into deploying interventionist VC policies in the 1990s, then what can we expect of states 
that held more interventionist economic management norms to begin with? We will find out as the 
next two chapters investigate the VC policy choices in the two most interventionist states –
Singapore and Vietnam. The implications of the Hong Kong findings will be assessed in the 
Analysis chapter, in line with a discussion of the other case studies’ findings to determine the 
generalizability, or uniqueness, of Hong Kong’s more-interventionist-than-expected policy choices. 
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6. Taiwan: Private Sector Promoter 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
“The successful model of a developed country can be used as a reference but cannot 
be duplicated as every nation must respond to its own social background and 
economic conditions.”  
- ROC (Taiwan) Government Information Office’s 1983 Reference Guide: 159 
 
Turning to the Private Sector Promoter proxy, this chapter investigates the sources of 
Taiwanese VC policy choices. Volumes of academic research have already examined the mechanics 
behind the economic miracles achieved in Taiwan and other East Asian economies, notably 
research by Robert Wade (1990), Alice Amsden (1979; 2001), Chalmers Johnson (1982), Sanjaya 
Lall (1996), Meredith Woo-Cummings (1999), and Stephan Haggard (1990). These scholars have 
provided insights into the industrial policies behind Taiwan’s miracle, the importance of economic 
success to the martial law government, and the drivers of the Taiwanese technology cluster’s 
outstanding performance. However, both Dan Breznitz’s Innovation and the State (2007) and J. 
Megan Greene’s The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan (2008) have lamented that there 
has been an insufficient examination of the sources of the Taiwanese state’s industrial policies. To 
this end, they comment that scholars have not adequately investigated how Taiwanese policymakers 
learned about and decided on the form of their industrial policies. Here, I address this lacuna in the 
literature by exploring why and how Taiwanese policymakers designed their VC policies, as part of 
their policy efforts to become a “Silicon Island” (GIO, 2001: 161).  
 
Identifying the sources of the Taiwanese VC policy choices will be valuable to IPE scholars 
Robyn Klingler-Vidra 128 All Politics is Local 
 
for four reasons. First, Taiwan serves as the Private Sector Promoter proxy in this thesis, providing 
us the opportunity to examine the impact of policymakers’ norms that favor small, local firms and 
tax incentives on VC policy diffusion outcomes. Taiwan also offers a case with an SME, high-
technology laden economic structure. Second, the origins of Taiwan’s VC policy are of interest to 
industrial policymakers since the local VC industry has been a central part of its high-technology 
competitiveness efforts. As I mentioned in this chapter’s opening paragraph, despite the VC 
industry’s contribution to the Taiwanese economic miracle, the sources of Taiwan’s VC policy 
choices have not yet been fully explored. As an illustration of the role of VC investments on the 
Taiwanese economy, its VC managers have invested in over 3,000 local companies and VC-backed 
technology companies constitute approximately half of all technology companies listed on the 
Taiwanese stock exchanges (Yeh, 2006: 22). Further, international competitiveness rankings, such 
as the one conducted by Swiss business school, IMD, rank Taiwan highly because of its local 
SMEs’ access to VC (Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the US, 2010).  
 
Third, Taiwan’s VC policies are of interest to numerous states’ policymakers given the 
achievements of the Taiwanese VC market. To this end, scholars have lamented that “Taiwan’s 
venture capital market is arguably the most successful engineered venture capital market in the 
world” (Gulinello, 2005: 848). Taiwan’s VC industry had become the fourth largest VC market in 
Asia (behind Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore) and the world’s third most active, in terms of deal 
volume, behind the US and Israel, by the early 2000s (AVCJ, 2005). The fourth, and final, reason 
why it is important to investigate the drivers of Taiwan’s VC policy choice is that Taiwan’s tax 
incentive has been one of the VC policy innovations identified in international VC policy circles. 
Accordingly, Taiwan’s tax credit is conceptualized as a VC policy diffusion item in this thesis.  
 
As brief background on the onset of VC policy diffusion in Taiwan, by the early 1980s 
Taiwanese policymaking elites had already come to believe that a local VC market, like that in 
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Silicon Valley, would be essential support to its burgeoning high-technology industry and SME-
dominated economy (Author Interview, Taipei, 6 January 2012; Yeh, 2006; Taiwan Info, 1986). At 
that time, VC was a relatively new asset class that had only achieved early success in Silicon Valley 
and Boston’s Route 128. As a result of its newness, hard evidence of the positive impact of VC 
investment activity on technology, innovation and the broader American economy was not yet 
available (Kortum and Lerner, 2000). Given the VC industry’s new, unproven nature at that time, 
how did Taiwanese policymakers come to be one of the first states outside the US to initiate VC 
policy diffusion? Further, after learning about the Silicon Valley VC policy environment, what 
shaped Taiwanese policymakers’ choice of their specific VC policy form? 
 
The first answer to the question about what has shaped Taiwan’s VC policy choice is 
functionalist. Here, the explanation is that VC investment activity was needed by Taiwanese start-
ups early on given the economy’s high-technology SME focus and its banks’ insufficient allocation 
of capital to SMEs. In response to their high technology SMEs’ need for early-stage financing, in 
1981 senior policymakers and private sector actors
69
 took a study trip to the US (specifically Silicon 
Valley and Boston) and Japan. Former Finance Minister, Kwoh-Ting (“K.T.”) Li pushed for the trip 
given his interest in learning about the drivers of technology clusters’ and VC industries’ success, 
especially Silicon Valley.
70
 As a result of the trip, the three men found that Silicon Valley’s VC 
industry, the university environment (Stanford University) and the Science Park were primarily 
responsible for its innovative environment (Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). Moreover, 
they had come to believe that a VC market, in particular, would help build out Taiwan’s incomplete 
financial services sector, promote its domestic technology start-ups, and help advance the local use 
of modern management techniques (Author Interview, Taipei, 6 January 2012; Saxenian and Li, 
2000: 4).  
                     
69
 The three men were the Minister of Finance, a partner of a major law firm in Taiwan and a partner from Hambrecht & 
Quist (Author Interview, Tapei, 5 January 2012). 
 
70
 A partner at H&Q “came to Taiwan and introduced the idea of VC to K.T. Li. He listened to the H&Q executive and 
then supporting VC became K.T.’s idea” (Author Interview, Tapei, 6 January 2012). 
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During, and beyond, the study trip the diffusion of information on the Silicon Valley VC 
policy environment had been transmitted to Taiwanese policymakers through an epistemic 
community of Silicon Valley and Taiwan-based investors and entrepreneurs. Then, as will be 
demonstrated in this chapter, Taiwan’s economic management norms and formal institutions shaped 
its VC policy adaption towards the deployment of tax-centric VC policies and a paper company – 
rather than LP – regulatory structure. As a result of these factors adapting what they learned of the 
Silicon Valley policy environment, shortly after the VC study trip, Taiwan’s Council for Economic 
Planning and Development (“CEPD”)71 passed a Ministry of Finance (“MoF”) bill that gave a 20% 
tax credit for first time VC investors beginning in 1983 (Taiwan Info, 1986). In this way, the 
chapter’s opening quotation about the necessity for Taiwanese policymakers to adapt foreign 
models to the local context foreshadows this chapter’s finding about the central role of domestic 
factors in adapting Taiwan’s VC policy choices away from the Silicon Valley policy environment. 
 
 To better account for the outcome of VC policy diffusion in the Taiwanese case, this chapter 
examines the impact of the confluence of international and domestic drivers on Taiwanese 
policymakers’ VC policy choices. Section 6.2 first provides context for the examination by 
detailing the VC policies deployed in Taiwan, across the funding, tax and regulatory components. It 
also introduces the history and character of the Taiwanese VC market that has grown in tandem 
with, and as a result of, its VC policies. Then, Section 6.3 investigates the impact of the external 
sources of VC policy diffusion, namely the primary diffusion mechanisms and the low-specificity 
Silicon Valley policy environment. Section 6.4 then explores how domestic factors, particularly 
Taiwan’s economic management norms, formal institutions and economic structure, have helped 
                     
71
 The CEPD is an advisory body to the Executive Yuan cabinet and is outside the “ordinary machinery” of the 
Taiwanese government (Wade, 2004: 196-198). In terms of how the CEPD fits into the policymaking process, the 
CEPD sets the broad policy plan, the IDB crafts specific industrial policies and then implements them (GRIPS, 2011: 2; 
Wade, 2004: 201) and the ITRI, III and other research institutes and think tanks help set industry strategies based on 
research in their respective industries (Breznitz, 2007: 100-135; GIO, 1986: 288). 
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drive its particular VC policy adaptation. To bring the findings together, the conclusion assesses 
how the combination of international and domestic factors have shaped Taiwan’s VC policy choice.  
 
6.2. Taiwan’s VC Policies and VC market 
To get started, this section details the three elements (funding, tax and regulation) of 
Taiwan’s VC policy choice. The below table summarizes the key VC policy milestones in 
chronological order: 
Table 6.1: Key Dates in Taiwan’s VC Policy Choice 
Year Milestone 
1981 
K.T. Li and Li-Te Hsu, former finance ministers, a partner at Hambrecht & Quist 
(“H&Q”), a partner at a Taiwanese law firm and a few others, took a VC study trip 
to the US and Japan 
Nov-1983 
Issuance of Regulations for the Administration of Venture Capital Enterprises and 
the “Project for Promoting Venture Capital Investment Enterprises” which gave a 
20% tax deduction to first time VC investors 
Sep-1985 
The Development Fund and Chiao Tung Bank provide NT$50m and NT$30m, 
respectively, to the First VC Investment Program 
Feb-1991 
The Development Fund and Chiao Tung Bank provide NT$1b and NT$60m, 
respectively, to the Second VC Investment Program 
Jan-1998 
The Development Fund appoints and funds the administration of the 3
rd
 VC 
Investment Program to the International Commercial Bank of China  
2000 VC investor tax credit discontinued 
May-2001 
Repeal of the Regulations for the Administration of Venture Capital Enterprises and 
introduction of the Scope and Guidance legislation 
Jun-2001 
Issuance of “Regulations on the Scope and Guidance of Venture Capital 
Enterprises” (hereafter referred to as the “Scope”; the “Financial Holding Company 
Act" in 2001 allowed financial holding companies to invest in VC 
Oct-2001 
Plans to strengthen the VC industry under the National Development Plan to be 
matched by the establishment of an NT$100 billion VC fund (NT$30 billion public 
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and NT$70 billion private funding) 
Feb-2004 
Amendment of Regulations on the Scope and Guidance of Venture Capital 
Enterprises to expand funding channels and ease restrictions on investment scope 
and fund utilization 
Sep-2004 
The Development Fund is placed under direct jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan 
(Cabinet) 
Dec-2004 
Executive Yuan places VC industry guidance and assistance under jurisdiction of 
MoEA 
2005 
Scope revisions require VC funds with capital commitments from banks, insurance 
companies, securities firms, financial holding companies or pension funds to apply 
to the IDB for approval 
2006 
Relaxed Scope makes it easier for investors to exit their positions by decreasing the 
required holding time of company securities and lifting the limit on share sales 
2008 
“Challenge 2008” has the Development Fund investing NT$ 30 billion alongside 
NT$ 70 billion in VC 
Mar-2012 
Bilateral FoVCF (Strategic Cooperation on Joint Investments in Venture Capital 
Funds) formed with the Development Fund and the New Zealand Venture 
Investment Fund 
Sources: Adapted from Yeh (2006), TVCA (2011), MoEA (2012), Executive Yuan Development 
Fund (2013) 
 
Whilst the Taiwanese VC policy efforts were first tax based, Table 6.1 illustrates that the Taiwanese 
government has also offered funding to its VC managers. Taiwanese VC funding has been 
channeled vis-à-vis co-investment in VC-backed start-ups beginning in 1985 (Pandey and Jang, 
1996). In addition, funding has come through a FoVCF structure, via a partnership with New 
Zealand’s FoVCF, beginning in March 2012 (MoEA, 2012).  
 
 Tax incentives were the first, and have been revered as the flagship, VC policy choice in 
Taiwan. Taiwan’s tax credit for VC investors was launched via the 1983 MoF issuance of the 
Regulations for the Administration of Venture Capital Enterprises (Kenney et al, 2002). The 
Regulations gave a 20% tax deduction for first time VC investors, as long as they maintained their 
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high-technology VC investment for a minimum of two years (TVCA, 2011). The tax credit was 
expanded to include corporations investing in VC funds in 1991 and this helped to expand the size 
of Taiwan’s corporate VC investor base (Kenney et al, 2002). Tax exemptions were also offered on 
the capital gains earned by VC managers investing in high-technology SMEs (Wang, 1995) and for 
earnings from VC monies that were reinvested in VC funds (Koh & Wong, 2005: 26). These tax 
incentives have aided the growth of Taiwan’s vibrant VC market and high-technology sector 
(Dietrich, 2003: 22). In fact, due to the very success of the VC tax credits in building Taiwan’s VC 
market by the new millennium, the VC industry’s 20% tax incentive was discontinued in 2000 
(Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012).
72
 
 
 Though not in a FoVCF structure, Taiwanese policymakers have been co-investing in start-
ups along with private VC managers via the National Development Fund (hereafter referred to as 
the “Development Fund”). These funding efforts first began in 1985 as the Chiao Tung Bank 
formed a VC fund by providing capital along with the Development Fund and the Sino-American 
Foundation, with the other 50% coming from the private American investment bank H&Q. The 
Development Fund and Chiao Tung Bank initiative was renewed in 1991 (as the Second VC 
Investment Program), when the USD 25 million fund was increased to a USD 75 million VC fund 
(Koh & Wong, 2005: 26-27; Kenney et al, 2002: 38-39). Additional government funding for the 
VC industry came in October 2001 as the Development Fund participated in the National 
Development Plan (“NDP”). Starting in the early 2000s and continuing until today, the NDP has 
raised 30% of its capital from the Development Fund and the remaining 70% has come from the 
private sector (Author Interview, Taipei, 6 January 2012).  
 
Taiwan’s first official FoVCF only came into being much later, in March 2012, as Taiwan 
                     
72
 As is discussed in the domestic factors section of this chapter, the decision to discontinue the tax incentive was also 
part of a broader change in industrial strategy, said to be driven by the March 2000 election of the DPP, which did not 
believe in sector-specific subsidies. 
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and New Zealand launched a bilateral public FoVCF via the Strategic Cooperation on Joint 
Investments in Venture Capital Funds, with assets under management of USD 160 million (each 
state has allocated approximately USD 80 million) (MoEA, 2012). The bilateral FoVCF involves 
Taiwan’s Development Fund and the New Zealand Venture Investment Fund (“NZVIF”), which 
has been modeled after Israel’s Yozma Fund (Lerner, 2009: 133-135). For Taiwan, the bilateral 
FoVCF affords access to “New Zealand's bio-tech, agri-tech and creative technology sectors” 
(Krupp, 2012). The Taiwan-New Zealand FoVCF structure – akin to the NZVIF and the Yozma 
Fund – requires that VC managers raise at least 40% of their capital from private sources and half of 
the investment capital will go to start-ups in each country.  
 
Prior to the New Zealand-Taiwan bilateral FoVCF, a quasi FoVCF had been in motion in 
Taiwan, via the Development Fund, beginning in the 2000s. For example, as part of the Challenge 
2008 initiative, the Development Fund committed to co-investing NT$ 30 billion when private 
investors allocate NT$ 70 billion to Taiwanese VC funds (Executive Yuan Development Fund, 
2013). Through 2004, the Development Fund had invested NT$ 62.5 billion in 42 different VC 
firms to “augment investment in the venture capital industry” in Taiwan (Executive Yuan 
Development Fund, 2013). Thus, prior to the bilateral FoVCF with Taiwan in 2012, FoVCF-style 
investments had occurred by way of the Development Fund beginning in the 2000s. 
 
Though the Silicon Valley VC regulatory environment has been the primary diffusion item 
in this case, the Taiwanese VC regulatory framework (the “paper company”) has not been 
consistent with the Silicon Valley LP structure. Instead, in the Taiwanese paper company structure, 
the VC management firm (private company) has a consulting relationship with the fund (paper 
company). In addition, Taiwan’s paper company structure has several attributes that differ from the 
LP structure. First, a central aspect of the paper company structure is that Taiwanese VC funds 
effectively have their own board of directors representing shareholders – investors in the fund, 
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rather than the VC manager, have authority over investment decisions (Yeh, 2006: 4). In this way, 
the VC management company only does the due diligence and makes recommendations for 
investments (Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). In contrast, in the American LP structure, 
the investors (LPs) do not have such rights, and instead the VC manager (the general partner) makes 
buy and sell decisions unilaterally. Second, in Taiwan only the VC management companies’ 
founders have equity stakes in the paper company (the VC funds). As a result, even senior 
employees do not have large financial interests in the profit of the fund (Kenney et al, 2002: 42).  
 
The third difference between the LP structure and Taiwan’s paper company structure is that 
Taiwanese paper companies do not have liquidation dates. This “evergreen fund” structure means 
that VC managers may run overlapping VC funds, instead of the American model of raising, 
investing and liquidating funds. The fourth difference is that Taiwanese paper companies are 
required to invest in registered firms (in the high-technology sector to be eligible for the tax credits, 
at least through the early 1990s). This requirement decreases the VC managers’ abilities to invest in 
seed opportunities as very early stage start-ups are oftentimes not yet incorporated as firms 
(Breznitz, 2007: 141). At least since 2006, the CEPD has been lobbied by Taiwan’s VC association, 
the TVCA,
73
 for the adoption of the LP structure in Taiwan as a means of better attracting 
international investment, but nothing has materialized as of yet (Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 
2012). 
 
Also different from Silicon Valley’s VC regulations, the Taiwanese regulatory environment 
has restricted the ways in which investors can exit, or profit, from the sale of SMEs. To exit via an 
IPO through the late 1980s, according to Taiwan Stock Exchange requirements, companies must 
first have five consecutive years of profitability (Breznitz, 2007: 140). Partially a result of these exit 
restrictions, in Taiwan a primary channel for exiting had been through the private, or grey, market, 
                     
73
 The TVCA was founded in 1992 by 22 VC fund managers in Taipei (TVCA, 2011). The TVCA was a private sector 
creation, and maintains its independence from the government (Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012).  
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instead of trade sales or public equity listings (Author Interview, Taipei, 6 January 2012). On the 
grey market, ownership stakes in VC-backed companies are oftentimes bought and sold via private, 
unregulated means rather than through public equity markets (e.g. stock exchanges). However, 
Taiwanese policymakers have created institutions to encourage public market exits instead of these 
grey market transactions. To this end, in 1988, the Taiwan stock exchange launched a third kind of 
listing for SMEs that had previously failed to meet profitability requirements. Then, in April 2000, 
the Taiwan Innovative Growing Entrepreneurs, an over-the-counter stock exchange, was launched 
to further help SMEs “overcome the hurdle of listing regulations” (GIO, 2001: 184). As a result of 
these efforts, VC exits via IPOs increased markedly and IPOs have become a primary channel for 
Taiwanese VC exits (Wang, 1995: 10-11).  
 
The last element of the Taiwanese VC regulatory environment that stands in contrast to that 
of the Silicon Valley policy environment is its VC fundraising restrictions. Taiwanese pension 
funds have not been allowed to invest in VC funds (Wang, 1995: 23; TVCA, 2011). Further, 
Taiwanese VC managers need to apply for a recommendation from the IDB (previously the 
Ministry of Finance) if they have capital commitments from banks, insurance companies or 
securities firms. There has been a limit on the percentage of a VC fund’s AuM that banks, insurance 
companies, etc. can constitute - with banks at 5% and insurance companies at 25% (Kenney et al, 
2002). Thus, unlike the Silicon Valley regulatory environment vis-à-vis the 1979 ERISA 
reinterpretation, launching a VC fund in Taiwan has meant securing the right percentages of capital 
from a restricted universe of potential investors.
 
These restrictions have been partially relaxed, as in 
2004 the MoEA drafted a relaxation of the Scope, to ease the limit on bank and insurance company 
investment amounts in VC (Yeh, 2006: 8). Yet, pension funds have still not been afforded access to 
investing in the VC asset class in Taiwan, which means a critical component of the Silicon Valley 
regulatory environment (the ERISA reinterpretation in 1979) has not been deployed in Taiwan.  
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To conclude this overview of Taiwanese VC policy choices, Taiwan’s VC policies have 
included funding (co-investments alongside VC managers and then a FoVCF beginning in 2012), 
VC-specific tax credits and a restrictive, non-Silicon Valley consistent regulatory framework. As 
introduced here, Taiwan’s VC policies have differed quite significantly from the Silicon Valley 
policy environment that its policymakers had studied. Rather than duplicating Silicon Valley’s 
regulatory context for VC investments and exits, Taiwan’s VC policymakers innovated a new VC 
policy tool by offering tax credits to VC investors beginning in 1983.  
 
The remainder of this section briefly outlines Taiwan’s VC industry evolution as further 
context for the investigation. The Taiwanese VC industry was established in the early 1980s, 
following the implementation of the first VC tax credit in 1983. The below timeline details the 
launch of the first VC fund (Acer’s Multiventure Capital Corporation) (Wang, 1995: 4) in 1984, as 
well as the next few VC fund launches and milestones in the Taiwanese VC market’s development: 
 
Figure 6.1: Taiwanese VC market timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Saxenian and Li, 2000: 5, Kenney et al, 2002: 21 
 
As previously mentioned, Taiwan had the world’s third most active VC market, in terms of deal 
volume, with approximately USD 10 billion under management by the early 2000s (AVCJ, 2005). 
Though not the largest AuM in the region, the Taiwanese VC industry has been the most active in 
Asia (in terms of the number of investments and exits), as well as the market “most similar to 
1984: Acer 
launches first 
VC fund 
1986: H&Q 
Asia Pacific 
launched 
1987: Walden 
International 
Investment 
Group launch 
 
1990: 20 VC firms 
operating 
1998: 59 VC firms 
operating 
2005: 105 VC 
firms operating 
Robyn Klingler-Vidra 138 All Politics is Local 
 
Silicon Valley” in its activity and investment behavior (Kenney et al, 2002: 29). Taiwan’s VC 
industry has not been bank dominated (as in Hong Kong) as it has had numerous corporate VC 
managers (e.g. Acer).  
 
6.3. External Sources 
 
Political economy scholars have lamented that economic competitiveness has been critical to 
Taiwan’s strategy to survive as a state (see Amsden, 2001). Taiwanese policymakers’ belief in the 
need for economic outperformance began when the state was formed in the late 1940s. But, from 
October 1971, when the United Nations voted to recognize the PRC and simultaneously expel 
Taiwan from the UN, there had been heightened urgency in the need to be economically 
competitive. In response to the ROC’s UN de-recognition, Taiwanese policymakers have had to 
pursue policies that would help ensure that trade and aid would continue to flow to the island 
(Greene, 2008). Taiwan received the trade and aid it needed from overseas. In fact, these inflows 
amounted to USD 4.5 billion by 1984 and had already been named as crucial to enabling the 
“Taiwan economic miracle” by 1986 (GIO, 1986: 237). As its largest trading partner, the US alone 
accounted for over 41% of this foreign investment into Taiwan (GIO, 1986: 239).
 74
 Given the 
critical role of American investment in Taiwan’s economy, a local VC industry is said to have been 
“at least partially conceived as a means to attract more investment from the US” (Author Interview, 
Taipei, 6 January 2012).  
 
More broadly, VC has been seen as a tool for improving the competitiveness of Taiwan’s high-
technology sector and therefore the state’s broader economic development (Wang, 1995: 4). 
Taiwan’s VC policy efforts have therefore been aided by the hope that VC firms would “integrate 
                     
74 The ROC’s official diplomatic relationship with the US wound down in the years following UN de-recognition, as 
the US severed diplomatic relations in December 1978 and closed its US Embassy in Taipei in 1979 (GIO, 1983: 346). 
US public and private exchange continued to flourish with Taiwan despite the unofficial relationship status (CEPD, 
2010). 
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capital, technology, talent and management for the purpose of upgrading Taiwan’s technological 
developments” (Executive Yuan Development Fund, 2013: 1). In this way, the Development Fund’s 
guidelines have aimed to:  
 
strengthen and aid in the development of the domestic venture capital industry, foster 
the continued growth of knowledge economy industries, enhance the nation's 
competitive ability, and accelerate domestic economic development (Executive Yuan 
Development Fund, 2013: 1).  
 
In recent years, competitive pressures to attract money for the Taiwanese VC industry has peaked 
interest in adopting the LP structure. More specifically, as Taiwan’s VC activity levels have 
declined, particularly since 2000, local VC managers have lobbied their industry association to push 
for the adoption of the LP structure. To this end, the General Secretary of the TVCA lamented that 
“if local VC managers want American money they need the LP,” and “the LP structure would be for 
foreign investors” (Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). Though the TVCA has lobbied 
CEPD, MoF and MoEA policymakers for an LP structure, it has not yet materialized.  
 
 In response to the early competitive pressures to grow a VC industry to support local high-
technology SMEs, VC policy learning occurred at the behest of policymakers such as K.T. Li,
 75
 
who has been cited as the “original champion of VC in Taiwan” (Saxenian and Li, 2000: 3). K.T. Li 
“promoted the conception of VC long before other Taiwanese policymakers were considering it” 
(Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). He set out to study the VC policy environment in 
Silicon Valley and Japan in 1981 as he saw the VC market as a solution to “Taiwanese SMEs’ 
insufficient capital” (Breznitz, 2007: 140; Kenney et al, 2002: 36). In this way, domestic champions 
of VC, such as K.T. Li, were pivotal to Taiwan’s VC policy learning process as they “studied the 
                     
75
 K.T. Li was a senior and influential member of the KMT part from the 1960s; Li was the Minister of Economic 
Affairs from 1965-1969, Minister of Finance 1969-1976 and Minister without Portfolio from 1976-1988 (GIO, 2001b: 
71). K.T. Li is called the “father of the economic miracle” in Taiwan, for his vision in building Taiwan’s technology 
industry. 
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options and then exposed the policy benefits and options to colleagues in Taiwan” (Author 
Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012).  
 
 The “Silicon Valley – Hsinchu Connection”76 has aided Taiwanese policymakers to learn 
about VC policy instruments and investment strategies (Koh & Wong, 2005: 27; Saxenian and Li, 
2000). This guanxi connection was formed in the 1950s when top Taiwanese students began 
moving to the US to study (primarily PhDs in engineering) by way of American-Taiwanese funding 
programs, such as USAID (Greene, 2008: 55). Then, in the early 1980s, Taiwanese policymakers 
began to conceptualize this brain drain as a “brain bank” and solicited the return of talent by 
fostering local high-technology sector opportunities (Wade, 2004: 191; GIO, 1983: 196). The local 
technology opportunities centered around Hsinchu Park, which had been K.T. Li’s creation. 
Hsinchu Park had been established in 1979 as an effort to build a Taiwanese version of Silicon 
Valley and to attract overseas Chinese back to Taiwan (Lee, 2000: 562). Through these efforts, by 
the late 1980s, 180,000 Taiwanese engineers were estimated to have returned from the US, 
particularly Silicon Valley, to Taiwan (Fuller, 2002: 16). The time Taiwanese students spent abroad 
has helped establish robust professional networks across Silicon Valley.  
 
More specific to this VC policy diffusion investigation, the “Hsinchu – Silicon Valley” 
guanxi have facilitated VC policy diffusion from Silicon Valley. In this way, the connection has 
“fostered transfers of institutional know-how as well as capital and market knowledge” (Saxenian 
and Li, 2000: 1). Taiwan’s VC policy epistemic community primarily consists of Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs and engineers at MNCs in the US, who have helped acquire information on Taiwan’s 
innovation-related industrial policies (Breznitz, 2007). Two of the key social agents facilitating 
                     
76
 The term “Silicon Valley – Hsinchu Connection” was coined by AnnaLee Saxenian and refers to the movement and 
interactions of people and capital between Silicon Valley and Taiwan’s local science park, Hsinchu, as well as the 
broader collaboration between these two high-technology clusters. 
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Taiwan’s VC policy diffusion process from Silicon Valley have been Dr. Ta-Lin Hsu,77 a senior 
IBM manager then VC investor in California, and Morris Chang,
78
 as they introduced VC to 
Taiwanese policymakers (Kenney et al, 2002: 25; GIO, 2001b; Saxenian and Li, 2000: 3). Dr. Hsu 
is said to have brought “Silicon Valley style venture capital to Taiwan” by setting up H&Q in 
Taiwan and educating policymakers in the Ministry of Finance and the Executive Yuan about the 
VC asset class (Author Interview, Taipei, 6 January 2012). Stan Shih,
79
 the founder of Acer and the 
first VC firm in Taiwan, has also been central to VC policy diffusion from Silicon Valley to 
Taiwan. For his part, Mr. Shih helped transmit the VC model by establishing the first VC firm in 
Taiwan in 1984. He has subsequently been quoted as saying that Taiwan's high technology industry 
development “is almost 100 per cent related to Silicon Valley” (Kirby, 2002).  
 
Silicon Valley has been the VC diffusion item in the Taiwanese case. The vague Silicon 
Valley idea has been diffused to Taiwan, but the vague nature of the Silicon Valley policy 
environment has allowed it to be adapted away from its neoliberal form. In Taiwan, Silicon Valley-
motivated VC policy efforts have been formed in line with preferences and constraints dictated by 
its local institutions and economic structures as the next section will demonstrate. An anecdote 
illustrates how Silicon Valley VC has been translated to Taiwan’s local environment. Instead of 
K.T. Li choosing the Chinese translation of “risky investor,” which is how the phrase venture 
capital would have been translated, he translated it to “start-up investor” so as to decrease the 
                     
 
77
 Dr. Ta-Lin Hsu is the founder and chairman of H&Q Asia Pacific, one of the first VC firms to enter Taiwan. H&Q 
Asia Pacific and was a founding member of the Technology Review Board, which advised the Executive Yuan on 
technology matters.  
 
78
 Morris Chang had been born in China, moved to Hong Kong in 1948 and then to the US to do his BSc and MSc at 
MIT. He then worked for Texas Instruments for 25 years and also got his PhD from Stanford University. Texas 
Instruments had sponsored his PhD in the 1960s and he had become Group Vice President there. He left Texas 
Instruments in 1983 to become President of General Instrument Corporation (1984-1985). Then he was recruited to 
Taiwan by K.T. Li to be the head of ITRI and, in 1987 he founded Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company 
Ltd.(“TSMC”) at the behest of K.T. Li (Author Interview, Tapei, 6 January 2012; GIO, 2001b: 13). 
 
79 Stan Shih has maintained relationships with senior policymakers; he was appointed as a technology advisor to 
Presidents Lee and Chen beginning in 1996 (Kirby, 2002; GIO, 2001b: 98) and has also been a Managing Director of 
the public research institute – the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI). 
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perception of risk in the asset class (Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). The point here is 
that Taiwan’s VC policymakers have synthesized new VC policy instruments that better fit its local 
context rather than try to duplicate the Silicon Valley policy environment. 
 
The Silicon Valley policy item’s low specificity has contributed to the Taiwanese adaptation 
of it. According to Taiwanese policymakers, rather than precise policies, they found that it has been 
Silicon Valley’s “generally enabling environment that has contributed to the VC market’s success” 
(Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). This finding contributed to Taiwanese policymakers’ 
desire to create a new VC policy item rather than try to recreate all the elements that drove Silicon 
Valley’s success. Taiwanese policymakers therefore designed initiatives specifically to replicate 
Silicon Valley’s university-centric innovation cluster outside of Taipei (in Hsinchu) and build a 
local VC market (Wang, 1995: 2). The Hsinchu Science Park’s late 1970s imitation of Silicon 
Valley’s science park exemplifies Taiwanese policymakers’ willingness to adopt more specific 
policy items “as is.” But, in the VC policy context, Taiwanese policymakers felt they had to do 
more than deploy a local version of one initiative; instead, they felt compelled to replicate key 
elements of the broad Silicon Valley environment. 
 
However, Taiwanese policymakers found that in the VC policy area a specific blueprint akin 
to the science park did not exist. Also, Taiwanese policymakers did not believe that Taiwan 
possessed the same generally enabling characteristics that facilitated Silicon Valley’s success. As a 
result of this assessment, they came to believe that more overt measures have been needed to jump 
start local VC activity. Thus, the non-specific nature of the Silicon Valley VC policy environment 
along with the acknowledgement of the other differences between the Taiwanese and Silicon Valley 
contexts, led Taiwanese policymakers to adapt their own policies. Taiwanese policymakers’ 
recognition of the differences between it and Silicon Valley also motivated them to learn from their 
more proximate states to help adapt their VC policies (Wang, 1995; Author Interview, Taipei, 6 
Robyn Klingler-Vidra 143 All Politics is Local 
 
January, 2012). 
 
To this end, Taiwanese policymakers have also learned about VC policy items in more 
proximate states. In this vein, a CEPD policymaker lamented that:  
 
Silicon Valley is a good example of liquid human capital and forming business 
ventures very quickly. In Taiwan we don’t have liquidity of human capital talent like 
in Silicon Valley. So, we have to also learn from Japan, Korea or Germany (Author 
Interview, Taipei, 6 January 2012). 
 
As a product of this belief in studying peers’ policies, agencies such as the CEPD have been 
mandated to keep abreast of “policies deployed by regional peers and the performance of peers’ VC 
markets, particularly Korea and Japan” (Author Interview, Taipei, 6 January 2012). Also, 
Taiwanese VC policymakers have regularly monitored VC regulatory developments in Japan, due 
to their “Japanese legal legacy” and “strong cultural affinity with Japan” (Author Interview, Taipei, 
6 January 2012). 
 
 In this vein, lessons learned by Taiwanese policymakers from the Japanese VC operational 
and regulatory environment have helped shape Taiwan’s regulations for its VC industry. Japan’s 
VC regulations (until 2002) had forbidden pension funds from investing in VC, prevented VC 
managers from undertaking their monitoring and control functions, and forced VC investors to 
accept “unlimited” liability (Kenney et al, 2002: 70-79). Moreover, Japan’s historically bank-
dominated, domestic and credit-biased VC industry, unlike the pension fund and institutional 
investor mix that is common in Western VC markets, is dominated by banks and insurance 
companies (31 per cent) and corporate VC managers (19 per cent), while pension funds and 
endowments only account for less than 5 per cent of investments in Japanese VC funds (Walter and 
Zhang, 2012: 140-141). The Japanese VC industry became more equity-friendly since the 1990s, 
but it is important to note here that at the time the Taiwanese policymakers studied the Japanese VC 
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industry environment, it operated without an LP structure, forbid pension fund investments in the 
asset class and had a high level of corporate VC managers participating in the market, relative to 
markets like the United States.  
 
 Taiwan’s VC regulations have drawn on several aspects of this restrictive Japanese VC 
regulatory environment. Most notably, Taiwanese VC policymakers found a VC market that 
operated without the LP structure. Moreover, Taiwan’s policymakers learned from Japan how to 
appease the risk-averse nature of local investors by using a corporate structure different from the LP 
structure in that it restricts the power that VC managers would have over investment decisions 
(Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). Taiwan’s paper company structure mimics the Japanese 
regulatory treatment of pension funds, also does not limit liability and similarly undermines VC 
managers’ power over investment decisions. As a result, the Taiwanese ideas of how to adapt VC 
regulations away from the Silicon Valley LP structure were impacted by what they have learned 
from Japan, starting with the 1981 study trip to Japan.  
 
 However, it should be said that Taiwanese policymakers have not simply copied VC 
regulations from the Japanese. Instead, they created their own paper company structure that has not 
been as restrictive as Japan’s unlimited liability structure. In this way, though Taiwanese 
policymakers learned from Japan in an effort to formulate more proximate VC regulations than 
those utilized in Silicon Valley, they have not merely emulated the Japanese regulatory framework 
either.
80
 Instead, following the 1981 VC study trip, Taiwanese policymakers developed VC policies 
– including regulations – that adapted the lessons learned from their studying efforts of both Silicon 
Valley and Japan.  
                     
80
 Taiwan’s adaption away from Japanese legal legacies and lessons learned from Japan is not unique to the VC 
industry. Taiwan’s financial sector laws and regulations have been adapted away from the Japanese model by the 
KMT’s leadership and their desire to suppress major business conglomerates (Aviles, 2009: 23). For example, in 
Taiwan “banks are prohibited by law from taking shares in the companies to which they lend or from having 
representatives on the board of directors, in sharp contrast with Japan” (Campos et al, 1996: 110). 
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Much more recently, the Israeli FoVCF policy item has been adapted in Taiwan. Taiwanese 
VC policymakers’ recently formed a bilateral FoVCF with New Zealand’s’ NZVIF (which was 
formed in 2002) in 2012 (MoEA, 2012). The bilateral New Zealand-Taiwan FoVCF has been 
shaped by lessons learned from Israel’s Yozma fund via the NZVIF and not through direct learning 
from the Yozma policymakers (Author Interview, Tel Aviv, 6 October 2013). The bilateral 
FoVCF’s structure draws particularly heavily on the experience of the NZVIF, which was modeled 
after Israel’s Yozma fund, as its managers underwent a “formal process of learning from the Yozma 
program” (Avnimelech, 2009: 22).81 Notably, like Yozma, the bilateral FoVCF requires private 
sector matching of funding (to the tune of 40%). In sum, Taiwan’s exposure to the Israeli FoVCF 
model has not been direct (it came through New Zealand’s knowledge of the Yozma model) and has 
therefore been the result of bilateral efforts with New Zealand. In this way, New Zealand FoVCF 
policymakers have acted as a public intermediary for VC policy information from Israel to Taiwan. 
 
6.4. Domestic Factors 
 
Taiwanese policymakers have been acutely aware of their domestic economic and normative 
context when designing VC policies. As an illustration of the centrality of local conditions on 
Taiwanese policymakers’ policy choices, they have been quoted as saying that each state:  
 
has its own model and approach to development, which are intimately related to its 
cultural, historical, and socio-economic background (GIO, 1983: 159). 
 
Taiwanese policymaking has been guided by this belief that industrial policies must be designed to 
fit the local context. This section details the VC-relevant characteristics of Taiwan’s institutions and 
                     
81
 Yozma founder, Yigal Erlich, was an official consultant to New Zealand policymakers when they created the NZVIF. 
He was so involved in the creation of the fund that he even chose the original (and current) manager of the Fund. He 
said that New Zealand is the state that most closely learned from and attempted to duplicate the Yozma model (Author 
Interview, 6 October 2013, Tel Aviv).  
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economic structure that have shaped the local fit of its VC policy choices. 
 
From a functionalist perspective, the economic structure of the Taiwanese economy had 
motivated the relevance of VC policies to Taiwanese policymakers by the early 1980s. For VC to 
have been successful in a local market, a Taiwanese interviewee quipped, there needed to be four 
things: “capital, entrepreneurial talent, investing talent and functioning stock exchanges – and 
Taiwan had all these ingredients” (Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). Similarly speaking to 
the existence of high levels of technology start-up activity, technology-focused SMEs have been 
said to be the “backbone” of the Taiwanese economy, in contrast to “many advanced nations, where 
conglomerates dominate the economy” (GIO, 1999: 172). In this way, SMEs have accounted for 
over 98% of Taiwanese companies, up to 80% of employment and 47% of the economic production 
(GIO, 2000; The Economist, 1998: 8).
82
 In addition to the SME-centric nature of the Taiwanese 
economy, by the year 2000 Taiwan had become a top global producer of high-technology products 
such as personal notebook computers and semi-conductors (Tsai and Wang, 2001: 65).  
 
Taiwan’s high-technology SME activity levels fostered demand for high-risk capital by the 
early 1980s. However, in the early 1980s, the providers of capital (banks) were not lending 
adequate sums to Taiwan’s burgeoning high-technology SMEs. As a result of the high-technology 
SMEs’ need for capital, Taiwan’s 1983 tax credit was launched with the following five goals: (1) 
provision of seed funds, (2) management support for technological enterprises, (3) guidance and 
assistance for the listing of the stock of technological enterprises on the stock exchange, (4) the 
transfer of technology from industrialized countries, and (5) the direction of long-term capital from 
other financial institutions to technological enterprises (Wang, 1995: 2; Italics added for emphasis). 
Here, the two Taiwan’s economic structure characteristics pointed to non-bank solutions for its 
                     
82 The prominent role of SMEs in the Taiwanese economy has been the result of policies that did not support national 
champions, choosing instead to focus on domestic SMEs producing computer components (Fuller, 2002: 19; Breznitz, 
2007). It should be noted that SME centrality to the economy is not unique to Taiwan; SMEs account for 60 to 70% of 
employment, on average, across the OECD. 
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SME funding gap. 
 
 As evidence of the genuine need that Taiwanese start-ups had for VC investment, the 
Taiwanese VC industry has had a substantive impact on Taiwan’s economy.83 This impact was 
attested to in a 2006 presentation given by Thomas M.F Yeh, the Vice Chairman of the Executive 
Yuan’s CEPD, as he lamented that Taiwan’s VC market: 
 
has made a substantial contribution to Taiwan’s industrial restructuring, SME 
development, high-tech industry incubation, job creation, and stability of economic 
development…Its impact on the nation’s most significant period of rapid economic 
boom has been remarkable (Yeh, 2006: 3). 
 
The Taiwanese VC market’s large impact on the local economy has been due to the domestic 
orientation of its VC managers and their investment targets. In this way, Taiwanese VC managers 
have been primarily investing local money as foreign money has historically accounted for less than 
7% of the investment in Taiwan’s VC market (Breznitz, 2007: 141). In addition to VC investors 
being local, the companies that Taiwanese VC managers have invested in have been 
overwhelmingly local, as nearly 80% of Taiwan’s VC investments have been in domestic start-ups 
(Dietrich, 2003: 5). The key point here is that the local VC industry in Taiwan has provided needed 
early-stage equity to local, high-technology start-ups since the 1980s. Said another way, had there 
not been a need for VC investments, the VC asset class would not have had such an impact on the 
local economy. 
 
Taiwan’s financial system, especially its banks’ control of credit away from early-stage 
technology start-ups through the early 1980s, helped to catalyze VC policy action. In the early 
1980s, when VC policy was first launched in Taiwan, its financial system was bank dominated. 
                     
83 If VC policy had been a political project only, and Taiwan’s local SMEs actually did not need nor want this form of 
early-stage capital, then VC would not have had a large impact on the broader economy beginning in the 1980s. 
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What’s more, a handful of banks had been so dominant over official financing in Taiwan that in 
1980 seven banks accounted for nearly 90 per cent of all domestic deposits (Wade, 2004: 159).
84
 
Taiwan’s high- technology SMEs could not secure access to these bank loans. Instead they had to 
establish credit lines with unregulated and unofficial sources (the grey market). As part of 
Taiwanese policymakers’ efforts to rectify banks’ inadequate provision of capital to technology 
start-ups, they set out to learn about VC policy items. Taiwan’s policymakers then established an 
off-shore banking facility, a unit trust scheme that has allowed foreign companies to take equity 
stakes in Taiwanese firms, and a VC tax and regulatory scheme (GIO, 1993: 235). Taiwanese 
policymakers have supported equity financing, particularly VC, to aid the growth of technology 
SMEs who could not secure financing from its historically bank-dominated financial system.  
 
 Moving on from the economic structure, I now examine the impact that the economic 
management norms have had on the forms of Taiwan’s VC policy choices. Taiwanese industrial 
policymakers’ economic management norms have preferred an indirect transfer of resources to 
target sectors, specifically via tax incentives.
85
 In this way, the Taiwanese policymakers’ orientation 
has been towards tax credits for the promotion of SME-produced technology sector exports (see 
Amsden, 1979; Wade, 1990; Fields, 2012). In part because of this aversion to direct financing, 
Taiwanese industrial policymakers chose to support computer components production as a 
strategically important sector as it did not require deep pockets and has been one of the world’s 
fastest growing consumer product markets.
86
 The Taiwanese Ministry of Finance began offering tax 
credits to the tune of 20% for high-technology sector R&D in the 1970s in an effort to support 
computer components production (Breznitz, 2007: 100-125; Fuller, 2002). In sum, Taiwanese 
                     
84
 The rigid financial structure through the 1980s was said to be politically motivated, so the state could monitor and 
direct financing as a means of limiting competing centers of private sector power vis-à-vis large companies (Breznitz, 
2007: 103-111). 
 
85
 Taiwan’s economic management norms have also preferred to support private sector production through the 
development of intellectual property at public research institutes, like ITRI and III. 
 
86 The semi-conductor market has had high annual industry growth rates (over 30%) and yearly sales upwards of USD 
300 billion (Ford, 2010). 
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policymakers’ pre-existing economic management norms have preferred tax incentives to spur 
high-technology SME activity.  
 
Robert Wade in Governing the Market suggests that Taiwanese policymakers’ pre-existing 
economic management norms have focused on the use of tax incentives because: 
 
The high priority to economic stabilization reinforced the position of the monetary 
authorities vis-à-vis the industrial authorities, limiting the use of selective credit as a 
primary instrument for steering the behavior of private firms as compared to Korea. 
Hence the government’s reliance on public enterprises, trade controls, and tax incentives 
(Wade, 1990: 296; Italics added for emphasis). 
 
In line with these pre-existing economic management norms, rather than direct financing of the 
high-technology sector, in the 1970s the state had reduced taxes on technology imports and gave a 
20% tax write-off for R&D expenditures. In addition, the Statute for Encouragement of Investment 
had provided investors with a five-year corporate income tax holiday for “newly established capital 
or technology-intensive projects” (GIO, 1986: 237). In this way, tax incentives were, therefore, 
already a “tried and true” strategy by the early 1980s (Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). # 
 
 Thus, by the time VC policy came onto the policy agenda in the early 1980s, the Taiwanese 
state had already been using tax incentives as the primary mechanism for its technology sector-
focused industrial policies since in the 1970s. Instead of trying a new policy formula, VC 
policymakers deployed the 20% tax incentive that had worked in the technology sector over the 
previous decade. Moreover, they did not “want to take risks so felt that it’s best to be consistent” 
with strategies that they know have worked before (Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). 
Similar to the 20% tax incentives given for high-technology R&D, Taiwan’s 20% incentive for VC 
investments in high-technology companies had been implemented as an effort to reduce “the 
amount of risk investors were taking with their investment” in risky technology ventures (Author 
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Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). In their various uses, the aim of the tax incentives has been to 
increase private investment in VC and high-technology SMEs (Wang, 1995: 2).  
 
Related to the tax instrument preference, as expected, Taiwanese policymakers’ private 
sector financing norms dictated that they have not committed large sums of money directly to the 
high-technology and VC industries. As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, Taiwan’s industrial 
policies for the high-technology sector have focused on tax credits, R&D provision and 
commercializing SME products and modest funding efforts (Greene, 2008). In this vein, 
policymakers have only given modest financing to private sector actors so that businessmen do not 
become reliant on public funding (GIO, 1983: 160). In the VC policy arena, private sector financing 
norms translated into the government offering tax incentives and co-investment partnerships with 
“Walden, H&Q and other VC managers, like Intel Capital and GE Capital” (Author Interview, 
Taipei, 5 January 2012). As a result of their private sector financing norms, Taiwanese VC 
policymakers have not allocated capital directly to VC managers without co-investment provisions. 
Given their preference for non-direct financing to the private sector, through the Development 
Fund’s co-investment, the government has offered modest support while decreasing VC managers’ 
risk on investments in Taiwan. In fact, their only FoVCF initiative came via the 2012 bilateral 
FoVCF with New Zealand. So, private sector financing norms steered policy choices away from 
funding, and instead towards indirect transfer via tax credits. 
 
Taiwanese policymakers’ company size and international versus local firm preferences have 
shaped its VC policy terms towards supporting local VC managers and start-ups. In line with their 
economic management norms that prefer policy tools that stimulate small, local firm activity, the 
government (the CEPD in particular) has encouraged local corporations, such as Formosa Plastics, 
to invest in the burgeoning VC asset class. To ensure that VC money has been going to local high-
technology SMEs, policymakers have restricted the tax incentive to privately held, Taiwanese 
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technology firms (Wang, 1995: 2). As a result of such incentives, many of Taiwan’s VC managers 
have been local technology firms that have succeeded and then invest in local start-ups. The 
corporate nature of Taiwan’s VC industry has then in turn shaped its subsequent VC policy choices 
as Taiwanese corporate VC investors have sought to buy companies for reasons other than strictly 
their financial return. These reasons include using the SME’s technology, acquiring a talented team, 
or heading off potential competition (Author Interview, Taipei, 6 January 2012). Also, Taiwanese 
VC managers have accepted the restrictive environment as it affords tax exemption (as long as they 
invest in high-technology SMEs) as well as the “prestige and credibility that comes with the special 
approval of the government” (Wang, 1995: 21).  
 
 The use of the paper company structure in Taiwan, instead of the Silicon Valley LP 
structure, has been driven by the preference for supporting local firms. More specifically, 
Taiwanese VC policymakers were found to have adapted the regulatory environment for VC since 
their local investment practices have dictated that investors typically have control over investment 
decisions. As evidence, Taiwanese policymakers: 
 
learned about the LP structure from the US, but they have changed the roles and 
responsibilities of LPs and GPs since Chinese people like to be involved in 
investment decisions. Chinese don’t like to give their money and then not have the 
chance to decide about how the money is spent (Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 
2012). 
 
As a result of VC policymakers’ sensitivity to local preferences, Taiwanese policymakers adapted 
the Silicon Valley LP regulatory structure for VC in Taiwan so that it pleased local investors. As a 
result of the adaptation of the VC regulatory structure in Taiwan, investors, not VC managers, have 
had the final authority over investment and exit decisions.  
 
Moving on to the impact of formal institutions, Taiwan’s VC policymaking process – which 
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has largely remained intact since the early 1980s – was found to have impacted the timing and 
shape of its VC policy choices. The insular Martial Law-era policymaking process allowed for the 
quick deployment of industrial policies in line with the preferences of top politicians and 
policymakers. By the early 1990s, Taiwan’s industrial policymaking process is said to have 
changed in step with this democratization (specifically the end of Martial Law in 1987 and then the 
lift of the national emergency rule in 1991). In this way, Taiwan’s “state corporatism” or 
“authoritarian-corporatist” political system of 1950 to 1985 evolved into a more inclusive model of 
“social corporatism” by the late 1980s (Wade, 1990: 228, 290). 
 
Despite political regime changes stemming from Taiwan’s democratization, however, the 
key actors and general framework of the VC policymaking process largely remained intact across 
both eras (Breznitz, 2007: 100-125; Author Interview, Taipei, 6 January 2012).
87
 Across both eras, 
the VC policymaking process has consisted of a “few elite leaders and technocrats” crafting policies 
(GRIPS, 2011: 6). VC policy’s consistent management over time stems from the industry and its 
policies not being solely the product or responsibility of a single ministry. This is because of the 
crucial role that K.T. Li played in establishing the VC policy; Mr. Li was not beholden to one 
specific ministry (as he was minister without portfolio) and neither has VC policy.  
 
As a reflection of the unchanged nature of the VC policymaking process, Taiwan’s VC 
policies did not change in step with Taiwan’s democratization in the late 1980s. The major VC 
policy initiatives had been launched during the martial law era; the 20% tax credit for investors was 
implemented in 1983. The first substantive changes made to Taiwan’s VC regulations and taxation 
had only been implemented in the early 2000s. At this time, regulations were changed to allow 
insurance companies to invest in VC. In the year 2000 the biggest change – in which the VC tax 
                     
87 The most significant change in VC policy oversight has been the shift of VC fund approval from the Ministry of 
Finance to the IDB, and the VC funding has remained under the separate purview of the CEPD. However, the funding 
and regulatory power has remained separate until today. 
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credit was repealed – took place. However, these policies took place nearly 15 years after 
democratization. The VC policy changes have been said to be a product of the further 
democratization of the political system, particularly the differing industrial strategy norms of 
Taiwan’s political parties (Author Interview, Taipei, 6 January 2012). More specifically, this was 
the first time Taiwan’s challenger political party (the DPP) took office, and the DPP then made 
industrial policy cuts in line with their less pro-business, and less interventionist, approach. To be 
sure, the discontinuation of Taiwan’s tax incentive has been found to be the result of the political 
leadership change:   
 
In 2000 all tax credits were discontinued by the DPP, except for R&D tax credits to 
really breakthrough technologies. They discontinued tax credits to industries that 
they deemed to be established and profitable – including the VC market’s tax 
incentive. There are now only 20% tax credits for special R&D (Author Interview, 
Taipei, 5 January 2012).  
 
In this way, Taiwan’s VC tax credit discontinuation in 2000 was just one of several industries 
affected by the DPP’s decision to stop tax credits. Though the VC tax credit discontinuation in 
Taiwan has not been the direct result of the 1987 democratization, it has been driven by a change in 
the political party in government, which would of course only occur in a democratic regime. 
 
Taiwanese policymakers’ distribution of budgetary power has reinforced their preference for 
using tax incentives, rather than FoVCFs, as the primary VC policy tool. The MoF had been the 
main regulating body for the VC industry from 1983 until 2005. During that time, VC managers 
had to seek “special approval” from the MoF to operate (Wang, 1995: 5) and the MoF launched the 
tax credit legislation. However, with the new regulatory package (the Scope) in 2005, the MoEA’s 
IDB effectively became the regulator. Since then, VC managers have had to seek fundraising and 
registration approval from the IDB. Though the IDB oversees the VC industry, it has had little 
authority over financing for the VC industry (Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). Instead, 
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the IDB has had more of a coordinating role as it has organized task forces to bring focus, energy 
and expertise to industry-specific policymaking (Breznitz, 2007: 100-125).
88
  
 
In contrast, the Executive Yuan’s CEPD has had budgetary power as it has invested 
alongside, and in, the VC industry via their Development Fund since 1985. However, the CEPD has 
not been involved in the tax or regulatory policymaking. Taken together, taxation and regulation 
have been under the purview of the MoF and the IDB while the CEPD has managed the VC 
industry’s funding. Since the policymaking and funding bodies have been separate in Taiwan, the 
creation of VC policies laden with financial support has not come easily. This stands in contrast to 
VC policymaking in Singapore where policymakers design initiatives and also possess large 
budgets from which they have been able to fund policies, such as FoVCFs. 
 
This distribution of policymaking power for Taiwan’s VC industry has also undermined the 
ability of private actors to lobby for VC policy change. To this end, as of January 2012, the TVCA 
director lamented that he did not “have a supervisory body to communicate with directly” (Author 
Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). The TVCA has been lobbying to change this, and specifically, 
to make the CEPD the supervisory authority for the VC industry since they already manage the 
Development Fund. The TVCA has also been “lobbying for regulations that allow pension funds to 
invest in VC for the last twenty-five years” (Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). While the 
TVCA has been lobbying on these various aspects of VC policy, they have not yet seen a 
substantive change as a result of their lobbying efforts. The TVCA’s inability to drive VC policy 
change stems from its lack of a centralized policymaking power.  
 
Finally, Taiwan’s VC policy adaptation has been shaped by its corporate tax environment. 
The tax rate in Taiwan for high-technology investment profits is zero as high-technology SMEs 
                     
88
 In fact, some say that the MoEA and IDB do so much consulting of private experts that the IDB “outsources” 
policymaking to semi-governmental think tanks such as the TIER and the CIER (GRIPS, 2011: 4). 
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have been categorized as “strategic industry enterprises” that have been afforded a tax holiday 
(Wang, 1995: 5-6). Only companies “limited by shares” have been qualified to receive these tax 
exemptions on capital gains in Taiwan (Wang, 1995: 10-11). As a result, the use of an LP structure 
“which would make VC investments eligible for the individual tax rate has not been attractive at 
all” to Taiwanese investors in technology-focused VC funds (Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 
2012). In this way, one of the aspects of Silicon Valley’s LP structure would have actually made tax 
treatment of VC investing less attractive in Taiwan. This is one of the factors that contributed to 
Taiwanese policymakers’ decision to use the paper company structure (as inspired by studying the 
Japanese VC policy context) rather than deploying a version of Silicon Valley’s LP structure. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
 
As Taiwanese policymakers have lamented, “every nation must respond to its own social 
background and economic conditions” – and this is precisely what Taiwan has done when making 
its VC policy choices (GIO, 1983). My empirical research found that policymakers did just this by 
responding to their local normative as well as economic conditions. Taiwan’s technology SME 
activity levels catalyzed its early VC policy diffusion. In response to technology SMEs’ need for 
funding, Taiwanese policymakers learned about VC policies as a means to increase the supply of 
capital and management expertise for Taiwan’s early-stage, high-technology SMEs. In addition to 
SMEs’ financing needs motivating VC policy diffusion, broader competitive pressures also 
stimulated Taiwanese VC policy diffusion. These broader competitive pressures have stemmed 
from Taiwanese policymakers seeking to employ policies that have driven the outperformance of its 
technology-focused, export-led economy.  
 
In response to these funding and competitive pressures, Taiwan’s highest ranking industrial 
policymakers organized a study trip to learn more about technology clusters, they focused on 
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studying the regions they had relations with and believed were most successful. Their boundedly 
rational determination led Taiwanese policymakers to study VC policy environments in Silicon 
Valley and Japan in 1981. Through the knowledge gained on this trip, elite policymakers, 
particularly K.T. Li, came to believe that VC markets had been essential to the success of the 
Silicon Valley cluster, and that VC would also be critical to Taiwan’s high-technology SMEs’ 
competitiveness. Following from their studies, Taiwanese policymakers formulated policies capable 
of developing a local VC market.  
 
Given the low specificity of the Silicon Valley policy environment, Taiwanese policymakers 
did not know which elements of the Silicon Valley policy context contributed to its VC industry 
success. In this way, Taiwanese VC policymakers felt they did not have a specific policy blueprint 
for how to create their local version of Silicon Valley. As a result, they took what they understood 
to be the positive elements of the Silicon Valley context (e.g. university-centric innovation and VC) 
and promoted their development in Taiwan using industrial policy tools that were tried and tested 
in the local context. In addition to the role of pre-existing economic management norms, Taiwanese 
policymakers have been impacted by their studies of VC policies in more proximate states (e.g. VC 
regulations in Japan). In this sense, Taiwanese policymakers have been empowered to synthesize 
VC policy forms based upon their bounded learning process.  
 
Given the role of the bounded learning mechanism, Taiwan’s economic management norms 
have been prominent in shaping the VC policy choices. As such, Taiwan’s implementation of 
‘medium’89 interventionist VC policies fits the Private Sector Promoter hypothesis for this proxy 
state. Acting in accordance with the Private Sector Promoter’s economic management norms – pre-
existing ideas about which policy instruments to use, policymakers’ preference for supporting 
                     
89
 Medium is the category assigned to the Taiwanese choice because tax incentives were the centre of gravity of 
Taiwan’s VC policy choice, at least until 2000. See Chapters 1 and 2 for more explanation of the interventionist 
spectrum of VC policy instruments. 
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SMEs (over MNCs or SOEs) and local rather than international, and private sector financing norms, 
Taiwan’s early VC policy choices were adapted towards tax credits. The Private Sector Promoter 
hypothesis did not, however, expect that Taiwanese policymakers would have created the paper 
company structure or the bilateral FoVCF. Contrary to analytical expectations, my primary research 
found that Taiwan’s unique VC paper company structure has been the result of domestic drivers. 
The paper company structure was designed to fit local investors’ norms regarding having control 
over investment decisions, implications of the domestic tax environment as well as the corporate 
nature of Taiwan’s VC managers. These other institutional characteristics had not been specified in 
the framework, but were discovered for their impact on VC policy choices, especially why 
Taiwanese policymakers have not duplicated Silicon Valley’s regulatory environment. 
 
The formal institutions of Taiwan’s elite-drive policy process – across both the Martial Law 
and democratic eras – allowed for the longevity of the tax-centric VC policies until 2000. Formal 
institutions enabled Taiwanese policymakers, particularly CEPD ministers and K.T. Li as the 
Minister without Portfolio, who held strong beliefs about the benefits of VC policy, to swiftly 
implement VC policies in the early 1980s given the concentration of policymaking, but not 
budgetary, power. Eventually, Taiwan’s democratization affected its VC policies as substantive 
changes to VC policies came in 2000, when the DPP was elected and did away with sector-specific 
subsidies, including the 20% tax credits for VC investors. 
 
In sum, given that Taiwanese policymakers learned about the vague Silicon Valley idea, 
some adaption was expected (as vague policy blueprints are expected to experience more adaption 
when diffused). Though the low specificity of the Silicon Valley policy environment contributed to 
suggested adaptation, the level of specificity did not alone account for the precise shape of Taiwan’s 
VC policy choice. Instead, Taiwanese policymakers’ VC policy choices have reflected their 
economic management norms and their adherence to domestic investor control practices and local 
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tax laws. Collectively, domestic economic norms overpowered the impact of competition for 
(American) capital on Taiwan’s VC policy choice. If competitive pressures had been the most 
impactful factor in Taiwan’s VC policy choice, there would have been higher degrees of 
convergence on the Silicon Valley model. Instead, bounded learning was primary, which facilitated 
the creation (and persistence) of Taiwan’s unique VC policy choices that fit local policymaking and 
investor norms. Taken together, Taiwanese policymakers learned about the Silicon Valley and 
Japanese VC policy items based upon their desire to build a local Silicon Valley. But, they then 
synthesized VC policies to fit the local political economy instead of duplicating Silicon Valley’s 
neoliberal VC policy formula.  
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7. Singapore: Financier and Director 
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
“You cannot replicate another Silicon Valley; Singapore had to do it our own way.” 
- K.C. Low, former manager of Singapore’s TIF (FoVCF), 12 September 2012 
 
 Singapore is the proxy for the Director and Financier typology, which expects VC policy 
choices characterized by high levels of intervention (particularly funding). As background, 
Singapore is one of the Asian Tigers, and considered an “economic miracle” by many (see for 
example, World Bank, 1994). To this end, Singapore transitioned from a “third world country to a 
first world nation” in one generation (Lee, 2000). Since gaining independence in 1965, the Lion 
City (Malay translation of “Singapura”), under the strong leadership of long-time Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew and the People’s Action Party (“PAP”), has attained infrastructure, institutions, and 
an economy on a developed country level.
90
 The private sector, particularly MNCs, have played a 
role in the Singapore industrialization story, but the omnipresence of the Government’s supportive 
tentacles in the economy can almost not be overstated.  
 
 For Singaporean policymakers to formulate their interventionist policies, they have picked 
winning sectors by “imaginatively discerning” which new technologies would be the next big thing 
(NUS Engineering Faculty, 2012). Based upon these visions of the future, the Economic 
Development Board (“EDB”) has actively courted high-technology and financial services firms to 
                     
90
 Singapore is classified as a developed country (or advanced economy) according to the IMF and World Bank. 
Singapore is also included in the MSCI World basket of developed countries, instead of the MSCI Emerging Markets 
group, which many of its neighbours are classified as. In Asia, only Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan and Australia are 
included in the MSCI World index (Korea and Taiwan are under consideration for Developed status as of June 2014). 
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establish their regional headquarters in Singapore (King, 2006). Through these efforts the state has 
helped integrate the Singapore economy into the world economy, become a top semiconductor 
manufacturing center, the busiest port in the world and a major financial center. These industrial 
efforts have been motivated by Singaporean political and policymaking leadership’s belief that 
Singapore’s economic competitiveness has been, and will remain, essential to the state’s very 
survival (see Han, et al, 2011). 
 
 Historically, Singapore’s entrepot economy and its policymakers have been focused on 
supporting large international firms. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Singapore’s high-technology start-up 
activity levels have been low (EDB, 1998; EDB, 2000). It is within this context that Singaporean 
policymakers have deployed industrial policies aimed at growing indigenous, technology SMEs. 
Policymakers’ interest in supporting SMEs began in the 1980s, as the Lion City’s reliance on 
MNCs was criticized as “quasi-industrialization” by influential Singaporean economists, such as 
Professor Lim Chong Yah (Han, et al, 2011: 140). In response to this critique, policymakers turned 
their attention to Singapore’s SME environment, in addition to working to continue attracting 
MNCs. In explaining SMEs’ need for government support, Singaporean policymakers have said its 
entrepreneurial ecosystem has been inhibited by its limited talent pool, regulatory environment, 
insufficient funding, and a weak entrepreneurial culture.
91
 To address these weaknesses, agencies 
such as the National Science and Technology Board (“NSTB”) and the National Research 
Foundation (“NRF”)92 have implemented policies focused on growing start-up activity and 
extending Singapore’s financial services offerings. Policymakers sought out information on how to 
best drive SME activity in a “if you build it, they will come” manner (Author Interview, Singapore, 
19 September 2012).  
 
                     
91
 The four pillars for economic strategies that were identified by the Technopreneurship 21 Ministerial Committee 
were education, facilities, regulations and finance (Ho, et al, 2002: 336). 
 
92
 Singapore’s NRF was named and modelled after the US National Research Council (Author Interview, Singapore, 19 
September 2012). 
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 VC policy diffusion began in Singapore under the umbrella of supporting local SMEs and 
further promoting Singapore as a regional financial center. In this way, VC policies have been 
pursued as part of Singaporean policymakers’ bid to have vibrant technopreneurship activity and 
innovation levels. As a result, Singapore’s VC policy choices have taken shape as policymakers 
have believed that a domestic VC market would help address the “dearth of early stage funding” 
available to any would-be technopreneurs (Author Interview, Singapore, 12 September 2012). 
Building the local VC industry, then, has been conceptualized as part of national efforts to increase 
local technology-sector entrepreneurial (coined “technopreneurial”) activity. The importance of a 
VC industry to technopreneurship and the Singaporean financial services sector has been repeatedly 
asserted by high-ranking policymakers. As an example, former chairman of the EDB (from 1975-
1981), Ngiam Tong Dow, said that VC companies have a “crucial role to play” for SMEs and 
innovation to take off in Singapore (Zhang, 2011: 182).  
 
 The Singaporean VC policy choices consist of adaptations of all three VC policy diffusion 
items – the Silicon Valley regulatory environment, Taiwanese-like tax incentives and the Israeli 
FoVCF. The first FoVCF deployed was the mammoth 1999 USD 1 billion Technopreneurship 
Investment Fund (“TIF”). More recently, a second FoVCF, the Early Stage Venture Fund 
(“ESVF”), was created in 2008 to seed new Singapore-based VC managers (NRF, 2008). 
Singaporean VC tax policy has included tax exemption schemes for up to 10 years (with a potential 
exemption for another five years) as well as a tax credit for investors’ losses in start-up investments. 
Finally, Singaporean policymakers also adopted the LP structure and have offered non-tax 
incentives for investors in VC funds. One of the notable non-financial incentives to promote 
investment in Singaporean VC funds has been the Global Investor Program (“GIP”) whereby 
foreign investors can obtain Singaporean permanent residency (“PR”) by investing over SGD2.5 
million in approved Singaporean VC funds (EDB, 2012). 
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 Why and how has the policy diffusion process resulted in these highly interventionist VC 
policy choices in Singapore? This chapter strives to answer this question by investigating the 
external and domestic sources of the Singaporean VC policy choices. To do so, the chapter is 
structured as follows. Section 7.2 identifies the specific elements of Singapore’s VC policy choices 
as well as characteristics of the Singaporean VC market. Section 7.3 examines the international 
factors that have affected the shape of VC policy diffusion in the Singaporean case. The external 
sources primarily include competitive pressures, learning, and the availability of multiple diffusion 
items of varying levels of specificity. Section 7.4 then turns to the domestic factors that have shaped 
Singaporean VC policymaking, particularly economic management norms, the formal institutions 
and economic structure. The Conclusion ties the findings of the international and domestic 
investigations together to ascertain how elements of the diffusion process have combined to shape 
Singapore’s VC policy choices.  
 
7.2. Singapore’s VC Policy Choices and VC Market 
 
 Singapore’s VC policies have mirrored much of the industrial policy strategies its 
policymakers have deployed from the 1980s through to today: courting international market leaders, 
building domestic expertise, and striving to become an Asian regional hub. In this way, Singapore’s 
VC policies have included funding schemes, tax incentives, and a market-friendly regulatory 
framework focused on attracting international investment. The following table details the key 
developments of Singapore’s VC policies: 
 
Table 7.1: Key Dates in Singapore’s VC Policy Choices   
 
Year Milestone 
1985 EDB Investments, a USD 100 million government VC fund, was formed to make 
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direct investments in high-growth start-ups 
1996 Vertex Venture Holdings (subsidiary of Temasek, the Singaporean SWF) launches its 
Vertex International Fund as one of the ten original Israeli Yozma Funds 
1999 NSTB, EDB and TIF Ventures co-invested with angels in the tech sector via the 
Business Angel Fund 
1999 Technopreneurship Investment Fund (TIF), USD 1 billion FoVCF, launched in April 
1999 Technopreneur Investment Incentive Scheme – loss insurance for investors in high-
tech start-ups 
2002 Broaden the scope of the TIF to attract all types of private equity fund managers (e.g. 
not just early-stage VC managers) to Singapore  
2002 Endorsed the recommendation of the Company Legislation and Regulatory 
Framework Committee, which resulted in Singapore establishing the LP structure  
2005 TIF was wound down due to scrutiny of its financial performance 
2008 The NRF launched the Early Stage Venture Fund (ESVF), by seeding six local VC 
managers with SGD10 million each, matching the private investor monies they raised  
2013 ESVF buy-back is opened up to international, not just Singapore-domiciled, VC 
managers  
Source: EDB (2000: 59), ERC (2002: v-vii), NRF (2008), TechInAsia (2013) 
 
 As shown in the table above, the TIF had not been the first VC funding initiative set up by 
the Singaporean government. In 1985, the EDB had launched a USD 100 million VC fund to make 
direct investments in local SMEs and in 1990 it launched the first seed stage VC Fund (EDB, 2000: 
58). Though not the first VC fund, the TIF has been a watershed in Singaporean policymakers’ 
financial support for the VC industry as the first FoVCF, and also in terms of its size (USD 1 
billion). Given that it was Singapore’s first policy initiative that focused on the VC industry and not 
SMEs, the 1999 launch of the TIF is identified as the first VC policy to be deployed in Singapore. 
 
 The TIF came into being as Dr. Tony Tan
93
 set up a ministerial committee to conceive of, 
                     
93
 Dr. Tony Tan has been a high profile civil servant and now politician. Dr. Tan was elected President in 2011 and had 
previously held senior positions across government entities, including being the Chairman of the Government of 
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and then to oversee, the Technopreneurship-21 initiative (Ho, et al, 2002: 336-341). 
Technopreneurship-21 aimed to replicate the “Silicon Valley and Taiwanese models,” meaning that 
policymakers strove to develop a robust ecosystem for technology-sector start-ups in Singapore, 
akin to those in Silicon Valley and Taiwan (Tan, 1999). The TIF role within the Technopreneurship 
21 initiative had been “to develop the VC industry by investing in local and overseas funds, with the 
intent of accessing deal flows and attracting them and their investee companies to Singapore” 
(EDB, 2002: 50). To be sure, the TIF was created to attract foreign investors, as its objective was to:  
 
make strategic investments in leading venture capital firms around the world, to 
promote the formation of indigenous fund management firms, encourage foreign 
venture capital firms to set up operations in Singapore, and in the process catalyze 
knowledge transfer and network development through overseas portfolio funds (Koh 
& Wong, 2005: 14). 
 
The TIF had several government affiliations to achieve these aims. The TIF was co-managed by 
two different units – the NSTB and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (Chia, 
2005: 27) – and was owned by EDB Investments Ltd.94  
 
 The TIF’s rapid distribution of capital in 1999 and 2000 conveyed a positive message about 
its potential. As evidence of the initial promise of the TIF, in 2000, a senior minister made the 
following comment about the TIF’s contribution to the Singaporean VC industry in its first year of 
operation:  
 
                                                                    
Singapore Investment Corporation (the Singaporean SWF), chairman of Singapore Press Holdings and the creator and 
head of the Technopreneurship 21 Committee and the NRF. 
 
94 The EDB Investments Ltd invests in high-growth companies domestically and abroad and invests across the VC, PE 
and corporate ventures channels. The EDBI co-managed VC funds include Cluster Development Fund, ED Ventures 
Pte Ltd, EDB Ventures 2, Pte Ltd, PLE Investments Pte Ltd, Mobile Commerce Venture Fund, BioMedical Sciences 
Investment Fund, Pharmbio Growth Fund Pte Ltd, Life Sciences Investment Pte Ltd, Singapore Bio-Innovations Pte Ltd 
and the TIF (Wang, 2002: 13).  
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More VC managers are coming to tap the huge pool of talent in the region. VC 
managers bring with them not only financial capability, but also management 
expertise and business network. The [US] $1 Billion Technopreneurship Investment 
Fund (TIF) launched by NSTB a year ago has greatly increased the presence of VC 
managers in Singapore (Heerjee, 2000). 
 
The 2002 Economic Review Committee (“ERC”) report echoed similarly positive comments, 
saying that the TIF had achieved early success in attracting VC firms and creating a 
technopreneurship community in Singapore (ERC, 2002: vi).  
 
 At the time of its launch, the goal of the TIF had been to attract world class VC talent to 
Singapore and to build a domestic VC market. In this way, the TIF’s managers were not only 
focused on the government’s financial return, e.g. getting its money back (Author Interview, 
Singapore, 12 September 2012). However, there was a change in leadership at the NSTB in 2004, 
and the new leadership “became intent on financial returns and was less patient in waiting for the 
long-term development of a VC industry” (Author Interview, Singapore, 20 September 2012). As a 
result of the new metrics, the TIF’s “first five years of operation had not been found to have 
delivered its new financially-focused key performance indicators, so the TIF was wound down by 
the EDB” in 2005 (Author Interview, Singapore, 12 September 2012). 
 
 The TIF has not been the last FoVCF initiative launched by the Singaporean government, 
despite the negative perception of its performance and its unwinding. In 2008, the NRF launched 
the ESVF to “catalyze the set-up of several early-stage venture capital funds” (NRF, 2008: 1). In 
this way, the ESVF was created to specifically address the “lack of funding available to 
Singaporean start-ups at the Series A and B Rounds” (Author Interview, Singapore, 13 September 
2012). The ESVF scheme’s structure and terms are more similar to the Israeli Yozma FoVCF model 
than the TIF had been, as unlike the TIF, the ESVF money has gone to newly formed, local VC 
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managers.
95
 In terms of the ESVF’s participation requirements, the six selected VC managers96 
have been required to have matching private investment commitments of at least SGD10 million 
from private investors. In addition, the VC funds have been required to invest in local start-ups to 
ensure impact on the Singaporean start-up ecosystem.  
 
 For its repayment terms, the ESVF scheme then gives participating VC managers the option 
to buy out the government’s investment within 5 years at the price of 1.25 times the NRF’s original 
investment (similar, but indeed different, to the repayment terms offered by Israel’s Yozma Fund) 
(NRF, 2008: 1). In September 2013, the ESVF terms were changed by the NRF to go back towards 
attracting international firms. The ESVF was changed to allow non-Singapore domiciled VC funds 
to be eligible. To this end, the NRF has said that “the goal of doing this is to attract more 
investment firms to set up in the country”(TechInAsia, 2013). 
 
 In addition to its FoVCFs, Singaporean policymakers have also offered several tax 
exemptions to VC managers and tax credits (on losses) to VC investors. This follows a tradition of 
Singaporean policymakers deploying industry-specific tax incentives, which they began with the 
1959 Pioneer Industries Ordinance (Kwong et al, 2001: 27). In the 1998/1999 budget the Finance 
Minister confirmed that tax exemptions for VC funds in particular would be extended on a case-by-
case basis for up to five years beyond the maximum of 10 years (MAS, 1998: 21). In addition, 
Singapore-domiciled VC managers’ profits have been made specifically eligible for a 10 year tax 
break (e.g. the tax holiday for pioneer industries) via the Venture Capital Incentive (section 97) of 
the Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) Act (Koh and Wong, 2005: 12; 
Dietrich, 2003: 50). The named inclusion of VC managers in the Relief from Income Tax Act came 
                     
95 Despite this domestic intention, Walden International, a well-established international VC manager, has received 
ESVF money for its Seed Ventures IV Pte Ltd (S4). The NRF selection of Walden’s fund was positioned as giving 
money to a successful Singaporean VC (Walden’s founder, Mr Tan Lip Bu, grew up in Singapore and attended 
Nanyang University) who had “pioneered many venture capital concepts in Asia” (NRF, 2008: 6). 
 
96
 The six ESVF VC managers selected in July 2008 are: BioVeda Capital II, Nanostart Asia, Raffles Venture Partner, 
Tamarix Capital, Upstream-Expara; and Walden International (NRF, 2008: 2). 
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on the heels of an ERC report that outlined the case for VC-specific tax environment improvements, 
including the exemption of management fee income
97
 from Singaporean tax, a streamline of PE/VC 
tax incentives into a single package and the removal of a minimum fund size to qualify for 
incentives (ERC, 2002). 
 
 Singaporean policymakers have also deployed tax incentives to help reduce VC investors’ 
downside risk. In this way, the Standards, Productivity and Innovation Board has offered the 
Enterprise Investment Incentives Scheme for start-up investors, such as VC managers. This has 
allowed VC managers to deduct up to SGD 3 million in losses incurred against their taxable income 
(Teng, 2011: 35). In addition, the Technopreneurship Investment Incentive Scheme has offered an 
allowance for tax deductions (up to 100% of equity invested) on losses from selling qualifying 
shares or liquidating investments in start-ups (Dietrich, 2003: 50, Chia, 2005: 27). However, 
Singaporean VC investor tax credits have not offered a tax credit for investors in the VC asset class 
as the Taiwanese VC tax policy innovation had done. Instead, Singaporean VC investor credits are 
only available for losses incurred, not for equity investments in the asset class. 
 
 The centerpiece of the Silicon Valley regulatory model, the LP structure, has been adopted 
in Singapore. The LP structure’s adoption was the result of the Technopreneurship 21 committee’s 
findings that the regulatory environment for SME investments could be improved (Author 
Interview, Singapore, 12 September 2012) and the ERC report that recommended its use (ERC, 
2002). Following the LP adoption in 2002, VC management companies in Singapore have been 
able to operate as LPs or bank associated VC funds (more typical of the Japanese model) (Wang, 
2002: 2). Here I note that the LP structure was adopted well after Singaporean policymakers had 
initially learned about the Silicon Valley model; the source of this delay is examined in the 
                     
97
 Performance fees were already exempt as they are capital gains (the VC managers’ share of profits from portfolio 
company exits). Management fees are the revenues VC managers make for running their funds, regardless of 
performance. Because management fees are not capital gains, they had not previously been tax exempt. 
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following sections. 
 
 The other piece of the Silicon Valley regulatory framework, the ERISA reinterpretation, has 
not been deployed in Singapore. To this end, large, local institutional investors have not been 
explicitly allowed to invest in VC funds. Instead, Singaporean VC policymakers have deployed 
regulatory incentives to attract international retail investors to allocate to Singapore-based VC 
funds. This regulatory incentive came in the form of the MAS’ GIP, which was launched in 2000 to 
increase the supply of international investment available for Singaporean VC funds. This has been 
done by offering permanent resident (“PR”) status to foreigners who invest a minimum of SGD2.5 
million in approved Singapore-based VC funds. The GIP has helped to raise capital for Singaporean 
VC funds, however, interviews with VC managers have suggested that the participants in the 
program are not necessarily good investors for the asset class.
98
  
 
 VC policymaking bodies have been created, and others have shifted focus, in order to make 
these VC policy choices. Committees and special foundations, such as the Technopreneurship 21 
Ministerial Committee and the NRF, have been formed and led by high-ranking ministers who have 
been given the authority to plan, fund and implement VC policies. As background on the 
Technopreneurship 21 ministerial committee, in 1994, Dr. Tony Tan had been tasked with 
designing policies to further Singapore’s knowledge-based economy. The culmination of his team’s 
five years of research and deliberations was the creation of the 1999 Technopreneurship 21 
initiative, in which the NSTB (and then the EDB) pledged to provide financial support, tax 
incentives and regulatory reforms for the VC industry (EDB, 2000; Author Interview, Singapore, 12 
September 2012). The second VC policymaking committee, the NRF, was established in 2006 as a 
department under the Prime Minister’s Office. The NRF was tasked with supporting Research, 
                     
98
 To this end, VC managers have expressed sentiment that GIP program participants have been “risk-averse and 
uninterested in the underlying VC investments” and have “just wanted their capital back in five years’ time” (Author 
Interviews, Singapore, 12 and 13 September 2012). 
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Innovation and Enterprise by setting a national innovation strategy and by allocating funds. 
 
 The Singaporean VC industry has become the third largest in Asia. The first VC 
management company in Singapore was formed in 1983 (the South East Asia Venture Investment) 
as a partnership between the EDB and an American VC management firm (Advent International) 
(Koh & Koh, 2002: 19). By 2005, there were more than 150 VC firms domiciled in Singapore (Koh 
& Wong, 2005: 11). In terms of their assets under management, Singaporean early-stage VC AuM 
has been estimated to be between USD 250 and 500 million as of 2012 (Author Interview, 
Singapore, 17 September 2012). But, when the Singaporean VC industry is defined to include later 
stage investments, the VC industry has USD 20 billion AuM. As Figure 7.1 below shows, the 
growth of Singaporean VC managers’ AuM has been remarkably steady.  
 
Figure 7.1: Singaporean VC Market AuM (USD billion) 
 
Source: adapted from Wang (2002), Chan (2006), AVCJ (2002), EDB (2002) and Low (2012); Since 1994, the AVCJ’s 
VC AuM figures have also included private equity, so these figures are higher than early-stage VC AuM alone. 
 
 Beyond the top-line AuM figures, the AVCJ has found that approximately 64% of funds 
raised by Singaporean VC managers had been invested in other Asian markets (Dietrich, 2003: 29). 
This high percentage of foreign investment reflects the propensity of Singapore-based VC managers 
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to invest in start-ups across Southeast Asia, China and India rather than in Singapore. In this 
respect, Singapore’s VC industry has been entrepot in nature, similar to Hong Kong’s, and unlike 
Taiwan’s domestically-focused VC market. 99 The international character of the Singaporean VC 
industry can be explained by its policies to attract foreign VC investors, the small amounts that 
domestic asset managers invest in VC funds, and the small pools of Singaporean SMEs in which to 
invest. Finally, there are a number of VC managers investing in very early-stage start-ups and later, 
growth stage firms. However, there have historically been only a few VC managers in the Series A 
and B rounds (e.g. between 500k and 2 million) range (Author Interview, Singapore, 13 September 
2012).  
 
7.3. External Sources 
 
 Singaporean policymakers have believed that economic competitiveness, stemming from its 
ability to innovate and its position as a manufacturing and financial services entrepot, has been 
essential to the state’s survival. Singapore has experienced specific competitive pressures vis-à-vis 
Taiwan as a regional technology competitor and Hong Kong as a financial center. These 
competitive pressures have driven policymakers to deploy policies designed to help Singapore 
better compete against these rivals (see, for example, the Financial Services Working Group report 
of 2002; Tan et al, 2004: 1-2). In this way, Singaporean policymaking elite have possessed “core 
beliefs” that they must support private sector actors in order to compete by maintaining its 
manufacturing prowess at affordable prices and its ability to “attract top talent” (King, 2006: 145; 
Han, et al, 2011).  
 
 In response to these broad competitive pressures, Singaporean policymakers have learned 
about, and then adapted, all three VC policy diffusion items – the Israeli, Silicon Valley and 
                     
99
 In comparison, 74% of Taiwanese VC investments have historically gone to Taiwanese companies (Koh & Wong, 
2005: 26). 
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Taiwanese VC policy items. In Singapore, learning has not been unique to the VC policy area as 
Singaporean policymakers have often been cited for their research of other countries’ best practices 
when crafting industrial policies. There are numerous examples of Singaporean policymakers 
learning from foreign sources. A few of these examples are Singapore’s deployment of adaptations 
of Israel’s national military service and government incubator scheme for high-tech start-ups 
(Author Interview, Singapore, 19 September 2012). Other examples are how the Singaporean state 
has learned to measure its policies’ performance from Shell Corporation (Han, et al, 2011), the 
government’s 1997 commissioning of McKinsey & Co to review their financial services sector 
strategy and hiring of Arthur D. Little to assess their financial sector IT strategy (Lee, 1998). Given 
the pervasiveness of Singaporean policymakers’ studying efforts, scholars have lamented that 
Singaporean policymaking has been powered by “a dedication to learning from international best 
practices and diligent implementation and documentation of plans and outputs” (Ohno, 2011). To 
this end, to facilitate their VC policy learning, policymakers have conducted “study trips,” and have 
constructed panels of international experts for their input (Author Interview, Singapore, 13 
September 2012).  
 
 In Singapore, learning about successful policies from abroad has been favored over learning 
through domestic policy experimentation. In this way, Singaporean VC policymakers have not 
wanted to be “the first mouse to get the cheese because the first mouse dies” (Author Interview, 
Singapore, 20 September 2012). Instead, Singaporean policymakers have preferred to be the second 
mouse to get the cheese (as the second mouse wins). Said another way, they have preferred to be the 
second country to deploy an already proven policy instead of developing an untested – and 
therefore conceivably risky – policy. To do this, policymakers have rigorously gathered information 
on foreign models and have then scrutinized how they could “adapt the policies to recreate the same 
set of circumstances in Singapore” (Author Interview, Singapore, 12 September 2012). Similarly, 
an interviewee lamented that policymakers ascertain “whether Singapore has the factors that 
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contributed to its success and how we can replicate them” (Author Interview, Singapore, 20 
September 2012).  
 
 Singapore’s VC policy diffusion was initiated in the late 1990s. As a result of Singapore’s 
late policy diffusion, all three of the VC policy items were already in existence. This enabled 
Singaporean VC policymakers to learn about each of the existing items. The states that Singaporean 
policymakers say they have learned the most from are those who are most relevant to Singapore and 
those policy models with the most impressive track records. Thus, they have focused on policy tools 
that are relevant in light of their “small population and focus on strong economic performance and 
innovativeness” (Author Interview, Singapore, 12 September 2012). Taiwan and Israel have been 
studied by Singaporean policymakers given their similar small size and geopolitical challenges.
 100
 
In addition to Singaporean policymakers’ perception of their proximity to these states, they have 
also been attracted to these items given their implementation successes. Singaporean policymakers 
studied Israel’s start-up cluster and VC industry success, and the role of government policy, 
particularly Yozma, in aiding the performance (Author Interview, Tel Aviv, 6 October 2013). In 
contrast, Singaporean policymakers’ studying of Silicon Valley has been more of a function of the 
cluster’s exceptional success and less of a feeling of affinity or proximity (Author Interviews, 
Singapore, 12 September 2012). Taken together, Singaporean policymakers have learned about all 
three VC policy items in order to ensure that Singapore is utilizing global, as well as proximate, 
best in breed tools.  
 
 A desire to replicate the Silicon Valley and Taiwanese innovation clusters had initially been 
the motivation for the learning that took place in the context of the Technopreneurship 21 
                     
100 Singaporean policymakers focus on Taiwan and Israel as proximate states for three reasons. One, they are both 
relatively small states, with populations of approximately 7 million (Israel) and 23 million (Taiwan) and small land 
masses (historically without hinterlands, though the Taiwan-Chinese economic relations have been improving so 
increasingly Taiwanese policymakers and private sector actors may see the PRC as its hinterland). In addition, 
Singaporean policymakers and politicians have spoken about the similarities to these two states in terms of security-
laden issues with neighbors. Third, both states have similarly given direct funding to specific industries to aid their 
development.  
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committee’s initiatives: 
 
around the time of the creation of the Technopreneurship Committee in 1994 the 
feeling shifted to one of believing that SME activity, such as that in Taiwan or in 
Silicon Valley, was needed to transition Singapore to its next successful phase 
(Author Interview, Singapore, 12 September 2012). 
 
This sentiment was reiterated by the head of the Technopreneurship 21 initiative when he said that 
they intended to “encourage entrepreneurs to commercialize technology to develop another Silicon 
Valley or Taiwan” (Tan, 1999: 12). After establishing its goal, the Technopreneurship 21 committee 
members made numerous study trips to countries and clusters deemed to have succeeded in this 
regard, including the “US (over 10 trips to Silicon Valley), Israel, Ireland, Scandinavian countries, 
Germany and Switzerland” (Author Interview, Singapore, 12 September 2012). According to K.C. 
Low, who was the head of funding programs for the Technopreneurship 21 committee and later the 
manager of the TIF, the aim of these study trips had been to “distil the essence of what the countries 
have done right, and then adapt it to the Singaporean context.” In addition to these study trips, K.C. 
Low lived in Silicon Valley in 1996 and 1997 to “ensure he thoroughly understood the Silicon 
Valley model” (Author Interview, Singapore, 12 September 2012; Italics added for emphasis).  
 
 Though Singaporean VC policymakers studied the Silicon Valley policy environment in the 
1990s, Singapore did not adopt the LP regulation for its VC industry until recommended to do so 
several years later. My research revealed that the LP structure had not been adopted in the 1990s 
because Singaporean policymakers believed that they already offered private companies, including 
VC management firms, an attractive regulatory offering. More specifically, Singapore’s the private 
company limited structure (which is notated as Pte Ltd) offers tax and limited liability treatments 
that are as attractive as the LP structure, if not more so. This is because the Pte Ltd is capital gains 
tax exempt, offers owners a separate entity so that liability for any debts or legal proceedings go in 
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the company’s name alone, limits investors’ liabilities, and allows the issuance of new shares to 
new shareholders (GuideMeSingapore, 2013).
101
 Due to the Pte Ltd’s offering’s, the LP structure 
had not been deemed to be needed from an operational point of view. But, in 2002 the adoption of 
the LP structure came as an effort to be “obviously familiar to international, especially American 
investors, by having a VC fund structure that is the same in name and in function” as the LP 
structure popular in Silicon Valley (Author Interview, Singapore, 17 September 2012).  In sum, the 
delay in adopting the LP structure had been a reflection of the fact that Singaporean policymakers 
felt that the Pte Ltd already offered their locally domiciled VC managers all the advantages of the 
LP structure. But ultimately, the LP structure was adopted to help attract international investors. 
 
 Singaporean policymakers’ interest in the Taiwanese policy item had been initiated by 
networks, but not personal sector guanxi; personal connections across senior ministerial levels. 
More specifically, high-level conversations between Taiwan’s then Minister without Portfolio K.T. 
Li and Singapore’s then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew about supporting innovation clusters and 
VC industries helped prompt Singapore’s interest in studying Taiwan’s VC policy environment 
(Author Interview, Taipei, 5 January 2012). Following on from these high-level discussions, former 
Prime Minister Lee charged his Singaporean policymakers to closely study the Taiwanese 
programs. Shortly thereafter, they crafted the EDB VC fund (akin to Taiwan’s National 
Development Fund) and ensured that VC managers had favorable tax treatment (Singapore offered 
VC managers tax exemption but they did not go as far as to offer a tax credit to VC investors as 
Taiwan had until much later). In 1999, however, as part of the Technopreneurship initiative that 
aimed to foster a local version of Taiwan, Singapore’s policymakers deployed an adaptation of 
Taiwan’s tax credit. Singapore gave tax credits for losses incurred on start-up investments (EDB, 
                     
101
 The seven advantages of the Pte Ltd structure are as follows: (1) separate legal entity with its own legal identity, (2) 
limited liability entity, (3) perpetual succession – the company’s persistence does not depend on the involvement of any 
of its members, (4) ease of raising capital – able to issue shares to new shareholders, (5) credible image, (6) easier 
transfer of ownership and (7) tax benefits and incentives including a low corporate tax rate (less than 9% for profits up 
to SGD 300,000 and up to 17% for profits over SGD 300,000), a capital gains tax exemption and dividends can be 
distributed to shareholders tax free (no double taxation at the entity and shareholder levels) (GuideMeSingapore, 2013). 
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2000) rather than a tax credit for the amount invested as Taiwan had done. 
 
 Beginning in the late 1990s, Singaporean policymakers specifically set out to learn about the 
Israeli VC policy item. Singaporean policymakers had become aware of the Israeli Yozma 
initiatives as a subsidiary of the Singaporean SWF Temasek (Vertex Venture Holdings) was one of 
the original LPs to participate in the Yozma Fund, as it launched Vertex International in 1996 
(Avnimelech, 2009). In addition, around that same time, the Technopreneurship 21 committee 
policymakers conducted study trips to Israel to learn more about Yozma. As a result of these trips, 
and their subsequent communications with the Israeli Chief Scientist Office, the Technopreneurship 
Committee “learned from Israel how to bring the private sector in” so that the FoVCF initiative (the 
TIF) was “not just comprised of government money” (Author Interview, Singapore, 12 September 
2012). More specifically, EDB and NRF policymakers have sent numerous delegations to meet with 
the Office of the Chief Scientist and the Yozma management team (Author Interview, Tel Aviv, 6 
October 2013). Singaporean VC policymakers study trips to Israel have been quite frequent; 
in some cases once a year and in other cases as frequent as every two months (Author 
Interview, Singapore, 18 September 2012).  
 
 More recently, while the NRF was conducting their research prior to the launch of the 
National Innovation and Enterprise Framework for the Next Stage of Economic Growth in 2008, 
they also studied the Israeli FoVCF item. As part of these efforts, a delegation led by the then NRF 
chairman, Dr. Tony Tan, visited Israel in 2008 to better formulate Singapore’s second FoVCF, the 
ESVF. Dr. Tan shared what the delegation learned about the Israeli Yozma Fund and its impact on 
the Israeli VC industry:   
 
In the early 1990s, the Office of the [Israeli] Chief Scientist also ensured that start-up 
companies have a fair chance of receiving venture capital funding at its early stage of 
growth. This was done by creating a number of early stage venture funds to invest in 
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Israeli start-ups. In addition to providing this much needed source of funding, this 
program ultimately resulted in the development of a healthy venture capital industry 
in Israel. Israel’s venture capital funds, unlike those in other countries, invest 
substantially in early stage Israeli start-ups and are now a US$1.4b industry (NRFb, 
2008:2; Italics added for emphasis). 
 
Dr. Tan’s 2008 statement demonstrates that he and his fellow NRF policymakers had learned about 
the value that had been derived from the domestic focus of the Israeli FoVCF model.  
 
 The result of Singaporean policymakers’ learning about the Israeli FoVCF policy item has 
been the launch of its two FoVCFs, the TIF and ESVF. Both of Singapore’s FoVCFs have 
replicated several of the key attributes of Israel’s Yozma fund. In a similar fashion to the Israeli 
Yozma Fund, Singapore’s first FoVCF, the TIF, offered matching funds at very attractive 
repayment terms to VC managers. However, the Technopreneurship 21 committee purposefully 
adapted the TIF to be different than the Yozma model. First, Singaporean policymakers multiplied 
the size of the FoVCF so that the TIF was ten times larger (USD 1 billion) than Israel’s Yozma 
Fund (USD 100 million). Second, the TIF gave 75% of its funding to international VC managers, 
whereas the Yozma Fund only invested in domestic VC managers. In this way, “unlike the Israeli 
Yozma Fund that focused exclusively on supporting domestic VC managers, the larger TIF was 
designed to attract world class VC managers to Singapore” (Author Interview, Singapore, 12 
September 2012). To this end, the TIF invested only 25% of its resources
102
 into local VC managers 
(Wilkin, 2004). The drivers of the TIF’s adaptations of the Israeli FoVCF will be explored in the 
next section. 
 
 The ESVF, unlike the TIF, had initially been focused specifically on domestic VC 
managers, as the Yozma model had been. To this end, unlike the TIF’s international focus, in the 
                     
102 The USD 1 billion TIF was divided into three sub-funds: USD 500 million went into a broad based fund, USD 250 
million for a strategic fund and USD 250 million for an early stage fund (Dietrich, 2003: 51). 
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2008 launch of the ESVF, Singaporean VC policymakers reverted back to learning about the 
domestic focus of the Israeli FoVCF when designing the ESVF. The domestic focus had been the 
result of the TIF’s winding down and poor performance, paired with policymakers’ research on 
where local VC managers were “missing” in the early-stage financing landscape (Author Interview, 
Singapore, 12 September, 2012). However, in September 2013 the ESVF was shifted back towards 
attracting international VC managers. The Yozma policy item contains both domestic focus and 
international firm attraction elements – as money went (mostly) to domestic VC managers that 
raised matching funds from international investors. While the 2008 iteration of the ESVF focused 
on the allocation of money to closed-end Singaporean domiciled VC funds, the 2013 change shifted 
the ESVF back in line with domestic preferences for attracting international VC managers, rather 
than pairing international investors with fledgling local VC managers. 
 
7.4. Domestic Factors 
 
 The first domestic factor examined in the Singaporean case is the impact of Singapore’s 
economic structure, especially its low SME activity levels, on the timing of its VC policy diffusion. 
Historically, Singapore’s economic structure has been centered on MNC production and 
employment. To this end, Singapore has not had the high-technology sector SME activity levels 
that clusters like Taiwan, Israel or Silicon Valley have had. Again, unlike Taiwan (and also Hong 
Kong) who had large inflows of Chinese entrepreneurs, Singapore “faced a severe dearth of 
industrial entrepreneurs” during its industrialization (Abeysinghe, 2007: 4). To compensate for the 
deficiency, Singapore’s economic structure had been built around MNC manufacturing rather than 
SME activities until the 1980s. Even today, entrepreneurship levels remain low in Singapore, 
despite nearly thirty years of government efforts to entice further technopreneurship activity.  
 
 As evidence of Singapore’s low SME activity levels, only 5% of new company registrations 
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in 2012 were categorized within the IT umbrella (GuideMeSingapore, 2013: 7). In addition, 
Singapore’s total early-stage entrepreneur rate (of 6.6% in 2011) placed it at a very average 12th out 
of 24
th
 place amongst comparable countries (NTU Ventures, 2011: 10). In recent years (e.g. since 
2009) technopreneurial activity has been rising as the Department of Statistics reported that 56,778 
new businesses were formed in 2012 alone (Qiuyi, 2013). But, in light of the low levels of SME 
activity at the time of Singapore’s initial VC policy action, its VC policy diffusion has not been 
found to be in response to local start-ups’ need for early-stage financing. Instead, a shift in 
Singaporean policymakers’ economic management norms in favor of wanting more local SME 
activity led to the onset of VC policy diffusion (via bounded learning). 
 
 The Singaporean financial sector’s bank or capital market focus is the other element of the 
economic structure that is examined here. Singapore’s financial sector has only had a neutral impact 
on the timing of its VC policy diffusion. This is because Singapore’s banking and capital market 
industries have both been vibrant, so credit-based financing has not overshadowed VC policy 
diffusion (as has been the situation in the next case, of Vietnam). As evidence of the relative 
balance of the banking and capital markets sectors in Singapore, the market capitalization of the 
Singapore Exchange, as of the end of 2012, was just over SGD 935 billion (equivalent to USD 760 
billion)(Xinhuanet, 2013), Singapore’s asset management industry has had around USD 865 billion 
AuM (Lindsay, 2010), and its banking and finance industry’s assets/liabilities have hovered around 
SGD 1 trillion (MAS, 2013: 99).  
 
 Singaporean policymakers’ economic management norms have had a marked impact on 
Singapore’s VC policy choices. As background, Singaporean industrial policymaking has been 
characterized by its interventionist beliefs, its policymakers’ high levels of expertise, its 
concentration of policymaking and budgetary power and its policymakers’ “dogmatic” adherence to 
core economic management norms (Author Interview, Singapore, 11 September 2012). Singaporean 
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industrial policy has struck a delicate balance between directing resources and activity in nearly all 
segments of its economy while also simultaneously encouraging the private sector to operate freely. 
In this way, policymakers’ broad economic management norms have driven them to design policies 
that stimulate private sector activity, not to replace or crowd out the private sector with public 
production or money.  
 
 Singaporean policymakers’ pre-existing economic management norms have dictated that the 
government should encourage private sector activity via funding initiatives. Moreover, 
policymakers have believed that the state’s funding has at times been a necessary catalyst for 
private investment (Author Interview, Singapore, 12 September 2012). These interventionist norms 
have been said to be the result of experience; the state’s “financial support for industry has worked 
thus far,” so policymakers “have continued to use similar strategies” as they design new industrial 
policies (Author Interview, Singapore, 20 September 2012). In addition, Singapore’s VC 
policymakers have preferred to deploy funding solutions as “the inputs and outputs are easier to 
measure, as opposed to more qualitative efforts such as training” (Author Interview, Singapore, 20 
September 2012).  
 
 In this vein, Singaporean policymakers’ interventionist economic management norms drove 
them to adapt the neoliberal Silicon Valley policy environment to their local context. Here, the 
comments of the founder and former manager of the TIF, K.C. Low, offer a telling illustration of 
the impact of their interventionist norms on their adaptation of the Silicon Valley policy 
environment: 
 
I spent two years based in Silicon Valley (1996-1997) to make sure I really 
understood how Silicon Valley works. When speaking with members of the Silicon 
Valley community they repeatedly say that they want the government out, and that 
Silicon Valley is a product of private effort, not government help. But, Singapore is 
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different, Silicon Valley evolved over a period of 30 to 40 years, and the US is a 
huge market, etc. I knew that Singapore had to use different, more specific 
techniques (Author Interview, Singapore, 12 September 2012; Italics added for 
emphasis).
 
 
 
Singaporean policymakers found the drivers of Silicon Valley’s success to be broad, e.g. over the 
course of 40 years, and not LP structure or ERISA reinterpretation specific (Author Interview, 
Singapore, 12 September 2012). As a result of their findings that the Silicon Valley policy 
environment did not offer a blueprint that could be replicated, coupled with their interventionist 
inclination, they turned to studying other more specific items. Therefore, it has not been the case 
that Singaporean VC policymakers only learned about successful interventionist models (e.g. 
Yozma). Instead, they invested significantly into learning about Silicon Valley. With that said, even 
while they learned about the neoliberal environment in Silicon Valley they were thinking about how 
to adapt what they learned to Singapore’s more interventionist context. 
 
 In line with their private sector financing norms, when policymakers decided to deploy VC 
policies, they took quickly, and repeatedly, to designing FoVCFs, namely the TIF and the ESVF. 
Their focus on FoVCFs came as policymakers’ norms have dictated that they provide financing to 
the private sector, whether in the technology or finance sectors (Doh, 1996: 348). Their preference 
for large private sector financing efforts propelled Singapore’s VC policy choice to center on 
FoVCF initiatives and for these FoVCFs to come with significant funding tools, to the tune of over 
USD 1.1 billion.  
 
 Despite MNCs’ continued dominance of the Singaporean economic structure, its 
policymakers’ company size preferences have shifted in favor of small firm support alongside 
attracting large firms. Beginning in the 1980s, Singaporean policymakers began to look beyond its 
low cost MNC-centric manufacturing, as they began to believe that “Singapore will need a culture 
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that encourages creativity and entrepreneurship, as well as an appetite for change and risk-taking” 
(Tan, 1999: 9). In line with this initial shift in company size preferences, though policymakers 
continued to deploy industrial policies aimed at enticing MNCs to set up local production hubs in 
Singapore, they also started to implement policies aimed at developing local SMEs’ 
competitiveness and entrepreneurial talent. These economic management norms regarding the need 
to promote SMEs first developed as a response to the 1985 recession (Doh, 1996: 350-351; 
Randhawa and Tan, 2009: 31).
 103
 At this time, there was the first widespread acknowledgement 
that Singapore’s reliance on MNCs, rather than local SMEs, may have come at a cost.104 Following 
the recession, committees and ministries began expounding upon the “strategic” importance of local 
SMEs (see, as an example of the output of such committees, the SME Master Plan in 1989) 
(Committee on Singapore’s Competitiveness, 1998: 8) and emphasizing the need for 
entrepreneurship (Bruton et al, 2002: 200). In this way, policymakers’ norms shifted towards their 
wanting to support SMEs’ ability to innovate, address unemployment issues and develop a risk-
taking culture. It was in this vein that they came to believe that a VC industry would support SMEs 
by closing the “financing gap” that local SMEs may face (Randhawa and Tan, 2009: 34-36). 
  
 Closely related to the company size preference, Singaporean policymakers have preferred 
efforts to support international, rather than local, firms. Policymakers’ preference for attracting 
international firms has manifested into the EDB’s MNC promotions, amongst other incentives 
packages. As a result, for Singaporean policymakers it was natural to adapt the Yozma model to 
have the TIF actively court “top-tier international venture capital firms to locate their regional 
                     
103 A caveat is in order here as Singaporean policymakers’ first foray into financing SMEs came nearly ten years before 
the 1985 recession, via the extension of credit (loans up to SGD 1 million) through the EDB and Development Bank of 
Singapore’s Small Industries Finance Scheme beginning in 1976 (Department of Trade, 1977; EDB, 1982: 34). 
 
104
 The recession showed that Singaporean employment, for example, was highly susceptible to MNCs’ personnel 
decisions. This overreliance on MNCs for manufacturing employment was further demonstrated by a 1985 National 
Productivity Board report that had found that the employment share of SMEs in manufacturing had declined from 61% 
to 32% between 1986 and 1983 (Luk, 1985: 1). MNCs were conceived to help SMEs as early as the 1986 Economic 
Committee report that said that being a regional operational headquarters would help “open up greater entrepreneurial 
opportunities for Singaporeans” (EC, 1986: 7). 
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operations in Singapore” (Koh and Wong, 2005: 10). Thus, VC policymakers have worked to 
attract international VC managers to have regional headquarters in Singapore, as the EDB had done 
with MNCs over previous decades (Kenney et al, 2002: 119). To this end, the TIF had been adapted 
away from the Yozma model in line with policymakers’ economic management norms that favor 
the attraction of international firms. As evidence of this, the TIF manager said that: 
 
Yozma was different than the TIF as it was more narrow in its focus. Yozma 
explicitly sought to build a domestic Israeli VC industry. The TIF had a broader 
mandate as it sought to bring international VC managers into Singapore and to 
establish local VC managers as well (Author Interview, Singapore, 12 September 
2012; Italics added for emphasis). 
 
Due to this intentional international adaption of the Yozma model, the lion’s share (75%) of TIF’s 
capital went to international (particularly American) VC managers.  
 
 The last economic management norm to be investigated is Singaporean policymakers’ 
preference for bank or capital markets. In this respect, policymakers have been mostly neutral to 
debt or equity instruments, or bank or capital market sectors. A reason for this neutrality is that 
Singaporean policymakers have not directed its banks to lend to fledgling firms, or would-be 
“national champions,” to the extent that some other East Asian policymakers (e.g. Korea and Japan) 
have done. Instead, Singaporean policymakers have focused on attracting multi-national banks and 
foreign asset managers who together offer a competitive suite of financial services in its bid to be a 
leading financial center (Tan et al, 2004: 4). Given that Singaporean policymakers are open to 
promoting all segments of the financial system, VC policymakers have been able to secure support 
for their policies. This has been because the attraction of top international VC managers to 
Singapore, as well as the development of local VC managers, would only further the 
competitiveness of Singapore’s financial sector offerings. 
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 A more domestically focused FoVCF was launched after Singaporean policymakers gained 
the experience of implementing the TIF (and enduring its relatively poor performance in terms of 
building Singapore’s local VC industry). The shift towards a domestic focus was commented on by 
the former manager of the TIF as he said that the “ESVF idea is a new version of an old idea – a 
new version of the TIF effectively – that is more focused on the domestic VC firms” (Author 
Interview, Singapore, 12 September 2012). The local focus is evidenced by the 2002 Financial 
Services Working Group (“FSWG”) Report: 
 
The government…can do more by complementing the current strategy of attracting 
large international fund management companies with a strategy to develop 
indigenous start-ups and attracting small and medium-sized fund management 
companies (ERC, 2002: v; Italics added for emphasis).  
 
However, it had not been a shift of policymakers’ norms towards local firm support that accounts 
for the ESVF’s initial domestic focus. 
 
 Instead, the domestic focus of the ESVF was driven by policy learning (again) from Yozma, 
along with Singaporean policymakers’ domestic policy learning via the TIF and the resultant 
normative shift towards supporting local firms. To design the ESVF, NRF policymakers went back 
to studying the drivers of the Yozma Fund’s success, which helped motivate them to design a 
FoVCF more in line with the original Israeli model (Author Interview, Singapore, 19 September 
2012). This return to the domestic focus of Yozma, however, is likely to not have happened if 
Singaporean VC industry activity had grown exponentially following the TIF’s deployment. Said 
another way, policymakers’ return to learning about the way to focus a FoVCF on domestic VC 
managers was facilitated by the poor performance of the TIF. This policy experience came along 
with the acknowledgement of low early-stage (A and B Round) funding levels, thus a pragmatic 
reason for supporting indigenous asset management firms. In addition, though Singaporean 
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policymakers had tried to focus on domestic VC managers for the ESVF, in 2013 they changed the 
requirements to open this FoVCF to international VC managers as well. In this way, Singaporean 
policymakers’ preference for attracting international firms shapes subsequent policy adaptations. 
  
 Moving on to formal institutions, my research found that Singapore’s politically-insulated 
regime, policymaking processes and concentration of budgetary power have enabled policymakers’ 
allocation of budget to VC policy initiatives. More specifically, the concentration of budgetary 
power has enabled VC policymakers to act on their economic management norms in favor of 
financing strategically important industries. In this way, the Singaporean committees, agencies and 
ministries making the VC policy choices have been able to secure budget and distribute financing to 
support VC and technopreneurship with ease. This seamless access to budget has been especially 
prominent when a high-ranking policymaking champion (e.g. Dr. Tan) has been associated with the 
effort (Author Interview, Singapore, 20 September 2012).  
 
 As a result of the concentrated budgetary power, for the Technopreneurship 21 initiative, 
especially the TIF, “concern over securing budget did not factor” into the policy decisions (Author 
Interview, Singapore, 12 September 2012). Singaporean policymakers have not considered 
obtaining budget as a constraining factor in their policymaking process; if a policy initiative had 
been thought to be worthwhile, then the budget would has been swiftly obtained (Author Interview, 
Singapore, 18 September 2012). In this way, though bodies such as the Technopreneurship 
committee and the NRF have technically had to seek budgetary approval, until democratization 
advanced via the 2006 and 2011 elections (in which the PAP won a smaller majority of the vote 
than they usually secure) this had been a mere formality.
105
 In light of this ease of budget access, 
                     
105 In light of the 2006 and 2011 election results (the worst in PAP history as they only obtained just over 66% and 60% 
of the vote, respectively) there has been discussion of greater scrutiny of government spending now and a need to 
ensure that initiatives reach more stakeholders now. This sentiment about the more politicized environment suggests 
interesting potential changes for Singapore’s interventionist approach should future election results (the next election is 
2016) be similarly competitive. This is purely speculative, but just a note that in a more politicized, or more democratic, 
environment, the Singaporean state may not be able to afford to direct large amounts of funding as it sees fit. 
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Singaporean policymakers have been able to adapt VC policy items, like Israel’s USD 100 million 
Yozma fund, into even larger FoVCFs, as they did with the USD 1 billion TIF.
106
 In addition, 
Singaporean policymakers have been the only case study examined that has deployed two FoVCFs. 
My finding is that the deployment of two FoVCFs has been aided by policymakers’ ability to access 
funding with relative ease – which reinforces Singaporean policymakers’ finance-laden economic 
management norms. As an illustration of VC policymakers’ ability to quickly deploy funding 
initiatives because of their easy access to budget and insulation from public input, the ESVF had 
been launched (including the time it took to design the initiative, get it approved and get budget 
allocated) within seven months of the NRF’s study trip to Israel. 
 
 As democratization had been static until recent elections, Singaporean policymakers had 
political insulation, which has also contributed to their ability to deploy interventionist VC policy 
initiatives. Here, I mean that policymakers have made the VC policy choices unilaterally, although 
the Singaporean VC policymaking process has included dialogues with the private sector. In this 
way, government consultation with the private sector has been said to merely be a “public relations 
exercise” (Author Interview, Singapore, 5 September 2012). The carefully elicited and managed 
involvement of the private sector in the policymaking process has aided the Singaporean 
policymaking machine’s “ability to create and implement the policies it believes are best, without 
having to change course as a result of public input” (Author Interview, Singapore, 20 September 
2012). Singaporean policymakers have gleaned feedback and industry insights from the private 
sector actors invited to participate in the industrial policymaking process. This has been because 
policymakers have believed that:  
 
Market practitioners are in the best position to help regulators keep abreast of new 
developments in the industry. Candid, thoughtful feedback, including dissenting 
                     
106
 The TIF is on par with the largest FoVCFs launched globally; the other largest FoVCFs have also been USD 1 
billion, such as Russia also deployed a USD 1 billion FoVCF in June 2006 (see the www.rusventure.ru website for 
details on the Russian FoVCF). 
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views, is essential to help the regulatory authorities fine tune policies and avoid 
mistakes (Lee, 1998). 
 
In this way, VC policymakers have elicited insights and opinions from “industry and academia, 
including BANSEA, SVCA and NUS Entrepreneurship Centre” (Wong, 2011:11). In sum, the 
existence of select private sector actors in councils and committees has helped give the impression 
of a democratic dialogue, while policymakers have retained their ability to deploy their preferred 
funding initiatives.  
 
 Finally, Singaporean VC policymakers’ subject-matter expertise has enabled them to learn 
about, rather than simply emulate, foreign models. Singaporean policymakers’ knowledge of policy 
items has been robust; and they possess significant expertise on the VC industry in particular. As a 
demonstration of their aptitude, Singaporean policymakers have been actively sharing details of 
their SME and innovation policy successes with fellow members of regional forums, such as the 
APEC SME Working Group (Author Interview, Singapore, 24 September 2012) and their  
industrial expertise is said to be well known even by their critics (Han, et al, 2011). Policymakers’ 
demonstrated ability to distill international best practices has helped them adapt VC policy items, 
such as Israel’s Yozma Fund, to the Singaporean context rather than just copy them. 
 
7.5. Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has examined the international and domestic sources of Singapore’s highly-
interventionist VC policy choices. As a result of their highly-interventionist and internationally-
focused economic management norms shaping their policy diffusion process, Singaporean 
policymakers deployed VC policies across all instruments (tax, funding and regulation), as they 
have drawn on, but adapted, the three VC policy items (Taiwan, Israel and Silicon Valley). More 
specifically, Singapore has launched two FoVCFs and has offered tax relief schemes for VC 
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managers and investors, adopted the LP structure and extended non-financial incentives for 
international VC investors.  
 
 The catalyst for Singapore’s VC policy diffusion had been its policymakers’ beliefs that 
Singapore needs to be economically competitive in order to survive. A local VC industry, which 
would aid its technopreneurship and the competitiveness of its financial center, could help drive its 
competitiveness. In this way, Singapore’s VC policy diffusion had been motivated by a shift in 
economic management norms in favor of SMEs. VC policy diffusion in Singapore had not been the 
result of an increase in domestic SME activity levels. Instead, Singaporean policymakers have 
believed that they have needed to diversify the economy away from MNCs and limit a hollowing 
out in order to remain competitive. As a result, Singaporean policymakers began to believe in 
supporting domestic entrepreneurial activity alongside MNC promotion. In this way, Singaporean 
start-up activity levels did not push policymakers to learn about ways to provide better access to 
early-stage capital. Instead, policymakers’ shifting economic management norms in favor of small, 
local firms helped stimulate VC policy diffusion.  
 
 As a result of competitive pressures and the related normative shift in favor of supporting 
local SMEs, the Singaporean policymaking apparatus initiated efforts to learn about, and adapt, 
successful and relevant VC policy items in the late 1990s. This led to policymakers conducting 
extensive research via study trips, particularly to learn about Israel’s Yozma Fund as well as the 
policy environments that had driven the success of the Silicon Valley and Taiwan clusters. To be 
sure, Singaporean policymakers across the NSTB, EDB, Technopreneurship 21 Ministerial 
Committee and the NRF learned about all three VC policy items.  
 
 Though all three items have been studied, the Israeli VC policy item has been the one at the 
core of Singapore’s VC policy efforts. Singaporean VC policymakers have collected information on 
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the Yozma Fund but then meticulously localized the FoVCF structure for Singapore. The 
localization, rather than duplication, of the Yozma item has been demonstrated by the changing of 
the scale and terms of the TIF (from Yozma’s USD 100 million given to domestic VC managers to 
TIF’s USD 1 billion in which 75% was given to foreign VC managers). In this way, Singaporean 
policymakers changed the focus of the Yozma FoVCF model as they adapted it to be a means of 
attracting international VC managers. Singapore’s initial ESVF structure was more similar to the 
Yozma model in its aim and structure; however, its terms were also adjusted away from the Yozma 
model. The Yozma Fund had given its private investors the opportunity to buy out their investment 
at cost, plus a nominal interest rate and a 7% share in future portfolio company profits. The ESVF 
instead offered a straightforward buyout at 1.25 times the NRF’s initial investment. Also different, 
in September 2013 the ESVF terms were changed to allow international, not just local, VC 
managers to participate. 
 
 In addition to learning about the Israeli FoVCF item, Singapore’s VC policymakers also 
learned about the more diffuse, and neoliberal, Silicon Valley policy environment. In fact, the 
Silicon Valley VC industry has served as their inspiration of what they have wanted to replicate. 
But, due to Silicon Valley’s low specificity and distance from the Singaporean economic and 
normative context, Singaporean policymakers have felt they needed to look to more proximate 
states for more relevant VC policy items. It is in this vein that Singaporean policymakers also 
sought out information on the Taiwanese and Israeli VC policy items.  
 
 Despite the different levels of specificity of the three policy items, Singaporean 
policymakers adapted the more specific policy items. In fact, it was only the Singaporean adoption 
of the Silicon Valley LP structure in 2002 was copied intact. This was done as a means to have the 
same regulatory structure as that of the US, not just in function (as the Pte Ltd had done) but also in 
name. In contrast to the level of specificity hypothesis, the more specific Yozma FoVCF and 
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Taiwanese tax credit VC policy items were both adapted while an element of the less specific item 
saw no adaptation. In this way, the specificity levels proved to be a weaker indicator of the degree 
of adaption than I expected them to be in the Singaporean case. 
 
 Singapore’s highly interventionist VC policy choices – which allocated large sums of 
financing as well as sector-specific tax breaks and regulatory incentives to the VC industry – has 
been consistent with the high interventionist hypothesis for the Financier and Director typology. 
Singapore’s VC policy choices have been markedly shaped by its policymakers’ domestic economic 
management norms driving their bounded learning process. To this end, Singapore’s highly 
interventionist VC policy choices have been driven by its policymakers’ adherence to their “core 
economic management norms” that favor the financing of the private sector, supporting 
international firms (rather than local), and aiding larger, more established firms. The bank versus 
capital market support norms played a neutral role in the Singaporean VC policy choice as 
policymakers have been equally inclined to support banking and capital market segments of the 
financial services sector. 
 
 The interaction of economic management norms shaped which policy items were studied as 
well as how they were adapted. In this way, Singaporean policymakers’ economic management 
norms shaped the policymaking process beginning with agenda setting through to evaluation, 
design and implementation. More specifically, Singaporean policymakers’ private sector financing 
norms encouraged the use of FoVCFs. Then, in the local adaption of the first FoVCF, their 
preference for attracting international firms (rather than supporting local) manifested in the TIF’s 
provision that 75% of its capital was allocated to international VC managers. It was not until the 
second installation of a FoVCF, the ESVF in 2008, that domestic VC managers became the focus. 
The domestically-focused ESVF was shaped by policymakers re-learning about the Israeli Yozma 
fund, and the domestic policy experience obtained from the (poor) performance of the TIF. 
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However, in keeping with their preference for attracting international firms, the ESVF has again 
become open to international VC managers, as the TIF had been. 
 
 Singapore’s domestic policymaking process was found to have reinforced its policymakers’ 
interventionist economic management norms by concentrating budgetary and policymaking power. 
The concentration of budgetary power has ensured that VC policies have been created and 
implemented quickly, with large sums of money (in excess of USD 1 billion) attached. In this way, 
the industrial policymaking process has reinforced Singaporean policymakers’ norms that dictate 
that they should provide financing to the private sector. My research also found that the swift and 
budget-laden initiatives have been facilitated by the government’s insulation from public input, 
except for solicited expert opinions, into VC policymaking.  
 
 Looking forward, my interviewees expressed sentiment that if Singapore continues to have a 
more politicized environment, as has begun to occur as the result of recent election results, then 
Singaporean policymakers’ ability to swiftly deploy FoVCFs may be eroded. But, for the history of 
VC policy thus far, Singaporean committees and ministries responsible for VC policy have been 
endowed with large budgets and impervious to public scrutiny.   
 
 In sum, Singapore’s domestic policymaking realm has adapted the VC policy items. 
Learning about the best policy options has been believed to be an essential piece of the Singaporean 
success story, as policies that drive economic competitiveness are thought to be critical to 
Singapore’s very survival. But, best in breed VC policy items have not been duplicated in 
Singapore. Instead, its policymakers’ economic management norms favoring financing and a 
policymaking process that adorns easy access to budgets has facilitated its international and 
interventionist adaptations. Furthermore, Singaporean policymakers’ desire to act as a financial 
center has motivated the international focus of the TIF (and the recent change to the ESVF), the 
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adoption of the LP structure, the deployment of the GIP and also the deployment of tax exemptions. 
Through the role of their local context in the VC policy diffusion process, Singaporean 
policymakers have adapted VC policy items to be different internationally focused with large 
budget and different than those we have examined in Hong Kong and Taiwan.  
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8. Vietnam: Command Economy 
  
8.1. Introduction 
 
“Official development assistance has funded Vietnam’s striking achievements in the 
last two decades, but with its middle-income status now, the country needs ODA 
mainly for the solutions it brings with it, not the money itself.”  
– Victoria Kwakwa, World Bank Country Director for Vietnam, Hanoi,  
17 October 2013 
 
Over the last twenty years, Vietnam’s economic trajectory has followed an unequivocally 
positive trend. Vietnam’s growth rate averaged more than 7 per cent annually between 1990 and 
2010, placing it in the same league as China and India as one of the world’s exceptional growth 
stories. This growth has come as the Socialist Republic has balanced economic liberalization with 
the maintenance of central planning and capital controls in what the CPV calls a “Socialist market 
economy.” Despite some hiccups in growth following the global financial crisis, analysts are 
equally optimistic about Vietnam’s economic future. To this end, in 2010 the Economist 
Intelligence Unit ranked Vietnam as the world’s number two emerging market for investment 
opportunities, second only to China. The continued excitement about investing in Vietnam comes as 
its private sector grows, its middle class develops, FDI volumes increase, and the competitiveness 
of its technology sector advances (Nguyen, 2007).  
 
Though Vietnam retains its agrarian prowess as the world’s second largest exporter of rice 
and coffee, its ICT sector has been attracting international attention. In this vein, ICT parks, 
including the high-technology cluster in the coastal city of DaNang, have been touted as Vietnam’s 
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local Silicon Valley. DaNang's Software Park, which has begun development in 2013, is the nation's 
second centralized IT zone (VietNam News, 2013). These high-technology parks have succeeded in 
attracting FDI. To this end, Vietnam’s ICT-sector FDI has grown over the last decade, as more than 
a dozen MNCs, including Samsung, Nokia, and Hewlett Packard, have opened factories in Vietnam 
to manufacture mobile phones, computer components, and other technology goods (Hung, 2011). 
The existence of these technology sector MNCs in Vietnam has helped develop local high-
technology talent and has helped spawn IT start-ups (Author Interview, Ho Chi Minh City, 24 
August, 2012). In addition to their significance to the Vietnamese economy, the MNC facilities in 
Vietnam are significant centers for the MNCs; Intel Corporation’s largest plant globally – which 
opened in 2010 – is a USD 1 billion facility near Ho Chi Minh City.  
 
In stark contrast to this technology sector growth and the broader exuberance for the 
Vietnamese market’s potential, Vietnam has one of the smallest VC markets in Asia on an absolute 
and relative basis. While financialization has accompanied, or even propelled, the East Asian 
success stories (including the other case studies examined in the thesis), financing for fast growing, 
high-technology SMEs remains underdeveloped in Vietnam (OECD, 2011: 7). Fast-paced economic 
growth, inward FDI flows, and growing technology industries, such as Vietnam’s, typically 
coincide with dynamic VC markets. China, as an example, has seen exponential growth in its VC 
market since 2000, with China-focused VC managers raising USD 10 billion in the first half of 
2011 alone (AVCJ, 2011).  
 
In light of its phenomenal economic growth and the development of its technology sector, it 
is worth asking why the constitution of a VC market in Vietnam has lagged its peers. The slow 
growth of Vietnam’s VC market has been explained as resulting from the state’s historic control of 
the banking industry, restrictions on foreign investment, regulations limiting the industries in which 
private companies can compete, insufficient private company reporting requirements and the lack of 
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a regulatory VC framework (Groh et al., 2011). Until the establishment of Vietnam’s first stock 
exchange in 2000, the lack of IPO exit opportunities had also been blamed for Vietnam’s 
undersized VC market (Sack and McKenzie, 1998; Zavatta, 2008). Also, until five years ago, the 
lack of domestic technology SMEs had been named as a culprit for the underdevelopment of 
Vietnam’s VC industry (Author Interview, Ho Chi Minh City, 22 August 2012). But, there has been 
an increase in the number of high-tech SMEs seeking VC funding in Vietnam. In fact, by 2011 
there were at least a dozen technology start-ups that had secured equity investments from VC firms 
(Fannin, 2011). Another explanation for Vietnam’s small VC industry has been that the Vietnamese 
government has not incentivized VC market activity as some Southeast Asian peers have. To this 
end, the few VC managers operating in Vietnam lament that the fledgling market has grown 
“despite the regulatory environment, not because of it” (Author Interview, Hong Kong, 20 
December 2011).  
 
Given Vietnam’s Socialist market orientation, level of development and bank-centric 
financial system, its policymakers’ failure to support the VC industry may not be altogether 
puzzling. As expected, Vietnamese policymakers did not discuss VC markets during the 1990s. But, 
within the last decade their technology-sector and SME-focused policymakers have begun 
supporting SME and hi-tech industry financing. Such SME financing discussions first appeared in 
Vietnam’s public policy language in 2003 as Prime Minister Decision 36/2003/QD-TTg prioritized 
the promotion of foreign investment in Vietnamese enterprises. Then, in 2006 the Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MoST) announced plans for a USD 28 million Venture Capital Fund that 
would disburse loans to Vietnamese high-technology SMEs (Intellasia, 2006; Zavatta, 2008). 
Building on this momentum, the World Bank-organized multi-actor Consultative Group
107
 (CG)’s 
2010 mid-year meeting concluded that a more developed capital market was needed for Vietnam’s 
continued technology sector growth (Ministry of Finance, 2010).  
                     
107 The World Bank Vietnam CG brings together representatives from the government, bilateral and multilateral donors, 
Vietnam Business Forum, international and local NGOs to discuss economic policy. 
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Policy efforts to enhance the capital available for Vietnamese SMEs further materialized in 
October 2011. This happened as the Ministry for Planning & Investment (MPI)’s Agency for SME 
Development (ASMED)
 
submitted a proposal to the Prime Minister to create the SME 
Development Fund (Talk Vietnam, 2012). The Fund was approved in April 2013 with a budget of 2 
trillion đồng (equivalent to approximately USD 96 million) (Prime Minister Decision 601/QĐ-TTg, 
2013). Also, Vietnam’s 2011-2015 Five Year Plan for SME Development has named financing its 
top priority. But, as this chapter will examine, while VC has entered into Vietnamese policymakers’ 
awareness, they have discussed VC in terms of credit (not equity) financing directly to SMEs.  
 
This chapter explores how and why Vietnam’s late VC policies have been transformed to 
focus on direct SME loans rather than the equity-based VC policy items. To do so, this chapter 
proceeds as follows. Section 8.2 provides an overview of VC policy in Vietnam and the Vietnamese 
VC market. The third and fourth sections, respectively, detail the international factors and domestic 
context, including the specificity of the VC policy item(s), mechanisms, economic management 
norms, policymaking process, and economic structure characteristics, which have impacted 
Vietnam’s VC policy choices. Section 8.5 analyzes the body of evidence to determine which 
elements have most impacted Vietnamese policymakers’ VC policy choices.  
 
8.2. Vietnam’s VC Policy Choices and VC Market 
 
Vietnam’s late VC policy diffusion, and the historically modest size of Vietnam’s VC market, 
has not simply been the result of the difference between Vietnam’s level of economic development 
and the other, more economically developed cases (Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore). Amongst 
Vietnam’s Southeast Asian peers, Malaysia had been an early standout in VC, as its VC managers 
had nearly USD 1 billion in AuM by 2003 (AVCJ, 2005). Part of Malaysia’s success in developing 
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its VC market has been attributed to policies that established a regulatory framework and provided 
public funding for the asset class. For example, the Malaysia Venture Capital Management Berhad 
(MAVCAP), a government FoVCF, was established in 2001 by the Ministry of Finance to support 
both the Malaysian ICT sector and the domestic VC industry (MAVCAP, 2012).  
 
Indonesia, though a slow starter in VC fundraising, has recently received significant attention in 
the last five years as “the next China” in light of its demographic and economic trends (AVCJ, 
2011: 5). VC managers’ excitement for Indonesian VC investment comes after the Indonesian 
government began supporting VC domestically. Their support has come through regulations 
defining what a VC firm is and how it is overseen via Presidential Decree No. 61 (Business Review, 
2010) and the Minister of Finance issued Regulation No. 18/PMK.010/2012 regarding Venture 
Capital Companies (ABNR Law, 2012). Malaysia and Indonesia are just two examples of how 
Southeast Asian states, though not Vietnam, have supported VC markets via adaptations and 
combinations of the VC policy items specified in Chapters 1 and 2 – equity-based VC-specific 
regulations, tax treatment and FoVCFs.  
 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 illustrate the VC money flows into Southeast Asian VC funds through 2003. 
In doing so, it highlights the relatively modest amount of VC activity in the Vietnamese economy:  
 
Figure 8.1: Vietnam and Peers VC market      Figure 8.2: Vietnam and Peers VC market AuM 
AuM (in USD million):       (as per cent of GDP): 
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Source: AVCJ (2005); Note regarding Figure 8.2 calculations: In 2003 GDP for each country was as follows: 
Indonesia’s USD 666 billion, Malaysia’s USD 210 billion, Philippines USD 356 billion, Thailand 429 billion, 
Vietnam’s USD 183 billion. GDP figures were used to calculate VC as a percent of national GDP for each country. 
 
Though Vietnam’s VC market was first established in the 1990s, at the onset of the Asian financial 
crisis most of the eight VC firms operating in Vietnam at that time left (Zavatta, 2008). A few years 
later, a new batch of VC firms started operating in the early 2000s. Yet, the numbers of VC 
managers and their investment levels have remained modest. Vietnam’s VC market has oscillated 
between AuM of approximately USD 450 million and about USD 150 million in 2003 (AVCJ, 
2005; Alt Assets, 2011). As of 2013, there are four PE/VC firms operating in Vietnam with 
approximately USD 450 million under management; they are IDG Ventures Vietnam, DFJ 
VinaVentures, Dragon Capital, and Mekong Capital.  
 
 The modest growth of Vietnam’s VC market AuM has been driven by an improvement in 
fundraising activity around 2006. In 2007, IDG Ventures Vietnam launched their USD 120 million 
IT-focused fund and in late 2006 DFJ Vina Capital launched VinaVentures with USD 50 million 
AuM.
108
 The increase in VC fund launches in Vietnam has come as investors’ hope for Vietnam’s 
IT industry has grown. As an illustration, in their Vietnam technology-focused VC fund launch 
statement, VinaCapital said they "will invest in Vietnamese companies to accelerate technology 
adoption locally and to foster development of innovative technologies with potential for global 
distribution" (VinaCapital, 2006).  
 
In terms of VC policy efforts thus far, national funds and SME financing schemes have been 
initiated by three entities: the MoST (the 2006 VCF), the Science, Technology and Environment 
Committee (via their 2007, USD 30 million fund for high-technology SMEs (Zavatta, 2008)) and 
                     
108 
The rest of the AuM comes from Mekong Capital launched its USD 50 million Mekong Enterprise Fund II and 
Dragon Capital’s USD 250 million Vietnam Growth Fund (a closed-end fund). It should be noted that the VinaVentures 
and IDG funds are the most VC funds in their investment approach; they invest in early-stage, high-growth (oftentimes 
technology) businesses, whereas Mekong and Dragon invest in a broader array of more established companies in 
various sectors. 
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the MPI (the 2013 SME Development Fund). However, these funds have been designed as loans to 
SMEs directly, not as FoVCFs. As evidence, Resolution No. 22/NQ-CP on May 5, 2010, which 
details plans for implementing Government Decree No. 56/2009/ ND-CP to support the 
development of SMEs, makes no mention of “equity.” Instead, an entire section (II) of the 
Resolution is dedicated to the “accessibility of credit capital sources” as well as the importance of 
securing donor funding. In this way, the resolution dictates the following priorities for the MPI in 
implementing SME financing support: 
 
negotiating, receiving or arranging official development assistance sources to provide 
technical assistance and enhance capabilities for credit institutions to expand their credit 
to small-or-medium-sized enterprises….and submitting to the Prime Minister a report 
on the application of credit mechanisms and policies….and proposing measures to boost 
the development of products and services suitable to small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, such as factoring and financing leasing (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 
2010; Italics added for emphasis). 
 
The ASMED’s SME Development Fund, which had been motivated by this Resolution and 
received approval in April 2013, carries on the tradition of focusing on credit solutions. According 
to Prime Minister Decision 601/QĐ-TTg (dated 17 April 2013), the SME Development Fund will 
offer “preferential interest rate loans at an interest rate 90% cheaper than financial markets” rather 
than equity investments in SMEs (Author Email Exchange with ASMED manager, 20 May 2013).   
 
In terms of regulations and taxation for the VC industry, Vietnam has not adopted a legal 
structure explicitly for VC fund managers, nor has the government offered any VC-specific tax 
treatments. Rather than VC industry regulations, licenses for VC managers to operate have come 
via one-off deals with government ministers, as in the case of IDG Ventures Vietnam. In exchange 
for their license, IDG Ventures Vietnam agreed with the MoST minister to:  
 
Robyn Klingler-Vidra 199 All Politics is Local 
 
help to market and promote the Hoa Lac Hi-Tech Park outside Vietnam and provide 
advice and support to the Ministry as it plans construction and operation of a High-Tech 
Conference and Exposition Centre in Hoa Lac Hi-Tech Park (IDG Ventures Vietnam, 
2007).  
 
The IDG agreement exemplifies the inconsistent nature of the regulatory environment for the VC 
market in Vietnam. This has been the approach rather than their transparent offering of VC 
industry-wide regulatory frameworks or incentives. In addition, WTO rules have been unevenly 
interpreted by different national agencies and regional authorities. This has also contributed to the 
unpredictable environment for VC managers investing in, and exiting from, Vietnamese start-ups 
(Author Interview, Ho Chi Minh City, 22 August, 2012; Do, 2008). On the taxation front, VC 
profits continue to be taxed at the general corporate tax rate of 25 per cent – though the VC funds 
operating in Vietnam are domiciled offshore (typically Singapore or the Cayman Islands) so the 
Vietnamese tax rate does not directly affect them.
109
  
 
In sum, VC has entered into policymakers’ agendas in Vietnam, particularly those responsible 
for SME support policies. However, VC policy measures akin to the global trend of offering 
regulatory, tax or FoVCF tools for a local equity-based VC market remain demonstrably elusive. 
The following table summarizes Vietnam’s VC policy-related initiatives thus far: 
 
Table 8.1: Key Dates in Vietnam’s VC Policy Choices  
Year Milestone 
2003 
Formation of the Enterprise Development Agency (now ASMED), the MPI agency 
focused on SME-related policymaking 
2003 MoST approved the National Fund for Science and Technology 
2006 
SME financing named as a “main task” in Prime Minister Decision No. 
236/2006/QĐ-TTg 
                     
109 These high tax rates do shape VC managers’ business decision as to whether to be domiciled domestically or off-
shore; by being off-shore domiciled the VC managers are treated as foreign investors rather than local, which 
accentuates the problems of limited investments and exit activities. 
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2007 
Science, Technology and Environment Committee discussion of a USD 30 million 
fund for high-technology  
2008 MoST National Fund for Science and Technology launched  
2010 WB-organized Consultative Group prioritized capital market development 
2011 ASMED submitted a proposal to the Prime Minister for a SME Development Fund 
2013 
Prime Minister Decision (601/QĐ-TTg - 17 April 2013) approved the SME 
Development Fund; Funding of 2 trillion Đong to distribute via preferentially priced 
loans for Vietnamese SMEs 
 
In addition to the VC policy efforts specified above, a VC market’s ability to operate is 
heavily impacted by the existence of high-growth SMEs. In this way, the laws guiding SME 
operations effectively act as a pre-requisite for VC markets, and thus VC policies. On this front in 
Vietnam, there has been some positive movement in the policy landscape. The 1986 Doi Moi 
(Vietnamese for “renovation”) reforms and the 2001 and 2005 Enterprise Laws improved the 
capacity for SMEs to legally operate in Vietnam as they outlined, and expanded, the ways in which 
private companies are allowed to operate in Vietnam. However, despite ASMED policy efforts and 
2007 WTO membership requirements, limitations on foreign ownership of local companies remain 
(Deringer, 2007; Do, 2008).  
 
Government treatment of SMEs still lags behind the positive treatment of SOEs and MNCs. 
To this end, Vietnam’s entrepreneurs have shared sentiment that: 
 
“the government isn't doing enough to assist [SMEs]. It may pull out all the stops for the 
likes of Intel, but officials have not created policies found in places like Singapore, 
China and Taiwan to attract tech start-ups. In Vietnam, start-up founders talk of 
descending into seven levels of bureaucratic hell just to get a work permit” (Boudreau, 
2008). 
 
For entrepreneurs, the regulatory environment still limits their opportunities. So, while Vietnam is 
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no longer the true Command Economy it was prior to 1986, its SMEs still do not have full freedom 
to operate and fundraise. As a result, VC managers’ ability to invest and divest has been limited. 
 
8.3. External Sources 
 
 Vietnam has had the Silicon Valley idea diffused to policymakers in the MoST, ASMED 
and Ministry of Information and Communications. As evidence, Vietnamese policymakers have 
said they want local Silicon Valleys, so Vietnamese national and regional governments have been 
deploying policies to develop IT clusters (see VietNam News, 2013). Vietnamese policymakers 
acquire information on the Silicon Valley model as they have attended donor forums, such as the 
World Bank’s Global Forums on Science, Technology and Innovation in 2007 and 2009, as well as 
the Global Innovation Summit in 2012. These forums, particularly the 2012 Summit held in Silicon 
Valley, have focused explicitly on teaching policymakers how to promote innovation ecosystems 
akin to “Silicon Valley at home” (InnoSummit, 2012). However, even in these interactions, my 
empirical research did not find evidence of Vietnamese policymakers acquiring information on 
specific aspects of the VC policy items (the LP structure, tax incentives or a FoVCF). In this 
respect, Vietnamese policymakers have not yet even had the opportunity to transform or reject 
specific VC policy items. They have just been made generally aware of the Silicon Valley idea and 
the benefits of such an innovative cluster to the Vietnamese economy. 
 
The main driver of the credit focus of VC policies thus far has come from Vietnam’s donor 
community giving SME loans and other credit-based advice. To be sure, the Socialist Republic’s 
vibrant donor community, which includes more than 50 IOs and foreign agencies, has promulgated 
credit-focused financing advice to the Vietnamese government. This advice carries weight in 
Vietnam, as the Socialist Republic continues to be one of the world’s largest recipients of donor aid 
(Thoburn, 2009) with donor aid accounting for one third of the CPV’s public budget (Aid 
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Effectiveness, 2012). These influential donors have not transmitted the specific VC policy items. 
Rather, donors reinforce policymakers’ habit of using donor monies to provide loans to private 
sector firms. As a result of the donors’ focus on loans rather than equity, Vietnam’s VC policy 
starting point has not been an imitation of Silicon Valley’s equity-based regulatory environment.  
 
 Further, rather than coerce, or aid the emulation or learning of, equity-based VC policies, 
Vietnam’s donors have discouraged Vietnamese policymakers from enacting, or researching, 
equity-based policies. The external actors who have been most active in directing Vietnamese 
policymakers towards credit-based SME financing initiatives have been Japanese technical experts, 
the World Bank, the UN, the ADB, and APEC. To be sure, these actors have “not encouraged 
private equity market development” (Author Interviews, Hanoi, 21 August 2012). As an illustration 
of how these donors have directed Vietnamese policymakers away from the VC policy items, the 
UN, in a 2007 report on SME financing in Vietnam, recommended that the state not intervene. To 
this end, the report proposed:  
 
that there is relatively little that ASMED can (or should) usefully do, at least in a direct 
fashion, to improve SMEs’ access to finance (Freeman and Le, 2007: 7).  
 
This type of advice has been given to Vietnam as its donors believe that the Socialist Republic is 
“not developed enough for sophisticated capital markets such as VC” (Author Interview, Singapore, 
24 September 2012). Finally, even when VC has been mentioned by its donors, they have not 
suggested any specific best practices. To this end, a recent APEC report commented that “as 
Vietnam is a late-comer, it needs to thoroughly analyze the policies applied by other countries in 
order to be able to compete with them in attracting venture capital” (Chen, 2010).  
 
 Though donors have continued to focus on loan-based methods with Vietnamese 
policymakers, donors’ equity-financing expertise has been shared with Vietnam’s private sector 
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actors. To this end, private sector development partnerships in Vietnam have provided capital and 
equity-financing advice. As an example, the World Bank Group’s IFC had been a seed investor for 
the Ho Chi Minh City-based VC manager Mekong Capital when it launched in 2001. The IFC’s 
Mekong Private Sector Development Facility invested in Mekong’s VC fund as it aimed to “create 
sustainable, for-profit businesses in Vietnam” (Author Interview, Ho Chi Minh City, 22 August 
2012). The other World Bank private sector partner, InfoDev, published a report on the 
opportunities and challenges associated with financing high-tech SMEs in Vietnam (Zavatta, 2008). 
The report suggested that greater support for equity financing would be beneficial for the market. 
Acting on their findings, InfoDev has funded private SME accelerators, including the Start Network 
and TOPICA in Ho Chi Minh City (Author Interview, Ho Chi Minh City, 23 August 2012; 
InfoDev, 2012). Thus, the only equity-financing advice into Vietnam has come from donors 
working “around the state” (Carroll, 2012) – and instead directly with the private sector – rather 
than with the state. 
 
 IO rules such as that of WTO membership requirements have not coerced VC policy 
diffusion to Vietnam. Vietnam’s 2007 WTO accession was hoped to improve the legal environment 
for VC investment activity, but has thus far it has had a limited impact on VC policy diffusion. On 
the eve of Vietnam’s WTO accession, in 2007, UNIDO released a report on SME financing in 
Vietnam. The UNIDO report found that VC funds’ inability to invest more than 30% of an unlisted 
private company’s equity (and 49% of a public company’s ownership) had been a challenge for VC 
investors (Freeman and Le, 2007). WTO accession was hoped to overcome this restriction because 
the Socialist Republic’s WTO Schedule of Specific Commitments in Services named the 
technology sector as a sector where foreigners can buy up to 100 per cent of company equity 
(WTO, 2006). Given the centrality of technology-focused SMEs to VC investors, the WTO rule that 
would give foreign investors full access to Vietnamese technology firms seemed promising. But, 
SMEs operating outside of the specific sectors, or even those operating in sectors identified by the 
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WTO agreement, including technology, have in practice not necessarily been open to foreign 
investment (Author Interview, Ho Chi Minh City, 24 August 2012).  
 
The incomplete adherence to the 2007 WTO commitments stems from Vietnam’s domestic 
regulations (e.g. Decree 139/2007/ND-CP) and policy environment that have continued to redefine 
what has been included in the WTO commitments. National and provincial ministers (mainly from 
the Department of Planning and Investments) interpret WTO guidelines to include, or not include, 
sectors in different ways. In this way, the current application of the WTO sector regulations has 
been said to be unclear and inconsistent across provinces and over time (Author Interview, Ho Chi 
Minh City, 22 August, 2012). As a result, foreign investors’ access to ownership in unlisted 
Vietnamese companies remains limited, even in “committed” sectors (Tran, 2012). Vietnamese 
entrepreneurs and VC managers have remarked that the broad implementation of WTO 
commitments has been lacking due to the inconsistent and unclear nature of government decrees 
(Author Interviews, Ho Chi Minh City, 22, 23 and 24 August, 2012).  
 
The 2014 phase of adherence to WTO commitments is, however, expected to better open 
foreign investment beyond the 30% equity cap across more sectors (Author Interview, Ho Chi Minh 
City, 22 August 2012). Further, it is hoped that future investors’ access will not be subject to the 
provincial DPIs’ differing interpretations of Decrees and WTO commitments when the new phase 
begins (Canadian Trade Commissioner, 2011). This is hoped to change via the WTO roadmap in 
2014 as even companies operating outside specific sectors will be open to foreign investment 
(Author Interview, Ho Chi Minh City, 24 August, 2012). Thus, while WTO rules have not yet 
driven, let alone coerced, regulatory changes for the VC investment arena in Vietnam, they may 
have a greater impact following the next implementation phase.  
 
 There has been a guanxi bridge between the US (California’s Silicon Valley in particular) 
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and Vietnam that has brought VC industry information and VC-style investing to Vietnam. 
Returning Vietnamese, through the knowledge and networks they have gained while studying and 
working in the United States, have contributed to the constitution of Vietnam’s VC market. In 
addition, foreign nationals have been early movers in the VC industry in Vietnam (Zavatta, 2008). 
Even today, of the four VC managers operating in Vietnam, at least half of them have spent time 
working and studying in the United States and founders of two of the firms are foreign nationals. 
IDG Ventures’ Managing Director, Henry Nguyen, has spent significant time in the United States. 
Henry was an Associate at Goldman Sachs in New York, completed his BA at Harvard University 
and earned his MD and MBA from Northwestern University. In addition, Mekong Capital’s founder 
and Managing Director, Chris Freund, is from California. Also, the Managing Director of DFJ 
VinaCapital Partners’ VC investment portfolio, Than Trong Phuc, spent over twenty years in 
Silicon Valley. Phuc joined Intel in Santa Clara, CA in 1986 and relocated to Vietnam by leading 
Intel Vietnam beginning in 1999. Finally, most of Dragon Capital’s senior management team are 
foreigners with investment experience in emerging Asia or Vietnamese with academic, and 
professional, experience in the United States.  
 
 Vietnamese policymakers have taken capital market policy inspiration, as well as advice, 
from other states. At the dawn of Vietnam’s economic reforms, its policymakers started paying 
attention to their “economically successful Asian neighbors.” CPV policymakers were particularly 
interested in their coupling of capitalist economic management with single-party leadership (Turley, 
1993: 3-4). In this vein, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry and diplomatic missions “collect 
economic and technical information” on other states, especially East Asian neighbors (Vu, 2003: 
48). They then share the information with national economic ministries and regional authorities. As 
an example of Vietnamese policymakers’ interest in learning from its East Asian neighbors, Prime 
Minister’s Decision No. 151 established the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) to 
manage the capital from SOE equitizations in 2005, naming Singapore’s Temasek Holdings as the 
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model (World Bank, 2006: 20). In addition, the Japanese keiretsu – the term given to Japanese 
companies with shared ownership and related business lines - helped inspire Vietnamese SOEs’ 
conglomerate structures in the 1990s (Perkins and Vu, 2009: 32). Despite this demonstrated interest 
in learning from East Asian peers’ policies, Vietnamese policymakers have not pulled in equity-
based VC policy information from these proximate states. Why? 
 
A primary reason has been that Japan has been identified as the country most central to 
Vietnamese SME policymakers’ learning. This centrality was said to be at least partially because 
Japan is the most proactive in sending “experts to provide technical assistance to the ASMED team” 
(Author Interview, Hanoi, 21 August 2012). The Japanese experts sent to provide technical 
assistance and funding to Vietnam’s VC-relevant policymakers, such as ASMED and MoST, are 
highly regarded by Vietnamese policymakers. These Japanese experts have contributed to 
Vietnamese policymakers overlooking equity-based VC policy items, since the advice given by 
these Japanese experts on SME support has been “focused on credit-based solutions” (Author 
Interview, Hanoi, 21 August 2012). The Japanese bias towards loan instruments in Vietnam is akin 
to its treatment of VC as loans, rather than equity investments, in its market at home.
110
 The reliance 
of would-be VC policymakers’ on credit-focused policy advice from Japanese SME financing 
policy experts helps explain why equity-based VC policy items have not been diffused to 
Vietnamese policymakers. 
 
8.4. Domestic Factors 
 
 Domestic factors have also contributed to the heterodox, credit-focused shape of VC policy 
diffusion in Vietnam. Like some of its Asian neighbors, the Vietnamese state has controlled a 
                     
110 
Japan, even more so than other Asian states that use loans rather than only equity instruments as VC, was slow to 
adopt an internationally compatible VC regulatory structure and government funding (Kenney et al, 2002). The 
Japanese state only improved its regulatory environment for equity investors in an effort to aid SME growth and 
innovation via equity investments in the 2000s. Thus, Japan itself has been a late adopter of equity-based VC policies.  
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deliberate market transition. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, starting with the doi moi reforms 
in 1986, a new constitution in the 1990s, and Enterprise Laws in the 2000s, the Vietnamese state 
has increasingly offered more space for private firms to operate (Forsberg and Kokko, 2007: 1; 
JICA, 2003: 4). In this way, the Vietnamese state’s role has slowly shifted from a financier with 
central authority over credit allocation decisions via the state-owned banks (World Bank, 2002; 
Perkins and Vu, 2009) to a market facilitator that empowers FDI through the creation of initiatives 
such as enterprise zones (Painter, 2005; Thoburn, 2009).  
 
 Domestic economic characteristics have had an impact on Vietnamese policymakers’ 
choices. In this way, even the doi moi reforms are said to not have brought on by a great ideological 
shift or the pending collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead, doi moi had been the government’s 
response to a severe domestic economic recession (Phan, 2003: 24) and the playing out of rival 
state-business interests (Gainsborough, 2002). Similarly, the implementation of liberalization 
policies has not merely been the result of compliance with donor requests. Instead, it has been 
argued that privatization represents a new form of interventionism that allows the state to extract 
value from firms such as its equitized SOEs (Gainsborough, 2009; Painter and Yeo, 2011). Also, 
Vietnamese policymakers, though “dependent on capital inflows to feed growth” have not been “a 
mendicant” before its donors (Painter, 2005: 277). In sum, policy decisions have been (at least 
partly) made according to the cadence of the CPV’s assessment of domestic economic needs rather 
than the cajoling of donor conditionality, including that of the IMF
111
 or World Bank.  
 
The functionalist argument for Vietnam is that VC policy diffusion has not been relevant to 
Vietnam due to the historically low level of high-technology SME activity and the bank-centric 
nature of its financial system. However, rising technology-focused SME activity levels have 
                     
111 
The donor community in Vietnam does not include the IMF for much of the period analyzed in this chapter. The IMF 
discontinued its financing programs to Vietnam as conditionality regarding transparency into government spending was 
not granted. Insights into the end of IMF financing in Vietnam based upon interview with VC manager in Ho Chi Minh 
City 22 August 2012. This lack of transparency was also found by Transparency International in its low ranking of 
Vietnam (Perkins and Vu, 2009). 
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recently increased the relevance of VC policies to Vietnamese policymakers. To this end, SMEs 
have, since 2004, grown from accounting for 38% of GDP to more than 41%. At the same time, 
public sector activity has declined from 39% to 35% (Business-In-Asia, 2011). Though these have 
been incremental shifts, here we see the economic contribution of SMEs beginning to outweigh that 
of SOEs. In addition, the absolute number of SMEs has grown exponentially in recent years. In 
2000, just over 14,000 new SMEs were registered, whereas 103,170 were formed in 2010 
(Business-In-Asia, 2011).  
 
In addition to the ten-fold increase in SME activity over the last decade, the ICT industry has 
taken off in Vietnam. Beginning around 2004, Vietnam emerged with mobile gaming and search 
start-ups that have drawn investment from foreign MNCs and VC managers for their cloning of 
successful business models (Fannin, 2011: 13). Also, as mentioned in the opening paragraphs of 
this chapter, several technology MNCs, including Intel and Samsung, have established operations in 
Vietnam. As a result of technology prowess and start-up activity levels advancing, policymakers 
such as the ASMED manager interviewed on 21 August in Hanoi, have acknowledged SMEs’ need 
for better access to financing. In this way, the rise of ICT entrepreneurship in Vietnam has 
contributed to the nascent VC policy interest in the last decade. 
 
 The other economic characteristic investigated is the impact of the bank or capital market 
balance of Vietnam’s financial system. Here, I found that the credit-centric nature of the 
Vietnamese financial sector has contributed to the State’s reluctance towards equity-based 
financing. Vietnam’s finance sector remains overwhelmingly bank, not capital market, based. As 
recently as 2002, financial services in Vietnam were dominated by the four State-Owned 
Commercial Banks, as they accounted for approximately 70 per cent of the total assets in the system 
(World Bank, 2002). The banks had complete control over the allocation of capital - which largely 
went to SOEs - thus depriving private companies’ access to financing to grow their businesses.  
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But, around ten years ago the Vietnamese state started to liberalize the banking sector. Though 
Vietnamese banks are no longer solely facilitators of state credit decisions, Vietnamese businesses 
have considered suffering from inadequate access to capital as capital markets remain 
underdeveloped and banks continue to dominate the lending landscape. SMEs still struggle to 
obtain capital from banks. To this end, the official WTO accession report stated that “only 32.4 per 
cent of SME’s have qualified for formal bank loans” (Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2007: 220). 
Even though there has been acknowledgement that bank-provided credit is not sufficient for SMEs, 
capital market development has been slow (Author Interview, Hanoi, 21 August 2012).  
 
Though Vietnamese policymakers have demonstrated their awareness of the need for alternative 
financing for SMEs, including VC markets, their private sector financing norms and bank versus 
capital markets preferences have dictated that they do not consider equity-based investments. This 
has even been the case during deliberations for the recently approved SME Development Fund 
(Author Interviews, Hanoi, 21 August 2012). ASMED policymakers’ private sector financing 
norms have prioritized securing donor-funded credit-based financing solutions. Formal institutions 
such as Resolution 56 reinforce these norms, as the MPI (of which ASMED is a part) is centrally 
responsible for managing relationships with Vietnam’s donors.112 As such, their “securing of large 
funding initiatives,” such as the SME Development Fund, helps them “to demonstrate success” 
(Author Interview, Hanoi, 21 August 2012). Said another way, Vietnamese private sector financing 
norms have prioritized the securing of further donor money for SME initiatives, rather than study 
equity-based VC policies deployed elsewhere. This has effectively led to a form of “technocratic 
alignment” as donors and Vietnamese policymakers have both preferred loan-based initiatives (see 
Meseguer, 2009: 25 for more on technocratic alignment).  
                     
112
 The MPI’s focus on coordinating and securing donor funding within the SME Resolution is consistent with its 
central role in the CPV’s relations with donors as well as the aid disbursement and reporting process (Painter, 2005: 
275). 
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 Related to policymakers’ private sector financing bias for using loan instruments, 
Vietnamese entrepreneurs have also preferred bank loans as the primary way to raise money. In this 
way, amongst Vietnamese policymakers and entrepreneurs alike there has been a preference for 
debt, as well as mistrust for equity investments. As an illustration of the distrust for equity 
financing, an early-stage equity investor shared an anecdote. In the story, a Vietnamese 
entrepreneur who took the check he received from an equity investor and bought a brand new USD 
200,000 BMW (Author Interview, Ho Chi Minh City, 24 August 2012). To be sure, instead of using 
the money for his start-up, he bought a car. He did this because an equity investment, as understood 
by that entrepreneur, was “money for nothing.” An equity investment was seen as free money since 
he did not have to make payments on a loan and had no collateral (other than his newly formed 
company) that could be called upon. A similar sentiment was expressed when the image of the 
successful Vietnamese entrepreneur was detailed as someone who had “raised money from an 
investor, rather than an entrepreneur who successfully exited via an IPO or trade sale” (Author 
Interview, Ho Chi Minh City, 23 August 2012). The persistence of the Vietnamese predisposition 
towards credit-lending, and newness (and distrust) to the concept of equity-based financing in 
Vietnam, has meant that policymakers and their constituents have not sought out equity solutions. 
 
The other economic management norms – the local or international firm preference and large 
versus small firm preference – have both been touched upon in preceding paragraphs. Here, I 
quickly address each of these economic management norms in turn. The local versus international 
firm preference has been mixed. In this way, SME policymaking bodies, especially ASMED, have 
designed initial VC policies for the benefit of domestic SMEs. Given that nascent VC policies have 
not been explicitly designed for the purposes of the VC industry’s benefit, this norm has not yet 
impacted VC policies specifically. Similarly, the large or small firm preference has only affected 
VC policies in a related sense. Vietnamese policymakers’ preference has historically (and remains) 
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for supporting large, state-run firms (e.g. SOEs and now “equitized” firms). This has been translated 
into the late adoption of SME focused policy initiatives in Vietnam. However, given that VC 
policies have been credit-focused initiatives for SMEs directly (largely run by ASMED) the large-
over-small firm preference has not shaped VC policies’ design directly.  
    
Domestic actors, particularly Vietnam’s existing VC managers, have not helped diffuse VC 
policy information from abroad to its policymakers. Vietnam-based VC managers have instead 
preferred to stay “off the radar” of the CPV and away from the unruly “red tape” (Author 
Interviews, Ho Chi Minh City, 22 and 24 August, 2012). The sentiment that government 
involvement is to be avoided rather than sought out is consistent with other scholars’ findings that 
operating within reach of the Vietnamese state “was not just unpredictable” but “frequently 
predatory” (Gainsborough, 2009: 268). In this way, VC managers have said that they would not 
benefit from further government involvement in their industry and so they have not attempted to 
initiate VC policy action (Author Interviews, Ho Chi Minh City, 22 and 24 August, 2012).  
 
Instead, one VC manager even lamented that he felt that the “informal advantages” they had 
from operating in a non-transparent market were substantial (Author Interview, Ho Chi Minh City, 
22 August, 2012). In addition, VC managers have said that they believe that (corrupt) state actors 
would only get involved when they want to extract payments.
113
 Several of the VC managers I 
interviewed shared the experience of the high-growth company VNG (formerly VinaGame) as an 
example of a successful business that lost its government sponsor or got too successful for the 
government to not want to partake in their profits. Here, VC managers have said that they believe 
that VNG’s public listing has been precluded by government enquiries into their business (Author 
                     
113 This article would be remiss if it did not mention that one of the VC managers, Henry Nguyen of IDG Ventures, is 
the son-in-law of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung (Fannin, 2011: 67). Mr. Nguyen, despite his academic accolades in 
the United States and his technical background, may represent the type of private sector actor able to succeed in 
Vietnam as a result of close personal relations with state officials. Sentiment amongst private participants in the 
Vietnamese market and academics alike is that such effective “sponsorships” from well-placed CPV members are 
essential to their “competitive advantage” (Author Interviews, Ho Chi Minh City, 23 and 24 August 2012; Painter, 
2005: 269).  
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Interview, Ho Chi Minh City, 24 August 2012). This anecdote illustrates VC managers’ preference 
for the Vietnamese VC industry to stay off the CPV’s policy agenda and why they have not 
demanded VC policy action. 
 
 Vietnam’s policymaking process has also contributed to the slow development of its VC 
policy diffusion. Vietnam’s policymaking institutions have been described as “decentralized, 
fragmented and sometimes incoherent” (Painter, 2005: 267) with ministerial coordination, capacity 
and information problems (see OECD, 2011: 10; Vu, 2003). As a result, Vietnam’s policymakers 
have struggled to convert ideas for complex policy areas into implemented policies (Ohno, 2009). 
Scholars such as Martin Gainsborough have found that policy implementation in areas such as SOE 
equitization have been “slow and incremental” (2002: 390). The VC industry’s oversight has 
similarly been decentralized and uncoordinated. The VC market has been overseen at the national 
level, from a regulatory perspective, by the MoST. However, funding and policy coordination for 
SMEs, including SME financing, has been managed by the MPI’s ASMED while budget for 
initiatives comes from the State Bank, the Ministry of Finance and numerous donors (Author 
Interview, Hanoi, 21 August 2012). The inefficient nature of policymaking helps explain why VC 
policy action, such as the SME Development Fund, had only been approved in April 2013, even 
though the ASMED team submitted the draft for the Prime Minister Office’s review in 2011. 
 
 The other formal institution contributing to Vietnam’s VC policy inaction has been the 
limited resources that Vietnamese policymakers have been able to leverage to study equity-based 
VC policy options. To illustrate, ASMED managers have described “Google Scholar” as “a key 
source of information.” Furthermore, ASMED policymakers have explained that their research has 
also relied on the proactive information brought to them from Japanese experts and the semi-annual 
APEC SME working group meetings (Author Interviews, Hanoi, 21 August 2012). Though the 
APEC forum was mentioned as a critical resource by ASMED managers, APEC SME workshop 
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participants described the Vietnamese representatives’ involvement as “limited and passive” given 
their “inability to communicate effectively” (Author Interview, Singapore, 24 September, 2012). 
Thus, the extent to which the Vietnamese ASMED delegates actively engage and learn from forums 
such as the APEC meetings is questionable. Instead, the limited resources available to the ASMED 
team have undermined their ability to obtain high levels of technical expertise. Their limited 
technical capacity has furthered their reliance on Japanese, and other donor, expertise, which has 
been credit-focused. 
 
8.5. Conclusion 
 
The functionalist hypothesis for Vietnam is that its modest high-technology SME activity levels 
and banking-centric financial system, would lead its policymakers to delay or reject VC policy 
diffusion. As a result, Vietnam was expected to reject VC policy diffusion, or be a late adopter. This 
hypothesis has been found to have largely been true, at least until recently. Vietnam’s high-
technology SME activity levels have grown in the new millennia, particularly since 2004. In line 
with this growth in high-technology start-up activity, there has been increasing interest in, and 
policy action related to, improving SME’s access to capital. Acting on this interest, in recent years, 
Vietnamese policymakers have begun deploying policies aimed at improving SME financing 
options. However, the policies discussed and implemented thus far have significantly differed from 
the equity-based VC policy diffusion items detailed in this thesis. In light of these developments, 
the finding is that the recent rise in SME activity levels has contributed to Vietnam’s late interest in 
credit-based SME financing policies.  
 
But, what explains Vietnam’s credit-based SME financing policy choices – instead of the equity-
based VC policy items – to date? My research found that it has not been the existence of multiple 
VC policy items, given Vietnam’s ‘late adopter’ timing that facilitated their synthesis of another VC 
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policy strategy. Instead, this late adopter has created a unique credit-centric form of VC policies in 
line with its donors’ advice and its domestic economic management norms. Externally, it has been 
the lack of specific policy information being transmitted and its donors’ bias for loan instruments 
that has shaped their policy choices. Domestically, it has been Vietnamese policymakers’ credit-
focused private sector financing norms and policymaking incentives that prioritize the security of 
donor loans that have steered policymakers towards SME loans.  
 
 Externally, only the generic Silicon Valley idea has reached Vietnam’s policymakers. The 
analytical framework expects transformation and variance to be more likely in cases like this, where 
the low specificity diffusion item is transmitted. But, in the Vietnamese case, the role of the 
diffusion item specificity has not been that straight forward. This is because though the general 
desire to create local Silicon Valley clusters has diffused, awareness of Silicon Valley’s VC policy 
environment has not yet diffused. In this way, while Vietnamese policymakers have had a desire to 
create local Silicon Valleys, I did not find evidence of learning about specific policy items that 
could help them recreate Silicon Valley’s policy environment (as had been the case in other states).  
 
However, international donors were found to have a marked impact on Vietnamese SME 
policymakers’ agenda setting and policy choice set through their funding and technical assistance. 
Here, though Vietnam’s donor community has discussed VC with Vietnamese policymakers, they 
have not recommended, let alone pushed, equity-focused VC policies for Vietnam. In addition, 
WTO membership rules have not forced open investment access for the foreign-domiciled VC 
funds operating in Vietnam. Also, donors, through their policy advice (e.g. the UNIDO report) and 
forums (e.g. the World Bank CG), have not encouraged the state to deploy equity-based financing 
for SMEs. Instead, the Japanese, who were cited as the most present and trusted of foreign advisors, 
have distilled information on loan-based initiatives.  
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The only donors who have supported equity-based VC-type investments have gone around the 
state. In this way, private sector development partners (the IFC and InfoDev) have made equity 
investments directly in private Vietnamese VC managers and SME accelerators. Also, external 
private actors have also brought in knowledge of VC markets, particularly returning Vietnamese. 
However, they have preferred to operate in Vietnam’s opaque regulatory environment rather than 
transmit VC policy information. Across all of these external inputs, policy blueprints for supporting 
an equity-based VC industry have not been diffused to the Socialist Republic’s policymakers. This 
has left ample space for Vietnamese policymakers to deploy the credit-focused instruments dictated 
by their donors in an effort to develop Vietnam’s local Silicon Valleys.  
 
 Domestically, policymakers’ pre-existing economic management and private sector 
financing norms have both favored credit-based solutions. Vietnam’s formal institutions have 
reinforced these biases towards credit instruments as policymakers have been incentivized to 
maximize donor funding. These factors have both contributed to Vietnam’s policies aimed at 
developing a local Silicon Valley taking the form of loan-based, donor-funded schemes. These 
factors have dovetailed with policymakers’ limited resources and technical capacity for proactively 
learning about complex, niche capital markets, such as VC. The limited resources available for 
facilitating policy learning have reinforced MPI policymakers’ reliance on donors, particularly the 
Japanese, to help them formulate SME financing policies.  
  
 Taken in sum, both external and domestic factors have played a role in directing Vietnamese 
policymakers away from equity-based VC policies despite their desire to create local Silicon 
Valleys. Historically, the low levels of technology SME activity and the bank dominated financial 
sector delayed VC policy diffusion. However, the recent growth of high-tech SME activity has 
prompted policy action. Yet, though interest in replicating Silicon Valley has taken root, 
Vietnamese policymakers’ normative bias towards credit-based schemes, their limited 
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policymaking expertise, as well as donors allocations towards the use of loans, have come together 
to adapt Vietnam’s variant of VC policy towards SME-direct loans. Effectively, neither external nor 
domestic factors aided the diffusion of the LP structure, tax incentive or FoVCF to Vietnamese 
policymakers. As a result, Vietnam’s VC policy choices have been uniquely credit-focused, and 
thus different from the VC policy choices in the other case studies. 
 
This chapter concludes the analytically-guided case study investigations. Beginning with the 
examination of Hong Kong, the spectrum of economic management norms have been assessed for 
their impact on different VC policy choices across East Asia. In addition, each case study tested 
state-of-the-art diffusion literature’s theories about aspects of the diffusion process (multiple 
diffusion items, varying levels of specificity and the different diffusion mechanisms) that drive 
variety, rather than convergence. Each case study analysis also examined the effects that economic 
structures had on the timing of policy diffusion, and the impact of formal institutions on the policy 
adaptations. The conclusions of each chapter discussed the findings of each case. To build out the 
broader findings of this research project, the next chapter, Analysis, draws together the implications 
of the VC policy diffusion investigations.  
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9. Analysis 
 
9.1. Introduction 
 
As a reminder of how the four preceding cases fit into the global trend of VC policy 
diffusion, VC policies have spread to more than 41 countries. Despite policymakers’ shared 
objective of replicating local versions of Silicon Valley, there is notable variance in the VC policy 
choices taken across states. This thesis seeks to explain why these varied choices, rather than 
convergence on the neoliberal Silicon Valley policy environment, characterize the VC policy 
diffusion trend. To this end, this chapter analyzes the drivers of the VC policy choices taken across 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Vietnam.  
 
VC policy choices globally, and in East Asia in particular, are not consistent with the 
neoliberal environment that fostered the growth of the Silicon Valley VC industry. True, elements 
of the Silicon Valley diffusion item, namely the market-enabling LP regulatory structure, have 
diffused to several, though not all, states relatively intact. However, the transmission of the LP 
structure is one of the only VC policy elements deployed internationally that does fit with the 
Silicon Valley model. Numerous states restrict VC fundraising and exit options as they have not 
deployed an ERISA-like reinterpretation, which was a core component of the enabling Silicon 
Valley regulatory environment. In this way, rather than competing to have the most international 
investor friendly regulations, like the open context that the 1979 ERISA reinterpretation facilitated 
for Silicon Valley fundraising, many VC policymakers do not lift restrictive legal and regulatory 
structures. What’s more, a myriad of tax credits and FoVCFs were deployed – and these policy 
tools are not present in the source Silicon Valley model. 
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To better unpack the implications of these findings, this chapter offers an analysis as follows. 
The next section presents the case studies’ key findings and then assesses the match between the 
hypotheses and the East Asian VC policy choices. Sections 9.3 and 9.4, respectively, then examine 
findings about the diffusion literature’s hypotheses and hypotheses about economic management 
norms as sources of VC policy choices. This is first done in terms of how VC policies were adapted 
from the source item(s), due to the diffusion mechanism(s), and the multiple diffusion items of 
varying levels of specificity. The analysis then turns to how domestic factors, particularly economic 
management norms, contribute to VC policy choices. Then, drawing the two spheres together, 
Section 9.5 discusses the critical finding that domestic economic management norms were central in 
states’ unique bounded learning processes, and therefore economic management norms are the glue 
that binds the domestic context with the diffusion process. The Conclusion, Section 9.6, outlines 
VC policy diffusion thesis’ contributions to broader IPE debates. 
 
9.2. Case Study Findings 
 
As previously mentioned, there has not been a single duplication of the hands-off Silicon Valley 
VC policy environment, even by the neoliberal Nightwatch-man proxy state of Hong Kong. 
Moreover, none of the states examined in the thesis adopted a near perfect replica of any of the 
Silicon Valley, Taiwanese or Israeli VC policy choices. Instead, in each of the four cases, 
adaptation from the source items occurred, and in most cases, hybridization of more than one item 
occurred. What’s more, in one case, credit-based policies were created, rather than policymakers 
adapting the equity-based VC policy items. Thus, the case study analyses revealed how VC policy 
diffusion drives limited, rather than complete, convergence on the Silicon Valley model.  
 
In each case, a greater extent of adaption, and more interventionist direction of adaption, 
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occurred than what was expected by the diffusion mechanism hypothesis. High degrees of 
convergence on VC policy items (especially the Silicon Valley policy environment) were expected 
in cases of emulation, competition and coercion. In contrast, learning was expected to lead to 
adaption of the VC policy items as policymakers adjust the VC policy items in line with their 
normative biases. As expected, bounded learning produced marked adaptation in all three cases 
where it was present (Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore). Evidence of the competition mechanism 
was also found to have motivated VC policy diffusion in the same three cases. However, in contrast 
to the expected impact of competition, competition was not found to have driven any neoliberal 
policy choices. Instead of driving replication of the Silicon Valley policy environment, 
competitive pressures were found to motivate policymakers to learn about interventionist 
policy items. Also, in the one case where coercion was at work (Vietnam), there was not 
convergence on the Silicon Valley policy environment. Rather than international donors coercing 
Silicon Valley-like VC policy regulations, my research found that Vietnam’s donors focused their 
advice and funding on loan-based tools.  
 
The failure of the diffusion mechanisms to explain the diffusion outcome is because, ultimately, 
the timing and form of VC policy choices were determined by domestic factors. More specifically, 
economic management norms were found to drive the adaptation of the policy item(s) to fit 
policymakers’ local normative contexts in each case. What’s more, the SME activity levels were 
found to be a blunt predictor for the timing of VC policy diffusion. In this way, domestic factors 
were central to VC policy choices regardless of the primary diffusion mechanisms. The centrality of 
domestic factors in VC policy choices supports the claims of IR scholars, such as Lenschow et al 
(2005) and Painter and Yeo (2011), about the need for domestic level analyses in diffusion research. 
In doing so, my findings support the assertion that policymakers have retained “room to move” 
(phrase borrowed from Layna Mosley’s (2000) research) due to their different domestic contexts.  
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As will be further discussed in Section 9.4, I found that policymaking processes (formal 
institutions) reinforce policymakers’ various economic management norms. More specifically, 
formal institutions related to the distribution of budgetary power, degree of democratization and 
regime type reinforced private sector financing norms. To this end, in states where policymakers’ 
norms preferred the use of financing to support the private sector, policymakers who have had easy 
access to budget whereas policymakers have had to seek external approval for funding are in 
normative environments that do not favor direct private sector financing. 
 
As a result of these inputs, the VC policy choices took different shapes in all four case studies. 
The four East Asian capitalism typologies’ economic management norms, particularly preferences 
related to interventionist orientation, private sector financing and the support of local versus 
international firms, were found to drive VC policy choices as expected. To this end, policymakers 
inclined to fund private sector activity, especially in Singapore, amplified the size of funding in the 
FoVCF item. In addition, their preference for attracting international firms was responsible for the 
Yozma model’s adaptation towards allocating FoVCF monies to international VC managers. As 
another illustration, Taiwanese policymakers, whose private sector financing norms preferred not to 
allocate money to firms, gave 20% tax credits after learning of the Silicon Valley policy 
environment. Taiwanese policymakers’ preference for supporting local firms helped shape these tax 
credits only being offered for local investments, and to the paper company structure’s use. While 
the choices of the four cases generally fit their level of interventionism hypotheses, as Table 9.1 
highlights, each state chose VC policy elements that the analytical framework did not fully expect:  
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Table 9.1: VC Policy Choices 
 
VC Policy 
Choices 
Hong Kong Taiwan Singapore Vietnam 
FoVCF 
ARF II gave 
four private 
VC managers 
less than USD 
100 million 
AuM to 
manage in 
1998 
A 2012 
bilateral 
FoVCF with 
New 
Zealand
114
 
Technopreneurship 
Investment Fund in 
1999 with USD 1 
billion AuM and 
the ESVF in 2008 
with USD 100 
million 
---
115
 
Tax 
General low 
corporate tax 
rate of 15%; 
VC-specific 
tax exemption 
in 2005 
20% tax credit 
initiated in 
1983; extended 
to corporations 
in 1991; 
discontinued in 
1999 
0% tax for pioneer 
industries; in 2002, 
VC-specific tax 
exemptions and tax 
credit for start-up 
investment losses 
No VC-
specific tax 
rate 
Regulation: 
Legal 
Structure 
Long-
established LP 
structure; No 
VC-specific 
structure 
(China enacted 
VC regulations 
in 2005) 
Paper 
companies; 
have not 
adopted the LP 
structure 
Private Company 
Limited (Pte Ltd); 
LP structure 
adopted in 2002 
No VC 
specific 
regulatory 
structure; VC 
managers are 
offshore 
domiciled 
vehicles 
Regulation: 
Incentives & 
Restrictions 
Pension funds 
are not allowed 
to invest in 
non-publicly 
traded assets, 
including VC 
Investor type  
maximums, 
some 
institutional 
investors not 
allowed; 
investors make 
investment and 
exit decisions 
GIP offers 
Singaporean 
Permanent 
Residency to 
foreign VC 
investors (above a 
certain threshold) 
Company 
investment 
and sale 
restrictions 
including 
foreign 
ownership 
requirements 
and IPO 
restrictions 
Timing 
Majority  
(late 1990s) 
Innovator  
(early 1980s) 
Majority 
(late 1990s) 
Laggard 
(mid 2000s) 
 
The following paragraphs expound upon the VC policy summaries in Table 9.1.  
 
                     
114 Beginning in 1985 Taiwanese policymakers launched a VC fund, the National Development Fund, which gave less 
than USD 100m via matching funds. Beginning in the 2000s the Development Fund also began acting as a quasi-
FoVCF as it did co-investments with VC managers. 
 
115 The Vietnamese government has launched a National Science Fund and the SME Development Fund, which was 
approved in 2013, but they have been structured as loans to SMEs, not as FoVCFs. 
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Beginning in the late 1990s, Hong Kong’s innovation and technology policymakers began 
seeking out information on VC policy items. Policymakers’ efforts to learn about VC policies came 
as a response to competitive pressures on Hong Kong’s financial services centric economy (vis-à-
vis Singapore and China’s capitals). In response to competitive pressures, a local VC industry was 
conceptualized to be a means of supporting domestic technology-sector SME activities, to diversify 
the economy, further its innovativeness and extend the comprehensive nature of the financial 
services sector. The Hong Kong policymakers’ interest in the technology sector came as they 
started to believe that more technology SMEs would help them to diversify away from financial 
services and reverse the city-state’s manufacturing hollowing out. As a result, Hong Kong 
policymakers underwent a normative shift towards supporting small, local technology firms. These 
new, more interventionist and domestic SME-focused economic management norms replaced 
policymakers’ once palpable normative opposition to intervention of any type. As Douglas Fuller 
(2010) similarly found, when it came to their want to support innovation, Hong Kong policymakers 
changed their beliefs as their laissez faire approach had reached its limit.  
 
In response to these competitive pressures, Hong Kong policymakers learned about the Silicon 
Valley, Israel and Taiwan VC policy items. But, it was not only what they learned from abroad that 
drove their VC policy choices. Instead, I found that it was their domestic SME financing policy 
experiences (especially the first ARF in 1993) that drove Hong Kong’s VC policy choices. 
Domestic policy learning and a marked normative shift in favor of government intervention 
combined to produce VC policy choices that were more interventionist than what was hypothesized 
for “the most free economy in the world.” To this end, the Nightwatch-man proxy of Hong Kong’s 
VC policy efforts included a FoVCF, a VC-specific tax exemption and the use of the long-
established LP structure, but not the adoption of ERISA-like regulations. This has meant that Hong 
Kong did not replicate the Silicon Valley policy environment, as it was expected to do.  
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However, the interventionist nature of Hong Kong’s VC policies should not be overstated. Hong 
Kong policymakers have not given a tax credit for investing in a VC fund. In addition, Hong 
Kong’s FoVCF was structured as an outsourcing model so the state did not have to pick winners. 
Given that Hong Kong’s FoVCF was a means for the government to avoid having to pick winners, 
and given that they only offered a tax exemption, and not tax credits, their VC policy choice was 
still adapted to be less heavy-handed than the other East Asian cases. As such, Hong Kong’s flag in 
Figure 9.1 is positioned further right on the interventionist continuum than it was expected, but not 
at the interventionist end of the spectrum. 
 
Taiwan’s policymakers also learned about VC policy in response to competitive pressures to 
attract international capital (especially after Taiwan’s UN de-recognition). It was in this context that 
Taiwan’s VC policy diffusion began in 1981, by way of a study trip to the US Silicon Valley, 
Boston’s Route 128 and Japan. Following their studies, Taiwanese policymakers, led by Minister 
without Portfolio K.T. Li, launched a 20% tax credit for local VC investors in 1983. To be sure, 
after learning about Silicon Valley, Taiwanese policymakers chose not to replicate the Silicon 
Valley policy environment. They deployed tax credits rather than deploying the LP structure or 
allowing institutional investors to allocate to the VC industry.  
 
Overall, the Taiwanese VC policy choice has been tax centric, as the tax incentive was the 
primary VC policy instrument for 25+ years, regulatory tools were not used to entice investment 
activity and its FoVCF deployment only came in 2012 as a bilateral initiative with New Zealand. 
Taiwan’s 20% tax credit is considered a VC policy innovation, as Silicon Valley had not offered 
any VC-specific tax treatment. But, the tax credit was not a new instrument for Taiwanese 
policymakers whose economic management norms dictated their preference for using tax credits (to 
the tune of 20%) to encourage private sector investment. In Figure 9.1 below, Taiwan’s flag is 
placed squarely on the ‘medium’ position on the continuum, given the centrality of tax incentives to 
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its VC policy choices.   
 
Figure 9.1: VC Policy Choices on a Neoliberal to Statist Continuum
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      Low   Medium  High 
      
   Regulation  Tax Incentives  Funding 
 
                 (Hong Kong)   (Taiwan)        (Singapore) 
 
While Taiwan’s tax-centric VC policy choice is in line with the Private Sector Promoter 
hypothesis, Taiwan’s VC regulatory policies are not consistent with what we would expect to have 
been deployed in response to competitive pressures. Rather than adopting the LP structure, and 
enabling international investors to invest in the VC asset class, as the American ERISA 
reinterpretation did in 1979, Taiwan’s VC regulatory structure restricts its VC managers’ 
fundraising and exit opportunities. Also, Taiwanese policymakers did not deploy a legal structure 
that would attract international investors as the LP structure does. Instead, their paper company 
structure has limited VC managers’ ability to make investment decisions as they must involve their 
investors in all investment and exit decisions – and this has kept international investors at bay. The 
explanation for Taiwan’s heterodox VC regulatory environment was found to lie in Taiwan’s 
prioritization of the local environment, particularly local investors’ preference for greater control 
over investment decisions, the local tax environment and the local VC market consisting of local, 
corporate VC managers. As this suggests, a dynamic feedback loop reinforces the local focus of 
Taiwanese VC policy – via its VC industry’s local, corporate nature.  
 
The local composition of the Taiwanese VC industry was caused by its initial tax credit policies, 
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 Vietnam not included on continuum because, as of yet, they have not deployed any equity-based VC policy efforts. 
Vietnam’s Silicon Valley-themed policy learning and action has instead focused on credit solutions for SMEs. 
Neoliberal Statist 
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and then later on, the corporate nature of Taiwan’s VC industry impacted policymakers’ VC policy 
choices. In Taiwan, unlike the other case studies where the VC market has been seen as an 
extension of its financial center’s entrepôt status (Hong Kong and Singapore), or an effort to lure a 
new form of FDI or donor aid (Vietnam), the Taiwanese VC regulatory platform was not designed 
to attract international capital. Instead, Taiwanese policymakers deployed regulations and tax 
credits so that local VC managers could finance their local high-technology SMEs. In this way, 
unlike in Hong Kong and Singapore, in Taiwan, the VC industry was strictly seen as a means to 
support the competitiveness of its local high-technology SMEs.  
 
The Singaporean flag is placed on the Figure 9.1 continuum in a manner consistent with its 
Financier and Director hypothesis: highly statist. This high-interventionism categorization is made 
because Singapore deployed versions of all three VC policy items – LP structure, tax credits and 
two FoVCFs. Moreover, Singapore’s VC policy center of gravity has been on its FoVCF initiatives, 
as it has harnessed the FoVCF structure twice in an attempt to attract international VC managers 
(the 1999 TIF) and to develop domestic VC managers (the 2008 ESVF). Singaporean policymakers 
learned about VC policy items from Israel, Silicon Valley and Taiwan. To this end, Singaporean 
policymakers learned about the Israeli Yozma Fund model for its FoVCFs, but also deployed an 
adaptation of the Taiwanese tax credit, in addition to adopting Silicon Valley’s LP regulatory 
structure. The catalyst for VC policy diffusion for Singaporean VC policymakers, similar to Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, was competitive pressures. In Singapore’s case, the competition it felt was vis-à-
vis Hong Kong and China in their bid to be the premier financial center in East Asia. 
 
Singaporean VC policymakers’ study trips, particularly to Silicon Valley and Israel, aided the 
diffusion of these VC policy items. In fact, to ensure that a key VC policymaker (the creator and 
manager of the TIF) fully understood the Silicon Valley VC policy environment, he lived in Silicon 
Valley for two years (1996-1997). He then returned home to Singapore with the goal of deploying 
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adaptations of what he learned. Information on the Israeli Yozma Fund was similarly acquired via 
study trips, as well as ongoing dialogues – driven by visits as frequently as every two months – 
between Singaporean VC policymakers and their Israeli Office of Chief Scientist counterparts. 
After first learning about the Israeli Yozma model, Singapore’s VC policymakers ratcheted up the 
size (from Yozma’s USD 100 million to their TIF’s USD 1 billion). Singaporean VC policymakers 
also changed the terms from investing in promising domestic VC managers towards soliciting top 
international VC managers by allocating 75% of the TIF to foreign VC managers. Then 
Singaporean policymakers studied the Yozma model again in 2008 as they sought to deploy a more 
domestically focused FoVCF, the ESVF. The aim was for the ESVF to be more akin to the 
domestic focus of the Israeli model, due to the discouraging results of the TIF. However, by 
September 2013, Singaporean policymakers changed the ESVF’s requirements such that 
international VC managers are able to participate. 
 
In Vietnam, Silicon Valley VC policy diffusion remains incomplete as its policymakers only 
know of the Silicon Valley concept, and not the elements of the Silicon Valley, nor Israeli or 
Taiwanese, policy environments. So, as of yet, Vietnam remains off the VC policy choice 
continuum in Figure 9.1. The Command Economy hypothesis for Vietnam is that it would be a 
rejecter of VC policy adoption. However, due to the incomplete nature of VC policy diffusion to 
Vietnam, they have not yet had the chance to reject, accept or adapt any of the VC policy items. In 
recent years, Vietnamese policymakers have expressed their interest in VC policy as a means of 
creating a local Silicon Valley in Vietnam. Initial discussions of the Vietnamese state supporting 
early-stage financing markets have come as part of the MPI’s prioritization of SME financing in its 
current five year plan. Yet, World Bank Consultative Group meetings and the MPI’s SME financing 
initiatives have not committed to supporting equity-based, early-stage financing.  
 
Despite these initial expressions of interest in VC policy, Vietnamese SME policymakers, 
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and their donors, adapted the means of establishing a local Silicon Valley to being focused on 
credit-based solutions. This credit-focused adaptation of VC in Vietnam comes from two forces; 
one, as its donors use and recommend loans and two, as Vietnamese policymakers prefer credit 
instruments. Further, this credit-centric cycle has been repeated as neither donors or policymakers 
have sought to learn about specific VC policy items. In this way, only the vague Silicon Valley idea 
has diffused, and so nascent VC policy efforts in Vietnam are only actually VC in name. In practice, 
Vietnamese policymakers have continued to deploy the credit solutions dictated by their donors. By 
virtue of the role of donor terms and financing on policy choices thus far, the diffusion mechanism 
at work in Vietnam thus far has been the coercion mechanism. However, Vietnamese policymakers’ 
bias towards credit-based solutions reinforces the donors’ pressure towards loans.  
 
Another factor discovered in the case study research is the way that East Asian policymakers are 
impacted by Japan as policy items diffuse from the West. More specifically, Japanese leadership 
and colonial legacies have impacted the adaptation of Silicon Valley policy concepts as they diffuse 
across East Asia. My findings across two cases were that the Japanese influence came due to its 
status as the leading industrialized economy in the region, the success of Japanese industrial policy 
efforts and the close relationships that policymakers maintain with Japanese policymakers. Japan is, 
in Weyland terminology, the “available” local model and it is used to localize Western models. 
 
In the first case of Japanese influence, the paper company structure in Taiwan was designed in a 
similar (but not the exact same) way to the company structure in Japan. Taiwanese policymakers 
were empowered to use a heterodox paper company structure because of their study efforts of the 
Japanese VC policy environment. But, the broader context that motivated Taiwanese policymakers 
to study Japan in the first place came from their reverence for Japanese industrial policymaking and 
cultural affinity due to the colonial legacy. In this way, Taiwanese policymakers study the policies 
of a state that they revere or have some affinity for (e.g. Japan), rather than conducting a fully 
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rational analysis of all the policy options available.  
 
The second case that was heavily influenced by Japan is Vietnam. In Vietnam, policymakers 
have not purposefully sought out Japanese policy information in the same way that Taiwanese 
policymakers did. Instead, in Vietnam the prominent Japanese influence came from the proactive 
efforts made by Japanese experts and donor agencies in designing, training and funding Vietnamese 
SME and capital markets development initiatives. Given the preference that these Japanese experts 
have for bank lending, and therefore credit instruments, they contribute to Vietnamese nascent VC 
policies’ credit focus. 
 
In sum, the case studies’ VC policy choices have been affected by policymakers’ economic 
management norms as well as the existence of multiple diffusion items and Silicon Valley’s low 
level of specificity. These factors have shaped the case studies’ diffusion processes, including 
which external items VC policymakers studied through to how to adapt VC policy items. Economic 
management norms, ranging from neoliberal to interventionist, to SME, MNC or SOE supporting, 
to bank or capital market focused, centrally drove the unique bounded learning processes. In this 
way, policymakers’ domestic economic management norms controlled which VC policy items were 
studied, how they were valued and the manner in which those VC policy items were adapted to the 
local contexts. In policy process terms, local economic management norms were found to shape the 
full policy cycle, beginning with agenda setting through to policy evaluation, design and, 
ultimately, implementation. What’s more, the resultant VC policies broadly fit the typologies 
expectations – though some elements were not hypothesized to occur, notably Hong Kong’s FoVCF 
and Taiwan’s heterodox regulatory context. 
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9.3. Diffusion Literature’s Hypotheses Results 
 
This section more thoroughly discusses the ways in which the existence of multiple diffusion 
items, diffusion items’ varying levels of specificity and the diffusion mechanisms impacted the case 
studies’ VC policy choices. The majority of this section assesses the ability of diffusion literature’s 
hypotheses to explain the direction of VC policy adaptation in each case. To get started, Table 9.2 
identifies each case’s primary diffusion item(s) and diffusion mechanisms: 
 
Table 9.2: Diffusion Literature’s Hypotheses 
 
 
Hong Kong Taiwan Singapore Vietnam 
Number of 
Diffusion Items 
Studied 
Three One
117
 Three One 
Specificity of 
Primary 
Diffusion Item 
Low Low High Low 
Diffusion 
Mechanisms 
Competition / 
Bounded 
Learning 
Competition / 
Bounded 
Learning 
Competition / 
Bounded 
Learning 
Coercion 
 
The existence of more than one VC policy diffusion item (as seen in Table 9.2, multiple 
diffusion items were found in half the cases) contributed to the hybrid choices and therefore the low 
degree of convergence on the Silicon Valley policy environment. In the VC policy diffusion arena, 
there were not competing models as in the genetically-modified organism case as explored by 
Falkner and Gupta (2009). Instead, there have been iterations of policy innovations that have aimed 
                     
117
 For most of the Taiwanese VC policy diffusion history the Silicon Valley model was the primary diffusion item 
studied. Only in the context of creating the New Zealand bilateral FoVCF, which launched in 2012, was the Israeli 
Yozma fund diffused and studied. Studying of the Israeli FoVCF model seems to have only begun in late 2010 or in 
early 2011. 
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at replicating the Silicon Valley VC industry that effectively expanded the menu of possible VC 
policy choices. If Silicon Valley had been the only model, and the Israeli and Taiwanese VC policy 
innovations were not available, then perhaps there would have been more convergence on the 
Silicon Valley policy environment, rather than different adaptations and combinations, of multiple 
diffusion items. Said another way, since there have been different adaptations of one, two or three 
VC policy items in each case, there has been less convergence on one single model, particularly the 
source Silicon Valley policy environment, across adopters.  
 
The diffusion literature’s specificity hypothesis was that VC policy items that are more specific, 
e.g. a blueprint, would lead to choices characterized by higher degrees of convergence. In contrast, 
vague VC policy items, e.g. a more general policy principle, would lead to lower degrees of 
convergence. As a result, in VC policy diffusion, the highly specific Israeli and Taiwanese VC 
policy innovations were expected to lead to more convergence on their precise forms while the 
vague Silicon Valley policy environment was expected to lead to less convergence. The levels of 
specificity were not found to impact VC policy choices as hypothesized. This is because the 
highly specific FoVCF model was not transmitted intact into any of the East Asian environments, 
and neither was Taiwan’s 20% tax credit. Instead, it has been only one piece of the less specific 
Silicon Valley policy environment (the LP structure) that was adopted in one of the cases 
(Singapore) without any changes.  
 
With this said, when examining the policy choices of cases where versions of the FoVCF or tax 
credit were deployed, the “core” of the items were translated. In cases where the Silicon Valley 
policy environment was diffused, the overall policy choices did not keep the core elements of the 
regulatory environment intact. The core of the Silicon Valley policy item often did not get deployed 
(LP structure only used in half of cases, and the ERISA-like legislation not adopted in any of the 
cases). Empirical research revealed that the vague nature of the Silicon Valley item led VC 
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policymakers to study the other items (e.g. Israel and Taiwan). In this way, interviewees 
commented that if the Silicon Valley VC policy item would have been more of a blueprint, then 
they would not have studied the other policy items as much.  
 
 Moving on, the VC policy diffusion mechanism hypotheses were articulated as follows: 
emulation, coercion and competition were all expected to lead to high degrees of convergence, 
especially on the internationally revered Silicon Valley policy environment. Bounded learning, in 
contrast, was hypothesized to lead to less convergence as each state’s different economic 
management norms would result in distinct adaptations of policy items.  
 
The hypothesis for competition to drive a neoliberal choice stems from the globalization thesis’ 
contention that competitive pressures produce low tax, regulatory-friendly environments. In the VC 
policy arena, this meant that competition was expected to drive VC policy choices that closely 
resemble the neoliberal Silicon Valley VC regulatory environment and horizontally low tax rates. 
But, competition, even in the case of neoliberal Hong Kong, did not result in VC policies that 
mirror the Silicon Valley policy environment. Instead, the competition mechanism was found to 
drive Hong Kong policymakers to pursue a FoVCF and a VC-specific tax exemption. In this way, 
rather than a race to the bottom, competitive pressures were actually found to have motivated the 
interventionist adaptation of the Silicon Valley policy environment. Competitive pressures on 
Taiwanese and Singaporean VC policymakers led to the pursuit of interventionist strategies. In the 
three cases where competitive pressures were at work (Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore), VC 
policymakers did not believe that a replication of the neoliberal Silicon Valley policy environment 
alone would be sufficient in helping them achieve their goals of building a local Silicon Valley. 
 
A horizontal reduction in corporate or capital gains tax rates is the expected textbook 
outcome of competitive pressures. However, my research found that VC policymakers did not 
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universally lower their tax rates via the same strategy. Instead, they went a step beyond a low tax 
environment as numerous VC policymakers (including those in Taiwan and Singapore) gave VC-
sector specific tax credits to VC investors. The deployment of sector-specific tax credits is not 
consistent with Silicon Valley’s horizontally competitive, or neoliberal, market facilitation strategy. 
Tax credits (of the Taiwanese innovation’s variety) constitute an interventionist form of industrial 
policy (because tax credits involve the concession of tax revenues, and therefore indirect funding).  
 
As a result, VC-specific tax credits do not reflect a simple triumph of competitive forces 
over policymakers’ ability to choose. This is because policymakers have been able to choose to 
exempt tax payments, or to reward investors with credits for placing capital in the assets class (as 
the Taiwanese tax credit innovation did beginning in 1983). They have also been able to offer 
different kinds of tax credits – credits in line with the money allocation to VC investments, or tax 
credits on losses that investors suffer from their start-up investments. In addition, policymakers 
have been able to choose different tax rates for VC managers’ profits – zero, capital gains tax level 
or corporate tax rates. However, policymakers’ ability to choose their policy should not be 
overstated; these various choices all represent different forms of downward pressure on 
policymakers’ ability to tax the VC industry. As a result, VC policymakers are choosing amongst 
various ways to concede their tax proceeds, whether reducing tax rates for VC managers or giving 
tax credits to VC investors.  
 
More generally, my finding is that policymakers responding to competitive pressures felt the 
need to learn about sector-specific incentives to build local VC markets. The interventionist 
adaptations in response to competitive pressures both undermine and reinforce the globalization 
thesis. These findings undermine the globalization thesis by suggesting that the role of the state 
actually increases in line with heightened competitive pressures. In this way, instead of a “retreat of 
the state” (Strange, 1996), in the VC policy arena, learning enables a transformation towards the 
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“competition state” (Cerny, 2007). This transformation stems from the state having an enhanced 
role as an economic actor rather than just getting out of the way of market actors. On the other 
hand, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, policymakers have felt they need to deploy policies 
and resources to please private investors. VC policymakers, succumbing to globalization pressures, 
felt compelled to study different ways in which they could directly transfer resources to the industry 
via FoVCFs and tax credits.  
 
The 1990s has been heralded as a time of globalization, a supposed ‘retreat of the state’ 
(Strange, 1996) and a rising belief in pro-market forces as promulgated by the Washington 
Consensus. But, it was in this very context that interventionist VC policy choices, stemming from a 
neoliberal source model, proliferated. Even in this least likely context, competition was found to 
drive learning about various interventionist VC policy choices, rather than convergence on the 
neoliberal Silicon Valley policy environment. The case study investigations found that this was the 
result because, above all, it was the impact of policymakers’ economic management norms, 
especially the private sector financing and local versus international preferences, that determined 
policymakers’ bounded learning processes. 
 
Learning was expected to lead to adaptation as policymakers studied policy items in line with 
their normative preferences and then translated the preferred elements to fit their local context. The 
case studies with learning as their primary diffusion mechanism (in response to competitive 
pressures) are Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan. In these cases, VC policymakers were found to 
rely on cognitive biases when studying and designing policy options for their local environments. In 
so doing, they did not pursue fully rational measures of policy optimization based upon perfect 
information about how the policy design worked. This is just what Meseguer (2009: 19) expected, 
that the consequence of bounded learning is that policymakers choose “divergent policies.” In line 
with this rationale, the bounded learning that powered 75% of the VC policy diffusion cases drove 
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policymakers to come to different conclusions about the best way to implement the VC policy 
items. This then facilitated each state’s VC policymakers to uniquely adapt VC policy items in line 
with their local normative context.  
 
In light of the sparse occurrence of coercion and emulation, it is difficult to generalize about the 
impact of the coercion and emulation mechanisms in VC policy diffusion. This was not a clear case 
of emulation (despite all the rhetoric about wanting to replicate Silicon Valley), and only one case 
of coercion: Vietnam. Despite international donors’ coercion in the Vietnamese case, policymakers 
have not copied VC policy measures from either the US, Taiwan or Israel. Instead, Vietnam’s initial 
attempts to support SME financing reflect donors’ preferences for credit-based projects (e.g. the 
SME Development Fund that was approved in April 2013). The Vietnamese finding demonstrates 
that coercion does not drive a copy of any VC policy items if the actors applying the coercive 
pressure are not advocating the use of the diffusion items. Instead, in this case, coercion appears to 
have led to even further variation across adopters as policy diffusion was in line with donor, and 
local policymaker, preferences. 
 
Together, diffusion scholarship’s hypotheses for the sources of variation were found to 
contribute to the limited convergence that characterizes VC policy diffusion. The existence of 
multiple VC policy diffusion items did contribute to adaption and hybridization of VC policy 
instruments not included in the original model – the Silicon Valley policy environment. In terms of 
the role of the mechanisms, the finding was that the competition mechanism has acted as a 
motivating force in three cases; acting as a catalyst for learning. Then, the bounded learning 
processes drove policymakers towards varied, interventionist VC policy choices in line with their 
economic management norms. Only in one case were coercive forces found to have been present. 
Contrary to the hypothesis that coercion would drive high degrees of convergence, these coercive 
pressures led to Vietnamese policymakers following the credit-based terms outlined by their donors 
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rather than the equity-focused Silicon Valley VC policy environment.  
 
9.4. My Analytical Framework Hypotheses Results 
 
My analytical framework expected economic management norms to explain the unique 
adaptions of VC policy items in each East Asian context. I expected VC policy adaption and timing 
to be generally in line with each state’s normative environment and economic structure, 
respectively. This section examines the impact of each of the normative and economic factors on 
the VC policy choices to determine the accuracy of my hypotheses. To get started, Table 9.3 details 
the domestic factors found to be responsible for the shape of the East Asian VC policy choices: 
 
Table 9.3: My Hypotheses Results 
 
 Hong Kong Taiwan Singapore Vietnam 
Primary 
Domestic 
Factors 
Shifting pre-
existing 
economic 
management 
norms in favor 
of intervention 
and small, local 
firms. Increased 
public scrutiny 
of spending 
undermined 
FoVCF usage 
SME-dominant 
economic structure 
and pre-existing 
economic 
management norms 
and private sector 
financing norms 
favoring tax credit 
policy formula & 
small, local firm 
support preferences 
drove paper 
company structure 
and tax credit  
Economic 
management 
norms favoring 
funding and 
attracting 
international 
firms and drove 
TIF shape and 
LP adoption. 
Normative shift 
towards SME 
support aided 
initial VC policy 
diffusion and 
ESVF shape 
Growth of 
SMEs in the 
economy, and 
shifting 
economic 
management 
norms towards 
SME support 
aided initial VC 
policy diffusion. 
Credit-centric 
financial system 
and norms 
adapted towards 
credit  
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 My framework articulated that economic structures, specifically high-technology SME 
activity levels and bank versus capital market balance, would determine the timing of VC policy 
diffusion. In each case, the level of SME activity impacted the general timing of VC policy 
diffusion, as the state with high initial SME activity levels (Taiwan) acted the earliest, in response 
to SMEs’ funding needs. However, in states with low initial SME activity levels, though they acted 
later, it was not always a rise of SME activity levels that instigated VC policy diffusion. Rather, 
policymakers’ normative shifts towards favoring small, local high-technology firms helped 
facilitate VC policy diffusion in two cases (Hong Kong and Singapore). In their cases, I found that 
policymakers’ company size preference shifts motivated VC policy diffusion, rather than 
policymakers responding to SMEs’ actual need for capital. In Vietnam, though VC policy has yet to 
substantively diffuse, Vietnamese policymakers’ interest in early-stage funding was motivated by 
its growing SME activity levels. As such, though Vietnam remains a VC policy diffusion rejecter, 
their SME activity levels sparked VC policy interest more akin to the earliest adopter, Taiwan. In 
contrast, in the majority adopter states of Hong Kong and Singapore it was normative shifts, not 
increases in SME activity levels, that catalyzed VC policy diffusion. 
 
 The financial sector’s bank or capital market focus was not found to affect the timing of VC 
policy diffusion to the same extent that SME activity levels did. This was found to be the result of 
East Asia’s increasingly balanced and comprehensive financial sectors. In Hong Kong and 
Singapore, bank and capital market activities have both been vibrant, with the two sectors even 
having similar values (in terms of assets and equity value) in Singapore. In addition, in these 
entrepot states, the VC industry is positioned as another financial services offering, rather than 
exclusively bank or capital market related. As a result, the neutral bank and capital market character 
of the financial sectors did not speed up, nor slow down, VC policy diffusion in the Hong Kong and 
Singapore cases.  
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In Taiwan, though banks dominated the financial sector’s provision of financing to SMEs 
through the 1990s, the bank dominance did not preclude policymakers learning about equity-based 
financing policies. Instead, the lack of bank financing for SMEs was so stark that it created an 
opportunity for policymakers to seek out alternative solutions for SMEs’ financing needs. In the 
Vietnamese case, however, I found that the bank dominant nature of the financial sector has slowed 
the timing of VC policy diffusion. The bank dominance of the financial sector, coupled with 
Vietnamese donors and policymakers’ preference for debt instruments (over equity tools), drove the 
credit-based SME policies thus far. In this way, it has not been the financial sector’s bank over 
capital markets nature alone that shaped the loan adaptation of VC policies in Vietnam. Therefore, 
the amount of high-technology SMEs or the bank-capital market balance has not alone accounted 
for the timing of VC policy diffusion.  
 
 I now turn to the impact of the five economic management norms. The interventionist 
orientation norms were found to have had a large impact on VC policies. Interventionist 
orientations determined the possible VC policy choice set. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
Singaporean policymakers (especially the EDB) deployed large funding initiatives to attract 
international firms to support domestic ICT and SME activity. When VC policy information 
diffused to Singapore, policymakers sought out to learn about the Israeli FoVCF model as this 
finance-laden tool was attractive given their preference for private sector financing. Similarly, 
Taiwanese policymakers, led by their economic management norms that favored the use of tax 
credits, created a 20% tax credit for VC investors rather than replicating elements of the Silicon 
Valley regulatory environment. Hong Kong’s policymakers initially focused on their enabling 
regulatory environment. But, when the “limits of laissez-faire” were reached (Fuller, 2010), they 
started to embrace the notion of intervening to enhance local innovation and start-up activity. For 
Hong Kong, the eroding of its leaders once iron clad neoliberal stance paved the way for its 
policymakers to learn about industrial policy tools such as sector-specific tax exemptions. Vietnam 
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experienced a shift in favor of increasing the white space available to private firms; this change 
paved the way for industrial policies to even be considered by Vietnamese policymakers.  
 
The second economic management norms, private sector financing norms, shape how 
policymakers deploy funding, especially FoVCFs. The four cases reflected a low to high spectrum 
in terms of private sector financing norms: Hong Kong was low, Taiwan moderate, Singapore high, 
and Vietnamese policymakers’ private sector financing norms were low. The private sector 
financing norms had two primary impacts on VC policy choices. Financing norms impacted the size 
and terms of the case studies’ FoVCFs. Here, Hong Kong and Singapore serve as extreme examples 
of the phenomenon. In Hong Kong, government funding to private sector firms was not in their 
policymakers’ lexicon until the 1990s, and even then, caution came with the allocation of funding to 
private sector firms. In line with their private sector financing norms, the Hong Kong VC funding 
scheme did not initially take the shape of a FoVCF. Instead, Hong Kong policymakers tried to 
manage a modest amount of VC money itself via the ARF beginning in 1994. However, after a few 
years managing the fund, policymakers felt that they were lacking the necessary expertise for 
managing a VC fund. Due to their domestic policy experience, only then did the 1998 ARF take the 
shape of a blue chip VC managed-focused FoVCF. It was in this context that the ITC policymakers 
hired four private VC managers to invest the ARF II money on their behalf. In this way, as the 
Hong Kong FoVCF was a means of outsourcing SME investments rather than a VC industry 
jumpstart effort. As evidence, the ARF II paid a 3 to 4% management fee to the ARF II VC 
managers as well as a share of the profits – in other countries, the FoVCF terms have focused on 
returns from portfolio company exits, not from management fees.  
 
The opposite case, in terms of private sector financing norms, is that of Singaporean 
policymakers, who have a history of allocating large sums of money to private firms. In line with 
their private sector financing norms, Singaporean policymakers increased the size of the FoVCF 
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(from Israel’s USD 100 million to the TIF’s USD 1 billion). Also, as funding came more naturally 
to Singaporean policymakers, they launched the TIF shortly after learning about the interventionist 
Yozma model, whereas Hong Kong policymakers only came to implement the FoVCF structure 
after years of a poor experience with direct VC fund management. In addition, despite the TIF’s 
poor performance, the financing happy Singaporeans were able to launch a second FoVCF (the 
ESVF), whereas the Hong Kong policymakers have not. 
 
Before moving on to the next economic management norm, I would like to acknowledge the 
limitation of the different private sector financing norms to explain FoVCF adoption patterns. 
Despite their different terms, three case studies did deploy varied adaptations of FoVCFs. In this 
way, FoVCFs were pursued even in two cases (Hong Kong and Taiwan) where private sector 
financing norms did not favor such initiatives. I found that the deployment of FoVCFs in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan came from three sources: an updating of their private sector financing norms over 
the period, (negative) domestic policy experience and learning about the highly successful Israeli 
FoVCF model. These changes and experiences overpowered the impact of initial private sector 
financing norms such that even states expected to not deploy a FoVCF, such as Hong Kong, ended 
up doing so. 
 
Third, policymakers’ local versus international firm preferences were found to impact the 
design of VC policy choices in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. Policymakers’ inclination 
towards supporting local, or attracting international, firms affected VC regulations, non-financial 
incentives and the terms of FoVCFs. As an illustration, Hong Kong’s entrepot preferences 
motivated its policymakers to ensure an internationally consistent regulatory environment, 
particularly the availability of the LP structure for its VC managers and an attractive tax 
environment. In Taiwan, policymakers’ focus on local enabled the persistence of their heterodox 
paper company structure, which endows local investors with the control they wanted to have over 
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investment decisions. Finally, in Singapore, policymakers have been focused on attracting 
international capital and international VC talent. Due to this international preference, Singaporean 
policymakers’ first adaptation of the Yozma model (the TIF) allocated 75% of its funding to 
international VC managers who set up operations in Singapore. In addition, Singapore created the 
GIP to attract international investors for their VC managers, adopted the internationally attractive 
LP structure in 2002, and adjusted the terms of its second FoVCF (the ESVF, which was originally 
designed to support local VC managers) to allow international participation as of September 2013. 
 
The fourth economic management norm examined in this thesis is policymakers’ large or 
small company preferences. Both small and large firm preferences were found to propel VC policy 
diffusion. This is because supporting SMEs was found to (eventually) be popular in all four cases; 
SME activity has been increasingly linked to innovation and competitiveness. To this end, even in 
cases where there had been clear MNC preferences, notably in Hong Kong and Singapore, there has 
been a normative shift in favor of supporting domestic SMEs as a way of promoting innovation in 
response to manufacturing hollowing out and diversifying away from a reliance on MNCs. 
Similarly, in Vietnam, there has been a normative shift in favor of supporting SMEs alongside 
SOEs and equitized firms as the white space for private sector activity continues to grow. In 
Taiwan, the small firm support norm had been established by the KMT regime by the 1970s, as the 
martial law regime strove to limit the potential rival power of large private firms in comparison to 
state power. As a result of its early interest in SME promotion, Taiwan was the first state to study 
the Silicon Valley VC policy model. The other states have initiated their VC policy learning efforts 
in line with their SME-interested normative shifts. Thus, East Asian policymakers were found to 
either prefer small firm support from the outset or experience a normative shift in favor of greater 
SME support – this preference affected the timing, not the form, of VC policies.  
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The fifth economic management norm investigated is the bank versus capital markets 
preference. In the financial system where the state has most closely used public banks to direct 
credit, Vietnam, the preference for banks, and credit instruments, over capital markets, and equity 
tools, was found to have delayed and adapted VC policy diffusion. In Vietnam, Silicon Valley 
replication policy efforts have been transformed into SME financing efforts via credit-based 
initiatives. As a result, Vietnamese policymakers have not pursued a FoVCF and instead continue to 
deploy loan-based initiatives as their solution to SME financing needs. In the entrepot financial 
systems of Hong Kong and Singapore, however, policymakers were found to not have a preference 
for supporting banks or capital markets. Instead, they have generally strived to support the 
comprehensiveness of their financial systems in a bid to be leading regional, and international, 
financial centers. In this way, Hong Kong and Singaporean policymakers deployed VC policies as 
an extension of their existing financial services offerings, not because VC was part of the banking 
or capital markets sectors.
118
 Finally, in Taiwan, though the state had historically directed credit 
decisions, I found that Taiwanese policymakers have not had a strong preference for banks over 
capital markets. This has been because Taiwanese policymakers have, above all, aimed to 
encourage domestic high-technology SME activity. As a result, as Taiwanese policymakers became 
aware that domestic banks were allocating insufficient capital to SMEs, they embraced equity-based 
VC markets as an alternative way to aid the growth of their start-ups. 
 
The below table distils the core impact of each of the five economic management norms on 
the four East Asian VC policies. 
 
Table 9.4: Impact of Five Economic Management Norms on VC Policy Diffusion 
 
 Hong Kong Taiwan Singapore Vietnam 
1) Reluctant to Use of a time- Studying and Focus on 
                     
118
 Their interest in VC policy also stemmed from the normative shift towards SME promotion as a response to 
manufacturing hollowing out and overreliance on MNCs. 
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Interventionist 
Orientation 
fund private 
firms 
tested 20% tax 
credit 
adapting 
FoVCF 
SMEs came 
late (in last 
decade) 
2) Private 
Sector 
Financing 
Late FoVCF 
adaption, and 
its outsourcing 
structure 
Tax credits use 
rather than 
funding 
Two FoVCFs 
of large size 
No funding to 
VC managers 
3) Small 
versus Large 
Firm 
Shift towards 
small firms 
catalyzed 
diffusion 
Early VC 
policy 
diffusion 
Shift towards 
small firms 
catalyzed 
diffusion 
Shift prompted 
initial SME 
financing 
interest 
4) Local 
versus 
International 
Firm 
Internationally 
friendly tax 
and regulations 
Locally 
attractive legal 
structure and 
regulations 
International 
attraction via 
FoVCFs, GIP 
and regulations 
__ 
5) Bank 
versus capital 
markets 
Neutral Neutral Neutral 
Bank-centric 
loans to SMEs, 
not equity to 
VC managers 
 
 
Finally, I present the findings for the impact of the formal institutions in the four East Asian 
case studies. The ease with which policymakers could secure sign-off and budget for policies was 
found to have a particularly strong impact on the deployment, size and terms of FoVCFs. In cases 
where policymaking processes endowed budgetary authority to the policymaking bodies, as in the 
case of Singapore, the policymaking process enabled policymakers’ quick and large use of funding. 
As a result, when Singapore’s Technopreneurship 21 committee decided to create a FoVCF in 1999, 
and then the NRF chose to deploy a second FoVCF in 2008, they were both able to deploy sizeable 
FoVCFs as soon as ready. Policymakers in the Singaporean context did not have to wait for an 
external party to decide how or when they could deploy money. In contrast, Hong Kong’s 
distribution of budgetary power endowed the Legislative Council with sign off on all budgetary 
requests. This was found to limit VC policymakers’ ability to direct financing to private firms. To 
this end, even when the ARF became a FoVCF in 1998, the LegCo’s budgetary review in 2004 led 
to the ARF II being wound down.  
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Democratization and regime types are the other formal institutions that were examined in the 
case studies. Here, my findings are that democratization limits the longevity of resource allocation 
to specific sectors – particularly tax incentives and FoVCFs. As an illustration, though Taiwan’s 
martial law ended in 1987, as soon as the first non-KMT political party took power in 1999 their 
policymakers chose to discontinue the VC industry tax credit. In Hong Kong, as politicization and 
the power of the legislative branch grew in the early 2000s, Hong Kong’s VC policymakers, who 
had warmed to more interventionist approaches, started to come under public pressure for their 
financing of private sector initiatives. This increase in public scrutiny caused its VC policymakers 
to wind down the ARF II and they have not been able to launch another FoVCF since.  
 
Looking ahead, increased public scrutiny due to democratization was expressed as an inhibitor 
of financing private sector activity in Singapore, though this sentiment has not manifested into less 
available financing as of yet. It is of course difficult, and problematic, to try to predict the future. 
But, I feel compelled to relay sentiment that several interviewees expressed, that further 
democratization in East Asia, and in Singapore in particular, may result in trimming back the use of 
interventionist VC policy items. I say this knowing that many of the 41 international states that have 
launched FoVCFs are democratic. As a result, democracy and FoVCFs are clearly not incompatible. 
Thus, I do not argue that democracy limits policymakers’ ability to utilize private sector financing 
tools. Rather, I posit that a sudden increase in public scrutiny due to democratization undermines 
policymakers’ ability to transfer resources to private sector firms. Increased politicization and 
public scrutiny already led to the discontinuation of interventionist VC policy instruments in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan in the 2000s. A similar trend is expected in Singapore as the PAP loses its 
stronghold on political leadership. 
 
Finally, over the course of my fieldwork it became apparent that policymakers’ level of 
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technical knowledge of the capital markets sector, enabled, and hindered, learning about VC policy 
items. Singapore serves as the extreme example of how high levels of expertise – and significant 
research resources – expedited the VC policy learning process. In the case of the ESVF as an 
illustration, Singaporean VC policymakers visited Israel in January 2008 to re-learn about the 
Israeli FoVCF model. Then, speaking to their efficiency, the ESVF initiative was launched in July 
of the same year. Vietnam, on the other hand, has been restricted to implementing what their donors 
dictate due to its VC policymakers’ low technical capacity.119 To this end, Vietnamese 
policymakers rely on policy advice – and funding – from their donors, while technocratic 
Singaporean policymakers proactively and meticulously study option items – and then quickly 
launch local adaptations.  
 
9.5. The Central Role of Economic Management Norms in Diffusion 
 
My research revealed that there is a dynamic relationship between the international and 
domestic spheres in policy diffusion, and it is fuelled by the central role of economic management 
norms in shaping unique bounded learning processes. This pivotal result demonstrates that a single 
level framework would have not been able to fully account for the sources of VC policy variance. 
An international diffusion framework would not have been able to explain the occurrence of 
different VC policy choices in the three states where competition and learning were the diffusion 
mechanisms. The finding that the same mechanisms (competition and learning) drove VC policy 
diffusion in three cases (Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore) would have meant that the three cases 
deployed the same policy choice. Of course, it was not the case that diffusion scholarships’ 
hypotheses could explain the unique VC policy choice in any of the three cases. Instead, domestic 
economic management norms, by steering the bounded learning process, were the primary shapers 
                     
119
 Vietnamese policymakers also need to comply with their donor programs constitute 30% of the Vietnamese state 
budget. So, even if Vietnamese policymakers had deep expertise on the VC industry, they would still need to comply 
with donor priorities and programs because they rely so heavily on donor aid. However, if the policymakers had greater 
expertise then perhaps they could better persuade donors to pursue other strategies. 
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of VC policy diffusion.  
 
Similarly, a domestic-level institutional framework would have missed the starting points from 
which VC policy diffusion began in each case. In the Taiwanese case, for instance, an investigation 
that did not acknowledge the role of policymakers’ learning from Silicon Valley may have assumed 
that Taiwanese policymakers created their VC tax credit as an extension of their technology sector 
policies. But, as my empirical research found, the idea of supporting a local VC industry did not 
come from domestic origins. Instead, the VC policy idea was diffused to Taiwanese policymakers 
by learning from Silicon Valley-based sources. Furthermore, a domestic framework would struggle 
to explain the widespread adoption of the FoVCF. This inability of domestic frameworks to explain 
policy adoption patterns is precisely the strength of diffusion frameworks, and the reason why 
domestic norm-focused diffusion tools were employed in this thesis.   
 
Economic management norms, not the varying levels of specificity or multiple diffusion items, 
drove the diversity amongst convergence outcome. My empirical research found that the vague 
Silicon Valley idea led to policymakers seeking information about other (more specific or relevant) 
VC policy items. This happened as East Asian policymakers came to the conclusion that Silicon 
Valley’s success was not the result of a specific policy set. They found that Silicon Valley was the 
unique product of forty years of a cluster developing. After coming to this conclusion, they then 
sought out information about more specific VC policy items and considered how they could design 
policies that would better with their local context. Therefore, Silicon Valley’s low level of 
specificity did not directly lead to variation; it led policymakers to further studying, evaluating and 
designing VC policies in line with their economic management norms. 
 
In some cases, the low specificity of the Silicon Valley policy environment led policymakers to 
learn about existing VC policy items (e.g. Singapore’s learning about the Israeli Yozma fund) and 
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in other cases, it led policymakers to look inward (e.g. Taiwan’s use of their tried and true tax 
credit). In this way, it was not just Silicon Valley’s low level of specificity that led to less 
convergence. There was another step in the process: the low level of specificity of the Silicon 
Valley policy environment spawned VC policymakers’ further learning (either from foreign or 
domestic sources) of other policy items. They then evaluated and adapted what they learned in line 
with their economic management norms. As a result, it has been the bounded learning process, in 
accordance with three of the economic management norms (pre-existing economic management 
norms, private sector financing and international versus local firm preference), not the vague 
Silicon Valley policy environment itself, which has driven the East Asian states’ unique – and 
therefore varied – VC policy choices.  
 
The impact of domestic economic management norms was found to be so strong that, counter to 
diffusion literature’s hypothesis about highly specific models leading to greater degrees of 
convergence, even when policymakers learned about highly specific VC policy items, like Israel’s 
Yozma fund, they did not create a duplicate version. Instead, even as East Asian policymakers 
learned about the highly specific FoVCF instrument, policymakers adapted the Yozma model in 
line with their economic management norms. As such, the highly specific Yozma model was 
adapted in three cases (Hong Kong’s ARF, Taiwan’s bilateral fund with New Zealand, and 
Singapore’s TIF and ESVF). The three different adaptations of the Yozma Fund is testament to the 
fact that just because a diffusion item has a high level of specificity, it is not beyond transformation 
in line with key economic management norms. In Hong Kong, this meant that its FoVCF (ARF II) 
was adapted into a way for policymakers to avoid having to pick start-up winners. In Singapore this 
translated into their first FoVCF (TIF) being ten times the size of the Yozma model and allocating 
to international, rather than domestic, participants. This illustrates how the adaptation of even 
highly specific policy items has been determined by economic management norms.  
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Economic management norms, particularly the interventionist orientation, determined which 
type of international intermediaries (particularly guanxi) VC policy information was diffused 
through. This manifested into neoliberal states’ VC policy diffusion coming from private 
intermediaries whereas the more interventionist states’ policymakers dealt primarily with public 
actors in the international arena. This bifurcation reflects the broader differences in the roles of 
private sector participants in policymaking in both of these contexts. To be sure, in cases where the 
state has not determined private sector production and has not led industrialization policies, private 
sector actors – via guanxi within and across borders and sectors - were more involved in the policy 
diffusion process. In this way, private actors in Silicon Valley were the main conduits of VC policy 
diffusion to Hong Kong and Taiwan. The converse was found in more statist systems, wherein the 
state leads the policymaking process by dealing with public, or official, international actors. Thus, 
in both Vietnam and Singapore, policymakers mostly dealt with official actors (at IOs or states).  
 
In the neoliberal states, guanxi based in Silicon Valley, or connected with ICT and VC sector 
players in the other model states, primarily shaped the agenda setting portion of the VC 
policymaking process. These guanxi brought the idea of VC and knowledge on how other states 
have supported it to local policymakers in Hong Kong and Taiwan (and have started to do so in 
Vietnam). Taiwan serves as an especially interesting case in terms of the role of guanxi, because 
senior policymakers, such as K.T. Li, were connected and informed by guanxi. In Taiwan, close 
relations with industry participants are valued and prioritized by industrial policymakers. In Hong 
Kong, the state even went as far as to hire policymakers that possessed Silicon Valley knowledge 
and guanxi, demonstrating the value they place on leveraging private sector insights and 
connections. Guanxi’s centrality in Taiwan and Hong Kong, in particular, is consistent with other 
business system accounts that highlight “the importance of highly personal, particularistic and 
diffuse ties” in these two states (Whitley, 1992: 11).  
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State-led environments have not relied on, or purposefully involved, guanxi in VC 
policymaking. In state-led Singapore, policymakers relied more on direct experience and policy 
information acquisition than on guanxi. The clearest example of this is how one of the top VC 
policymakers in Singapore spent two years living in Silicon Valley to ensure that he personally 
understands the model. In Vietnam, there has been a mixed role for guanxi. Vietnamese 
policymakers have not prioritized relationships with private sector guanxi. They have, instead, 
achieved much of their policy learning through connections with other types of contacts – donors. 
The guanxi that have brought VC information into Vietnam thus far have been returning nationals 
and foreign nationals setting up VC firms in Vietnam. The major caveat to this Vietnamese case, of 
course, is the relationship between one of the four VC managers (the Managing Director of IDG – 
Henry Nguyen) and the Prime Minister (the IDG head is the Prime Minister’s son-in-law). This 
guanxi was not found to have specifically formed VC policy action, but may be one of the 
contributors to the rising awareness about the VC industry amongst Vietnamese policymakers.  
 
Finally, I found that it has been either a competitive or coercive force that first catalyzed VC 
policy diffusion in each case. In this way, the coercion and competition mechanisms were only 
found to have initiated VC policy diffusion processes. Following this prompt, bounded learning was 
triggered in three out of four cases as domestic VC policymakers sought out information on VC 
policy items. In this way, externally-generated competition and coercion forces served as catalysts 
for economic management norms to determine which VC policy items were studied (e.g. Weyland’s 
availability heuristic), how the elements were evaluated (the diffusion items’ “representativeness”) 
and how they were adapted (the extent to which movement away from the “anchor” occurred), 
during bounded learning processes. VC policies have not simply diffused into a receiving space or a 
“black box”; instead, VC policymakers’ normative contexts drove VC policymaking processes.  
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9.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the findings of the East Asian VC policy diffusion investigations. 
The diffusion scholarship’s hypotheses were examined for the impact of diffusion mechanisms and 
multiple policy items of varying levels of specificity on policy choices. The results of these factors’ 
impacts on the VC policy choices were then compared to their expected impacts. The existence of 
three VC policy items (Silicon Valley, Taiwan and Israel) was found to be a contributor to the 
limited degrees of convergence on the Silicon Valley policy environment. The varying levels of 
specificity, however, did not lead to a clear pattern, or to the hypothesized impact. In this way, the 
number of diffusion items had more of an impact than the varying levels of specificity. The last of 
the diffusion literature’s hypotheses, about the diffusion mechanisms, expected less adaptation from 
the Silicon Valley policy environment than what occurred. Even the diffusion mechanisms that 
were expected to drive convergence, such as coercion and competition, propelled adaptation.  
 
The chapter analyzed the comparative domestic contexts, particularly economic 
management norms, formal institutions and economic structures, to determine how the hypotheses 
compared to my findings. Domestic factors were found to be central drivers of the persistence of 
variety. Hence the title of the thesis begins with “All Politics is Local,” which is a return to Tip 
O’Neill’s (1994) use of the term. This is in contrast with Dan Drezner’s (2007) book All Politics is 
Global, because my central finding is that each state’s policymakers adapted VC policies in line 
with their own, unique domestic contexts. To this end, international power structures, or the 
restrictive pressure that market forces are said to have over policymakers’ choice sets, were not 
found to rule over domestic input into VC policy choices. 
 
Three of the five economic management norms –interventionist orientations, private sector 
financing and local versus international firm preferences – had the greatest weight on the VC policy 
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choices. Interventionist orientations were instrumental to shaping VC policy choices by shaping 
what was studied and then how policy items were translated locally. Private sector financing norms 
were found to be central to shaping VC policy choices, especially the use, size, and terms of 
FoVCFs. The international versus local company preference adapted VC policy items, both in terms 
of the deployment (or not) of internationally consistent regulations and in adapting FoVCFs (or not) 
to allocate to international VC managers. These three norms helped shape different adaptations of 
the policy items. But, over time there have been normative shifts such that policymakers’ economic 
management norms regarding large and small firm support, and bank versus capital markets, 
converged. Though initial company size preferences varied across the cases, company size 
preferences were found to have converged on norms that “supporting SMEs is good.” This shift has 
actually been partly driven by policymakers learning about the Silicon Valley cluster. The bank 
versus capital market preference became more balanced over time, and so did not matter to the 
extent as I hypothesized, except in the case of Vietnam where policymakers’ preferences remain 
bank centric. 
 
The functionalist hypotheses – that high-technology SME activity levels and bank versus 
capital market balance would explain the timing of VC policy efforts – were only found to be a 
blunt predictor of the timing (e.g. diffusion adopter category). They have not been found to be 
capable of explaining the precise timing of VC policy diffusion. This has been because SME 
activity levels only drove the initiation of VC policy diffusion in the Taiwanese and Vietnamese 
cases. In the other two cases, they were found to be less instrumental in Singapore and Hong Kong 
as shifting economic norms encouraged VC policies in an effort to develop high-technology SME 
activity. Similarly, only in the Vietnamese case did the bank-centric nature of the financial system 
slow VC policy diffusion. It was found to have a neutral or positive impact in the other cases, either 
reflecting a relative balance of banks and capital markets (Singapore and Hong Kong) or banks 
having too much control over credit to SMEs (Taiwan). 
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Looking ahead, chapter 10 concludes the thesis by applying the analytical developments and 
empirical findings to larger IPE debates. The findings are discussed within the context of my 
analytical contribution to the policy diffusion and East Asian comparative capitalisms research 
agendas. The chapter also discusses the ability of the analytical framework to guide investigations 
of other policy diffusion trends. In addition, the next chapter discusses the empirical findings’ 
contribution to academic and practitioners’ knowledge of VC policies. The concluding chapter also 
outlines areas for further research. 
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10. Conclusion  
 
10.1. Introduction 
 
As mentioned in the opening chapter, this thesis was motivated by theoretical and empirical 
gaps in IPE research. More specifically, this thesis responds to a mutual neglect within IPE 
scholarship. The mutual neglect stems from the separation of international and domestic contexts in 
diffusion frameworks. As a result of this gap, diffusion frameworks have struggled to analytically 
account for the only limited degrees of convergence that have occurred as the result of diffusion 
processes. This thesis has made progress in bridging this gap by bringing together tools from policy 
diffusion and comparative capitalism to investigate the drivers of convergent, yet varying, policy 
choices. In doing so, the thesis has made theory-based and empirical contributions to the IPE field 
by uncovering the primary role of domestic economic management norms in diffusion processes.  
 
The major theory-based contribution of the thesis is its furthering of existing diffusion 
frameworks to account for variance amidst convergence. To do this, the analytical framework 
developed here delineated comparative capitalism typologies to account for the range of economic 
management norms across East Asia. In doing so, the thesis brought domestic factors into the center 
of international policy diffusion analyses. A second contribution is the framework’s further 
conceptualization and testing of how multiple diffusion items and their varying levels of specificity 
contribute to limited degrees of convergence. The third theory-based contribution is the thesis’ input 
into the “states versus markets” debate, particularly its evidence of why competition does not result 
in universal convergence.  
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Empirically, this thesis provided original investigations into sources of VC policy diffusion, as 
VC policy had not been previously examined by IPE scholars. To contribute to the analysis of this 
under-researched policy area, I delineated the VC policy elements (regulations, taxation and 
FoVCFs) and conceptualized the multiple VC policy items (Silicon Valley, Taiwan and Israel). I 
also explored the sources of VC policy choices in four in-depth cases (Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Vietnam) and compiled an original dataset of the VC policies deployed by 46 states. 
For East Asia specifically, my empirical research also contributes to our knowledge of the role of 
guanxi and Japan’s leadership role on industrial policymaking in East Asia. 
 
To more fully develop how my theory and empirical work contributes to IPE scholarship, the 
chapter is organized as follows. Section 10.2 discusses the thesis’ theoretical contributions and 
Section 10.3 highlights its empirical contributions. Then Section 10.4 outlines areas for future 
research as it relates to how the domestic norm-focused analytical framework can be leveraged to 
investigate other policy areas as well as how further research to be carried out on the VC policy 
area. Finally, the brief Conclusion section brings the thesis to a close.  
 
10.2. Theoretical Contributions 
 
The theoretical contributions of this thesis to IPE literature come from its ability to account for 
limited degrees of convergence. This was primarily achieved by delineating and testing the role of 
economic management norms in determining policymakers’ unique bounded learning processes. To 
do this, I invoked comparative capitalism tools to formalize expectations about the impact of the 
different East Asian economic management norms on their policy choices. In addition, the thesis 
tested state-of-the-art diffusion scholarship’s hypotheses about the role of diffusion mechanisms, 
multiple policy items and varying levels of specificity in driving adaptation in the diffusion process.  
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My primary contribution was furthering our understanding of why and how bounded learning is 
expected to drive different adaptations of policy items in each state. I demonstrated how boundedly 
rational policymakers each come to their own, different conclusions following their study and 
localization efforts. My conceptualization of how bounded learning drives variety rather than 
conformity builds on the work of Kurt Weyland (2006), particularly his delineation of how 
cognitive biases drive different policy choices across states.
120 
Adapting the tools developed by 
Weyland, I investigated the impact of five specific economic management norms in framing how 
policy information was sought out, evaluated and adapted in the bounded learning process.  
 
My case study investigations generally reinforced the bounded rationality hypothesis as they 
found that bounded learning drove adaptation in line with policymakers’ economic management 
normative contexts. Three economic management norms in particular – (1) interventionist 
orientations, (2) private sector financing and (3) the support of local versus international firms – 
were found to have shaped policy evaluation and design to fit with domestic contexts. Based upon 
these three economic management norms, each East Asian state’s policymakers came to different 
conclusions about which VC policies to study, how to value them and then they chose to formulate 
their own unique VC policies. As discussed in Chapter 9, two of the economic management norms 
– small versus large company preferences and bank versus capital market preferences – were found 
to not have a distinct impact in each state. This was the result of shifts towards small firm and 
capital market support across much of East Asia. 
 
However, as discussed in Chapter 9, it was not only bounded learning that led to variation, but 
also coercion (in the Vietnamese case). Coercion resulted in a unique VC policy choice as the 
credit-focused policies dictated by the more powerful actors (donors) were not the VC policy items. 
                     
120
 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of Weyland’s three cognitive heuristics (anchoring, representativeness 
and availability) and Chapter 4 for an explanation of how my framework takes his cognitive heuristic tools in a more 
domestically-rooted, policy area-specific direction. 
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Competitive pressures were found to be a catalyst for VC policy learning efforts, but only a trigger, 
not a final driver of the policy choices. As a result, even diffusion mechanisms that were expected 
to lead to convergence on the neoliberal agenda (coercion and competition) were found to facilitate 
adaptation. This finding supports the thesis’ overall hypothesis that diffusion drives variance, not 
complete convergence. But, it means that more work remains before we are able to formulate 
generalizable hypotheses about the precise degrees of convergence that the four mechanisms drive.  
 
This thesis contributes to diffusion scholarship’s understanding of how diffusion mechanisms 
are not simultaneous, mutually exclusive or equal in impact. In this respect, I extend the work of 
diffusion scholars who have acknowledged this interrelated nature of diffusion mechanisms (see 
Kogut and Macpherson, 2008) and the potential for the co-occurrence of emulation and learning 
(Meseguer, 2009). Diffusion mechanisms’ interrelated nature has come as competition to attract 
international investment has not in and of itself been a diffusion mechanism that explains policy 
choices. Similarly, coercion to comply with IO stipulations has not resulted in copying of existing 
policy items. Instead, coercive and competitive forces were discussed for how they brought new 
policy items onto the policymaking agenda. Then, either (bounded) learning or emulation of policy 
items occurred. In this way, even in the face of external pressures (e.g. competition or coercion), I 
have conceptualized how policymakers retain agency as it is the domestically-led learning 
mechanism produces the precise shape of their policy choice.  
 
Through my delineation of economic management norms within East Asia, I provide more 
nuanced conceptualizations of East Asian policymaking environments. My contribution here comes 
as comparative capitalism research, particularly VoC, has been criticized for its failure to offer 
Asia-relevant typologies beyond a singular “Asian model.”121 Going beyond the Korean or Japanese 
                     
121
 While my East Asian typologies are a contribution to the comparative capitalism research area, I am not claiming to 
be the first to offer East Asian capitalist typologies. Helpful contributions have already come from Whitely (1999) and 
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type, my typologies help to rectify comparative capitalisms’ failure to sufficiently delineate the 
variety of other government-market relations in Asia. My typologies add more precision to how IPE 
research conceptualizes the variety, rather than singularity, of East Asian policymakers’ economic 
management norms.  
 
I conceptualized four types of East Asian states that differ in their economic management 
norms: the Nightwatch-man state, the Private Sector Promoter, the Financier and Director and 
Command Economy. My typologies delineate East Asian policymakers varying private sector 
financing norms, small versus large and local versus international company preferences, bank 
versus capital market preferences and interventionist orientations. My East Asian typologies better 
acknowledge and differentiate the range of different economic management norms guiding 
policymaking in East Asia, particularly as they relate to small firms and capital markets. As there 
has been an overgeneralization that East Asian state-firm relations revolve around banks and large 
firms, East Asian policymakers’ approach to SMEs and capital markets have been understudied. 
Giving more attention to capital markets and SMEs’ policies is timely as East Asia has seen a rise in 
high-technology entrepreneurial activity and capital market growth. 
 
Another theory-based contribution is my testing of state-of-the-art diffusion literature’s 
expectations for how the existence of multiple policy items and levels of specificity contribute to 
limited convergence. My findings support Falkner & Gupta’s (2009) argument that only limited 
degrees of convergence are likely when multiple policy models exist. With multiple (but not 
competing) successful policy items, I found that policymakers are empowered to choose and adapt 
elements from each policy item. Knowing that there was not only one specific policy formula that 
works, policymakers are then empowered to combine and adapt their own versions of the policy 
items. However, I found that the level of specificity of the diffusion item does not necessarily drive 
                                                                    
Walter and Zhang (2012) that go beyond Amable’s (2003) singular Asian model. However, these existing typologies 
were not focused on the institutional and economic features relevant to this empirical area.  
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more or less convergence, as expected by Hall (1993), Lenschow et al (2005), and Weyland (2006). 
A vague source policy was found to contribute to policymakers seeking additional, more specific 
policy items, but in contrast to the expectation, both vague and specific policy items were adapted.  
 
In addition, this project contributes to the “states versus markets” debate. The occurrence of 
varying, interventionist VC policy choices as the result of the neoliberal Silicon Valley VC policy 
environment’s diffusion stands in contrast to the globalization thesis’ hypothesis. The globalization 
thesis would expect that, in light of rising capital mobility and therefore competition for capital, 
there is less scope for states to intervene in private sector activity. To this end, the only tools 
available to policymakers would be lower tax rates and more market friendly regulations. But, a 
smaller role for the state, in which the state would simply create a favorable environment for 
markets to operate (which is what the Silicon Valley model consists of), has not been the result of 
VC policy diffusion. Instead of a neoliberal race to the bottom, states raced to intervene by giving 
VC-sector specific tax credits, to funding VC markets via FoVCFs, and giving money and residency 
to international VC managers for setting up operations locally. In this respect, competitive 
pressures did not undermine the state’s ability to direct economic activity. On the contrary, the need 
to attract funding seems to have transformed, or even expanded, the set of tools available to 
policymakers wanting to build local VC markets.  
 
But, does the interventionist adaptation of the Silicon Valley VC policy environment really 
represent greater state power vis-à-vis the market? While policymakers were found to have capacity 
to choose from a number of interventionist tools, the ability to choose amongst these tools does not 
necessarily mean that there has been an expansion of the state’s power vis-à-vis the market. I say 
this because states have been largely only endowed with the ability to deploy policies that please 
international capital holders, not to increase tax rates or impose more stringent regulations. To 
illustrate this point, none of the states examined in this thesis have increased the rate of tax they 
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charge for VC managers’ profits or operating revenues.  
 
With this said, in some cases, specifically Taiwan and Vietnam, policymakers have not lifted 
limits on the universe of eligible investors the VC asset class. In all states, policymakers were found 
to have resisted pressures to open VC investment regulations so that all investor types can allocate 
to VC funds as the ERISA reinterpretation had done for Silicon Valley in 1979. In addition, not all 
states have deployed the LP structure that is popular amongst international investors. However, 
even in these cases where some non-market friendly regulations have persisted, there have been 
efforts to appease local capital holders (e.g. Taiwan’s paper company structure gives investment 
decision-making power to investors, not VC managers) and start-up investment and exit 
environments have been increasingly opened (e.g. Vietnam’s increasing scope for private 
companies to operate). Therefore, overall policymakers’ VC policy tool set has consisted of pro-
market, not restrictive or redistributive, policies. In this way, there have been constraints on the 
interventionist VC policy choice sets as policymakers have mostly been limited to policies that give 
(or concede) money or greater openness to VC markets. Policymakers have gained in their ability to 
choose unique policies amongst a new, but restricted, universe of pro-market choices. As a result, 
my research found support for the argument that there has been a transformation of the state 
towards more of an economic actor (here an investor in the VC market), rather than an expanse or 
reduction in power. 
 
Finally, my fieldwork found that the level of interventionist policies has already been, and will 
increasingly be, undermined by processes of democratization in East Asia. In this way, in three 
cases, increased public scrutiny or political posturing has hampered or threatened the ability of 
policymakers to sustain their interventionist policy initiatives.
122
 These findings indicate that the 
                     
122 
This happened in both Hong Kong and Singapore, where policymakers were forced to wind down their FoVCFs in 
the mid-2000s. The winding down of both of their FoVCFs has been due to legislative branch budgetary power and 
public scrutiny, respectively. The discontinuation of tax credits in the Taiwanese case was found to have been caused by 
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state’s ability to allocate capital for sector-specific industrial policies, such as VC policy, has been 
undermined by increasing democratic input. Democratization, therefore, was found to impact the 
sustainability of interventionist industrial policies. However, FoVCFs and tax credits continue to be 
deployed and sustained in democratic states (e.g. the UK, Australia and the US). As such, I argue 
that the downward pressure on interventionist policies in this policy area is more due to the 
democratization process, than a steady democratic state. In this way, it does not appear to be a 
broader reflection of the impact of democracy on states’ abilities to deploy interventionist industrial 
policies. In steady-state democracies, it seems that their policymakers are not restricted as they have 
learned how to stand up to public scrutiny. As such, the democratization process may inhibit the 
sustainability of policymakers’ interventionist policies.  
 
10.3. Empirical Contributions 
 
In light of IPE literature’s lacuna on VC policy coverage, this thesis has empirically contributed 
to IPE scholarship by bringing in the VC policy area. This gap in literature had been surprising 
given the large sums of funding given to VC markets (e.g. Singapore’s and Russia’s USD 1 billion 
FoVCFs), the centrality of VC financing to national innovation systems (including Taiwan’s semi-
conductor industry) and the widespread occurrence of the Silicon Valley aspiration. The thesis first 
addressed this VC policy gap by identifying and categorizing the three primary VC policy elements: 
regulation, taxation and funding. The VC policy items were then conceptualized on an 
interventionist continuum ranging from low (neoliberal) to high (statist). In this conceptualization, 
regulatory policies constitute the “low”’ end, tax measures are at the “middle” of the spectrum, and 
FoVCFs are labeled as the “high” form of intervention. Establishing the interventionist nature of the 
VC policy elements helps to measure and compare each state’s VC policy choices, and their 
                                                                    
the change in government from the KMT to the DPP in 2000. As a reminder, Taiwan’s policy change came the first 
time any opposition party won office since Taiwan’s democratization in 1987. With the change in government came a 
change in political ideology away from private sector support. The Taiwanese DPP, once elected in 2000, brought with 
them new economic management norms that dictated that specific industry policies were unnecessary. As a result, all 
industry-specific tax credits, including the VC investor tax credit, were severed. 
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adaptations away from the Silicon Valley policy environment. 
 
My empirical work also contributed by detailing and categorizing the vague Silicon Valley 
policy environment and the subsequent, and more specific, Taiwanese and Israeli VC policy 
innovations. In this way, I detailed how Silicon Valley was the first VC policy item as it served as 
the target that policymakers aspired to replicate. In the course of my fieldwork, I found that 
policymakers also studied the VC policy innovations of other relevant, successful adopters: 
Taiwan’s 1983 tax credit and Israeli’s 1993 FoVCF. IPE, and broader academic research, had not 
previously identified the VC policy items in comparative terms.
123
 My conceptualizations of the VC 
policy items as the initial Silicon Valley source and the two subsequent policy innovations will 
contribute to future research projects that analyze the diffusion of VC policies globally.  
 
To the best of my knowledge, prior to my thesis, such an extensive dataset of VC policy choices 
had not yet been compiled. My original dataset details 46 countries’ VC policy efforts through 
2012. The large-N dataset was essential to conceptualizing the VC policy diffusion story – as 
through the compilation of the large-N dataset, I discovered that 41 countries adopted VC policies 
at different times using markedly different, and notably interventionist, policy tools. In addition to 
the value the large-N dataset contributed to framing this research project, it is a contribution to 
scholarly knowledge of VC policies as it is the first research project that details VC funding, 
taxation and regulatory policies in so many different states. In this way, my examination and 
categorization of VC policies across geographic regions offers a unique global snapshot of VC 
policy specifics, trends and differences.  
 
Another empirical contribution stems from my study’s investigations of the sources of VC 
                     
123
 This statement comes with a caveat that the Silicon Valley VC policy model and the Israeli FoVCF had been 
discussed in Josh Lerner (2009)’s Boulevard of Broken Dreams. Further, the Israeli Yozma model has been detailed and 
compared to Taiwan and the US in research projects conducted by Gil Avnimelech and Morris Teubal. However, these 
analyses were not done in the same sequential way, and therefore did not put the source model and innovations together 
as they have been organized in this thesis. 
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policies in East Asia. Prior to this thesis’ research, there had only been a handful of studies that 
detailed some VC policy choices in some of these cases (e.g. Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore’s 
VC policies through 2003 had only been covered in the Dietrich (2003) and Kenney et al (2002) 
studies). Furthermore, these existing East Asian VC policy studies did not explore the sources of 
the VC policy choices. Instead, they had summarized the VC policy efforts of each state through the 
early 2000s. In addition, Vietnam’s nascent VC policy discussions had not previously been covered 
in academic research.  
 
My empirical research revealed the roles of guanxi throughout East Asia when how Western 
models are diffused. The networks of industry professionals and policymakers that formed the 
different case studies’ guanxi were found to have transmitted and framed VC policy information 
differently. Guanxi mattered most in the more neoliberal states (Hong Kong and Taiwan), whereas 
public officials controlled much of the VC policy diffusion in bureaucratic Singapore. In Vietnam, 
guanxi – with returning nationals and foreign nationals – brought VC industry activity to Vietnam. 
However, official relations with donors have been the primary conduits by which VC policy 
information has been transmitted to Vietnamese policymakers.  
 
Finally, I found that the Japanese state plays a large role in contextualizing policies for East 
Asian states. In this way, Japan served as a local, peer model for East Asian policymakers as they 
work to understand and localize the Western policies they learn about. This was vividly illustrated 
in the Taiwanese case, as policymakers motivated to replicate the Silicon Valley model conducted a 
study trip to Japan at the same time, to learn more about the Japanese tax and regulatory 
environment (which they had inherited through their Japanese colonial legacy). Singapore, in its bid 
to be international investor friendly, offered a Japan-like company structure in addition to its local 
private company structure. In Vietnam, Japanese technical experts and donor funding had a marked 
impact on shaping the knowledge of Vietnam’s SME policymakers and their conceptualization of 
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SME financing. Moreover, the Japanese preference for credit instruments, and the deployment of 
SME funding in loan structures, propelled Vietnam’s local Silicon Valley aspirations to take the 
form of SME loans rather than equity investments. 
 
10.4. Future Research 
 
In the future, this thesis’ analytical framework can be applied to investigate the diffusion of 
other industrial policy areas as well as the drivers of VC policy choices in other regional clusters. 
Applying this domestic norm-focused framework to other industrial policy areas, or VC policies in 
other geographic areas, would help refine the framework’s ability to account for the drivers of 
diversity amongst convergence. In addition, by applying this framework to other policy areas, IPE 
scholars may uncover greater variance in diffusion outcomes than what internationally-focused, 
large-N frameworks have found to simply be convergence. Furthermore, applying this framework to 
other empirical areas will enable examinations of the domestic context in shaping policy diffusion, 
rather than seeing the domestic realm as only a binary receiver or rejecter of diffusion. To this end, 
empirical studies that leverage my domestic norm-focused diffusion framework can further sharpen 
IPE scholars’ understanding of the localization that occurs in the policy diffusion process. 
 
The empirical research carried out in this thesis detailed the drivers of VC policy choices, but 
did not connect the various VC policy formulae to differences in VC market performance. Said 
another way, the focus here has been on explaining VC policy choices, not policy outputs (e.g. why 
VC activity has been more robust in Taiwan than in Singapore). Future empirical research on the 
VC policy area is needed to examine the impact of specific VC policy choices on domestic VC 
markets’ performance. Such research would focus on whether tax credits, regulatory frameworks or 
FoVCFs drive higher levels of VC fundraising, deal flow, etc. The results of such a study would be 
helpful in providing policymakers with more information about the outputs of their VC policy 
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choices. To date, assessments of the direct impact of VC policies on VC market activities have not 
been carried out across a broad range of states (with the notable exception of Josh Lerner’s (2009) 
narrative about what can be learned from failed policy attempts at supporting VC markets).  
 
Finally, my next research project will delve more deeply into the impact of democratization on 
industrial policymaking in East Asia. This work will be an extension of my finding that 
democratization was an inhibitor to the use and sustainability of the FoVCF and tax elements. As 
politicization and democratization grew in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, policymakers had to 
discontinue tax credits and FoVCFs, respectively. Further examination of the precise mechanism by 
which democratic trends undermined the use of interventionist industrial policy can provide 
valuable insights into the future of the developmental state as well as the particular forms of state-
industry relations in East Asia. My further investigation of the impact of democratization will be 
relevant for scholars working on industrial policy issues, regardless of the region. 
 
10.5. Conclusion 
 
To conclude, this thesis extends existing IPE research programs to explain diversity amongst 
convergent trends in a previously unexamined empirical area. It uncovered why what should be a 
textbook case of universal convergence had a surprise ending. In doing so, this thesis speaks to a 
broader IPE audience as my theoretical tools help account for how and why diffusion leads to 
varying degrees of convergence, even when competition and learning transmitted a clear source 
model. Scholars interested in advancing arguments about domestic agents being more than a mere 
receiver of diffusion may build upon my conceptualization of the impact of policymakers’ 
economic management norms in the bounded learning process. My work can be applied to reveal 
how, even in the face of competitive pressures and the widespread studying of a successful strategy, 
as policies diffuse, “all politics is local.”   
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Annex I: Excerpt from Large-N VC Policy Dataset 
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Annex II: Large-N Dataset Summary for FoVCFs 
 
# Country Name  
Year of 
Establishment 
AuM 
Region / 
Cluster 
1 United States 
Massachusetts Technology 
Development Corporation 
(MTDC) 
1978 
USD 2 M 
initially 
Americas 
2 
Taiwan (Republic 
of China) 
National Development Fund 1985 
up to USD 
100 M 
Asia 
3 France 
Fondinvest Capital and CDC 
Enterprise 
1988 EUR 624 M Europe 
4 Denmark Vækstfonden 1992 
DKK 3.8 
billion 
Europe 
5 Ireland Enterprise Ireland 1993 EUR 250 M Europe 
6 Israel Yozma 1993 USD 100 M Europe 
7 Argentina 
Multi-lateral Investment Fund 
(Inter-American Development 
Bank) 
1993 USD 2.2 bn 
Latin 
America 
8 Chile 
Multi-lateral Investment Fund 
(Inter-American Development 
Bank) 
1993 USD 2.2 bn 
Latin 
America 
9 Mexico 
Multi-lateral Investment Fund 
(Inter-American Development 
Bank) 
1993 USD 2.2 bn 
Latin 
America 
10 Canada 
BC Renaissance Fund, Alberta 
Enterprise Corporation, Alberta 
IAVC Capacity Builder, BDC 
Fund of Funds 
1994 ~CAD 25 B 
North 
America 
11 Finland FII; FoF Growth 1995 EUR 685M Europe 
12 Sweden The Sixth AP Fund 1996 SEK 10 B Europe 
13 Australia Innovation Investment Fund  1998 
AUD 20M 
each 
Asia  
14 Korea 
Small and Medium Business 
Fund 
1998 N/A Asia 
15 Singapore 
Technopreneurship Investment 
Fund (TIF) 
1999 
USD 1 
billion 
Asia 
16 Hong Kong ARF II (Privately managed) 1999 
less than 
USD 100 M 
Asia 
17 United Kingdom UK High Tech Fund 2000 GBP 1 B Europe 
18 Belgium 
Participatiemaatschappij 
Vlaanderen NV 
2001 
900+ 
million 
Europe 
19 Greece TANEO 2001 EUR 150 M Europe 
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20 Hungary 
Development Capital 
Programme 
2002 
45 billion 
HUF Europe 
21 New Zealand 
New Zealand Venture 
Investment Fund (NZVIF) 
2002 NZD 200 M Asia 
22 Norway Argentum  2002 NOK 6 B Europe 
23 Netherlands TechnoPartner 2005 EUR 11 M Europe 
24 Poland National Capital Fund 2005 
PLN 65,86 
M 
Europe 
25 Russia Russian Venture Capital Fund 2006 
USD 1 
billion 
Europe 
26 Austria Not available 2007 
Not 
available 
Europe 
27 Brazil Finep 2007 USD 158 M 
Latin 
America 
28 Portugal 
Portugal Venture Capital 
Initiative (PVCI)   
2007 EUR 111 M Europe 
29 Turkey 
Istanbul Venture Capital 
Initiative (iVCi) 
2007 EUR 160 M 
Europe 
30 China 
National initiative with local 
funds 
2008 
USD 1 
billion 
Asia 
31 Slovenia Slovene Enterprise Fund  2010 EUR 189 M Europe 
32 Czech Republic 
Operational Programme 
Enterprise and Innovations 
(oversight by MIT) 
2011 ? Europe 
33 Italy Italian Innovation Fund 2011 
Undergoing 
discussions 
Europe 
34 Estonia N/A N/A N/A Europe 
35 Germany 
N/A - Germany's 1975 Deutsche 
Wagnisfinanzierungsgesellschaft 
(WFG) was a direct VC fund 
N/A N/A Europe 
36 Iceland N/A N/A N/A Europe 
37 India N/A N/A N/A Asia 
38 Indonesia N/A N/A N/A Asia 
39 Japan N/A N/A N/A Asia 
40 Luxembourg N/A N/A N/A Europe 
41 Slovak Republic N/A N/A N/A Europe 
42 South Africa N/A N/A N/A Africa 
43 Spain N/A N/A N/A Europe 
44 Switzerland N/A N/A N/A Europe 
45 Saudi Arabia N/A N/A N/A 
Middle 
East 
46 Vietnam N/A N/A N/A Asia 
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Annex III: List of Interviews 
 
6 January 2011, Israeli Minister of Commercial Affairs in the United Kingdom, London, UK. 
19 January 2011, Founder of a Singapore-based early-stage investment management firm, 
Videoconference. 
18 March 2011, Director, European Venture Capital Association, Brussels, Belgium. 
26 June 2011, Teleconference with a former associate at a Vietnamese VC management firm. 
20 December 2011, Head of Hong Kong Science & Technology Parks, Hong Kong. 
20 December 2011, Manager in a Vietnam-focused VC fund, Hong Kong. 
20 December 2011, Head of Data for the Asian Venture Capital Journal, Hong Kong. 
21 December  2011, Senior Manager for the Hong Kong Innovation and Technology  
Commission Technopreneur Funding Schemes, Hong Kong. 
3 January 2012, Executive Director, HK Venture Capital & Private Equity Association, Hong 
 Kong. 
5 January 2012, General Secretary of the Taiwan Venture Capital Association, Taipei City, Taiwan. 
5 January 2012, Manager, Committee of Communications Industry Development Office of MoEA’s 
 Institute for Information Industry, Taipei City, Taiwan. 
5 January 2012, Planner at Institute for Information Industry and Curator of Start-up Digest, Taipei 
 City, Taiwan. 
6 January 2012, Angel fund investor, Taipei City, Taiwan. 
6 January 2012, Chairman of the KT Li Institute for Digital Information (and colleague of K.T. Li), 
 Taipei City, Taiwan. 
6 January 2012, Senior Specialist, CEPD Department of Economic Research, Taipei City, Taiwan. 
18 August 2012, Associate in Strategy Consulting Firm focused on advising Vietnamese financial 
services companies, Hanoi. 
20 August 2012, Deputy Director in Vietnam’s Ministry of Industry and Trade’s Trade Promotion 
Agency, Hanoi. 
20 August 2012, Projects Coordinator in External Communications and Relations Department of 
Vietnam’s Ministry of Industry and Trade’s Trade Promotion Agency, Hanoi. 
21 August 2012, International Coordination Division Manager in Agency for SME Development of 
Vietnam’s Ministry of Planning and Investment, Hanoi. 
21 August 2012, Agency for SME Development Finance Programs Manager, Vietnam’s Ministry of 
Planning and Investment, Hanoi. 
22 August 2012, Managing Partner and Founder of a Vietnam-based PE/VC management firm, Ho 
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Chi Minh City. 
23 August 2012, SME Association Founder and World Bank Advisor, Ho Chi Minh City. 
23 August 2012, Director of Vietnamese fund management firm, Ho Chi Minh City. 
24 August 2012, Managing Director of business angel investment firm, Ho Chi Minh City. 
24 August 2012, Managing Director of Vietnamese VC management firm, Ho Chi Minh City. 
5 September 2012, Head of Policy Southeast Asia for a technology MNC, Singapore. 
11 September 2012, Associate Professor, National University of Singapore, Singapore. 
12 September 2012, Former manager of the TIF from 1999 until 2005, and member of the 
Technopreneurship 21 Ministerial Committee, Singapore. 
12 September 2012, Singapore Venture Capital Association member, Singapore. 
13 September 2012, Country Policy Head for technology MNC, Singapore. 
13 September 2012, Singapore-based entrepreneur and former civil servant, Singapore. 
16 September 2012, Founder of incubator and private sector contributor to National Research 
 Foundation, Singapore. 
17 September 2012, VC Manager and member of SVCA leadership, Singapore. 
18 September 2012, Founder of Singaporean incubator supported by government funding, 
 Singapore. 
18 September 2012, Journalist focused on reporting entrepreneurship and VC news and manager  
 of a government-sponsored incubator, Singapore. 
18 September 2012, Director of Singaporean university enterprise support center, Singapore. 
19 September 2012, Confidential Government ministerial ICT policy panel meeting, Singapore. 
20 September 2012, VC manager and former civil servant, Singapore. 
20 September 2012, Head of Entrepreneurship Promotion, SPRING, Singapore.  
20 September 2012, Head of SME Healthcare & Biomedical Programs, SPRING,  
 Singapore. 
24 September 2012, APEC Small & Medium Enterprise Working Group Director, Singapore. 
25 September 2012, A*STAR Deputy Director of Planning & Policy, Singapore. 
25 September 2012, A*STAR Head of Planning & Policy, Singapore. 
25 September 2012, CEO of Singapore-incorporated media start-up company, Singapore. 
20 May 2013, ASMED Manager, email exchange. 
6 October 2013, Founder and Manager of The Yozma Group, Tel Aviv.  
